



His Youth • His Marriages • His Blood Purges
The Men Who Want His Head

—WHAT RUSSIA'S NEW RULER MEANS TO YOU

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MALENKOV

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THE FIRST FULL-LENGTH LIFE STORY

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The publishers of Lion Books commissioned Robert Frazier, writer, researcher, and authority on Soviet affairs, to prepare a full-length story on Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov *as quickly as was humanly possible*.

The publishers felt it was urgent to release the book *now* so that every American man, woman, and child could *immediately* know the truth about Russia's new ruler.

Of equally great significance are the fact-steeped, documented chapters which detail, *in many instances for the first time anywhere*, the full story of the Russian government, the makeup of Malenkov's Presidium, the inner struggles for power, the rise of anti-Semitism, the Soviet attitude on sex and the family, and Malenkov's stand on war and peace.

The Lion edition of *Malenkov* is, we feel, the truly important story of 1953.



Malenkov is a completely new book, prepared exclusively for Lion Books, Inc. It has never appeared before, in any form, at any price.

Robert Frazier

MALENKOV

LION BOOKS, INC.

270 Park Avenue

New York City

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Lion edition published

April, 1953

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CONTENTS

Part I

I	BIRTH OF A BUREAUCRAT: 1902-1917	9
II	THE EARLY PARTY YEARS: 1917-1921.	25
III	BEHIND EVERY MAN . . . THE WOMAN: 1922-1925	29
IV	ON STALIN'S KNEE: 1925-1933	33
V	THE BLOOD COUNT RISES: 1934-1939.	38
VI	WAR YEARS: 1940-1946	42
VII	THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: 1946- 1949	46
VIII	END AND THE BEGINNING: 1950-1953	50
IX	WHAT MAKES MALENKOV RUN: A Psychological Profile	55

Part II

X	INSIDE MALENKOV'S RUSSIA	65
XI	MALENKOV AND ANTI-SEMITISM	75
XII	MALENKOV AND SEX	88
XIII	RULER OF $\frac{1}{6}$ THE EARTH . . . $\frac{1}{3}$ ITS PEOPLE	97
XIV	MALENKOV'S HATCHET MAN: BERIA	107
XV	MALENKOV'S ELDER STATESMAN: MOLOTOV	123
XVI	MALENKOV'S GENERALS	137

Part III

XVII	WHAT'S AHEAD NOW?	147
XVIII	WAR OR PEACE?	154

To
Mother and Dad

who have been my inspiration



and with thanks to

Fran

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

Birth of a Bureaucrat: 1902-1917

WHAT KIND OF MAN is Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov? How did he rise to his present position as the world's most important figure? Will he bring war or peace?

He is, in actual fact, and without arousing the rancor of the most patriotic of Americans (or Frenchmen or Englishmen), the most powerful man in the world. Not because he has inherited an empire far in excess of that of the fierce Mongol, Genghis Khan, whose dream of conquering the world had almost succeeded. Not because he rules more of the earth's surface than any man before him except Stalin. Not because he can call upon great military might and great partisan loyalties from fanatic satellite nations.

Not because of any of these is Malenkov more powerful than Eisenhower, more to be watched than Churchill or Chiang or Mao or Nehru.

Malenkov's power lies in his fingertips, not in the sprawling thousands of square miles and millions of people under him. He can, with a flick of his finger, call off a war in Korea, promote a revolution in French Indo-China, make peaceful overtures to the United States, instigate strikes in Hamburg and Paris, change governments overnight in Czechoslovakia. Any of these he can do. All of them he may do.

That is his power.

But it is also our enigma.

Ruler of one-sixth of the earth's surface; one-third of the world's population; commander-in-chief of an army of 11,000,000 men; keeper of ten to fifteen million slave laborers; custodian of an A-bomb and perhaps an H-bomb stockpile; chairman of the Council of Ministers of

the U.S.S.R.; First Chairman of the Soviet Communist Party; inheritor of an empire which has engulfed nearly 600 million humans in China, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Korea; a land of 14,242,000 squares mile; ideological string-puller for thousands of political adherents all over the world; successor of Josef Vissarionovich Stalin—this is Malenkov, cunning, calculating tyrant who maintains power over an estimated 800,000,000 people. Great human question mark, Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov, upon whom may rest the doom or survival of civilization.

Who is he? Where did he come from?

Indications are that his physical repugnance is more a reflection of what appears to be a malevolent character than actual defects of feature. Squat, round-faced and pudgy, with an enormous head topping 250 pounds of pastry-fed fat poured into a five-foot-seven-inch frame, his heavy jowls crease around a tense mouth to a set of double chins. Small Slavic features which ordinarily make for sensitivity serve instead to give him a grim, unyielding, deadpan expression. His narrow, sharply upturned nose, jet black hair, black eyebrows, cold steel-blue eyes and thin compressed lips are concentrated toward the center of his face, leaving wide, featureless areas to stare at. His eyebrows curve up at the ends as if made up for the role of Mephistopheles, traditional evil figure of the devil. Prototype of the cartoon capitalist, which the Communists are so fond of portraying in dark, well-cut business suit, with starched cuffs over pudgy hands and a diamond ring or stickpin, he deviates from this caricature only in that he wears the uniform of a plain soldier in the Soviet Army, in imitation of the late Stalin. A spare military tunic, buttoned up to the neck, and a shapeless, grey, visored cap give him the appearance of a plump rich boy who has just joined a gang of dead end kids to prove he isn't a sissy. He looks like the fascist, Farouk, except not quite as ugly. Iron-fisted and scowling, he

tends to go into maniacal rages when crossed. He is an unattractive figure assuredly. Yet, this is the titular head of a vast empire, a man now able to commandeer staggering resources.

Of Malenkov's personal life little is known. He was married twice. In 1940, he divorced his first wife, Valeria (Lera) Galoubtsova, one of Molotov's secretaries, a plump, attractive blonde (on whose shoulders he obtained his first boost to party eminence), to marry the attractive actress, Elena Khrushchev. Elena quit the stage and was said to have taken an administrative job in the Moscow University. She is also described as wearing expensive clothes, mannishly tailored and riding about in a long black Zis limousine, the equivalent of a Packard. The Malenkovs have a teen-aged son and daughter who live with them in their Kremlin apartment and their country retreat outside of Moscow. No lion socially, Malenkov smokes expensive (Northern Palmyras) cigarettes, has a *dacha* (summer home) like all Kremlin bureaucrats outside of Moscow to which he commutes by bulletproof limousine. His only sport is duck-hunting.

He is said to be a tireless worker who can work for days with only occasional naps. The present Mrs. Malenkov, seemingly bored by her husband's late hours, has sought relief by becoming an actress again. She obtained a job at a Moscow little theater group by giving a false name. Her co-workers wondered about her fine clothes and the fact that a car and chauffeur often picked her up after the performance. But she chose to remain anonymous until the day one of her colleagues got into trouble with the MVD over some ideological impurity in a pamphlet he had written. The obliging Mrs. Malenkov told them who she was and arranged for the man to go to see her husband. The actor found Malenkov in a box in Moscow's Bolshoi Theater drinking tea and eating French pastry. The actor reported, "He didn't offer me any pastry, but he said: 'My wife has told me everything; it is all pure nonsense. Come to see me tomorrow at the Central Committee.' "

Occasionally, Mrs. Malenkov's colleagues got an intimate view of her home life. "One morning," recalls one of the cast, "Mrs. Malenkov came in and told me she hadn't slept a wink all night because her husband had a toothache and the dentist came in with all his machines to fix his teeth."

An observation of him made by one diplomatic visitor at a Moscow dinner at a time when Americans were beginning to recognize his pudgy, petulant face in official Soviet photographs, next to Stalin's relatively benign, leonine mask, indicated that Malenkov was apparently oblivious to what was going on around him at the table. "When toasts were made, he would lift his glass automatically, then relapse into sneering silence." Said another, "I would hate to be at the mercy of that man."

No American has ever had more than a word or two with him. His only trips out of Russia were to attend Cominform meetings in Poland and Romania and to represent the Russian Party at a Czechoslovak Party Congress in Prague. These excursions into Eastern Europe were designed to keep the satellites in line—in particular to press the extirpation of the Titoist heresy. This was part of the general policy of consolidation. Malenkov, since the death of his rival, A. A. Zhdanov, had been the chief scourge of Titoism.

As a Marxist theoretician, Malenkov does not rate high, but he is a prodigious orator and can out-talk practically any of his colleagues. At the Communist Congress last October he spoke for five hours and ten minutes.

What Malenkov lacks to be a Kremlin leader is a glamorous personality, which the Soviet press may supply in time.

Six specialists of internal medicine from Nashville, Tennessee, agree that Premier Georgi Malenkov would be a poor insurance risk even outside the purge-haunted Kremlin. He may be suffering from a heart or glandular ailment, which, incidentally, seems to be a rather common type of ailment among Soviet higher officials. Stalin

is reported to have had a heart ailment since early youth and his survival to the age of 73 is testament to the excellent medical care he received. Various Russian delegates of the U.N. have remarked at one time or another that their hearts were bad. Probably the rich foods containing a high degree of animal fats which they can afford to indulge in are responsible for much of the hardening of Soviet arteries. Malenkov has a passion for French pastry, cream puffs especially, and he has been warned about his arterial setup.

Dr. William Scott is of the following opinion: "He doesn't look unlike people with Cushing's disease. It is a disease of the adrenal glands and results in high blood pressure and obesity. He is liable to blow a fuse under pressure."

Dr. Amos Christie said, "I thought he might have a glandular disturbance. Things flash through your mind like that when you see a picture." While Dr. J. Harvill Hite states, "Life insurance statistics indicate men with too much weight do not have as great a life expectancy as men with average weight. He may be a cardiac."

Actually, the symptom of overweight has many interpretations. Some psychiatrists believe that it signifies a desire for protection, the bulk serving as a sort of fortification against the dangers of the outside world. As a matter of fact, pictures which were taken in 1937, shows him to be much slimmer, weighing perhaps 180 to 190 pounds. Presumably, he was even thinner years earlier to have attracted his talented first wife, and even to have served with Red Army units. His weight seems to have aggregated with his aggregation of power. There are other psychiatric definitions of the syndrome of obesity. Of particular significance is the fact that some obese people deliberately take on weight in hopes of rendering themselves unattractive. Apparently, as in all his other ambitions, Malenkov has been successful in achieving this. The popular concept of fat men is that they are jovial and expansive, but Malenkov's reputation with the dip-

lomatic corps is to the contrary. Envoys described him as stiff and forbidding, one who has rarely been seen to smile.

Of the anecdotes and descriptions of Georgi Malenkov, few, if any, throw a kindly or humane light on his character. He is described as a man without pity or remorse, able to sleep better at night if during the day he has removed an enemy from his path. Wily, competent, ruthless and humorless, Malenkov, with his deadpan face, his ability to dog the heels of Stalin and survive a succession of bloody purges, has forced the Western world to regard him as a Stalinoid Neanderthal machine man that Koestler dramatized in his novel, *Darkness At Noon*.

A western diplomat said recently: "If I knew I had to be tortured, and if I were picking people from the Politburo to do the torturing, the last one I would pick would be Malenkov."

Most political analysts consider him the epitome of the successful man in modern bureaucratic totalitarianism—an individual who has no qualm at betraying today his benefactor of yesterday and who can produce results at all costs.

The consensus is that before long the Russian people will yearn for the good old days of Stalin, "the benign." He is reported to have a machine mentality and a machine tirelessness powered by an inordinate appetite. By building methodically and ruthlessly the best political machine of all his colleagues in the Politburo, he alone was in a position to slip into Stalin's role.

Actually, an attempt to characterize him as an automaton may not be completely accurate. Very little attention was paid to him by foreign visitors except for the occasional observer who glimpsed with a shudder the dangerous closeness of this implacable hulk to the omnipotent Stalin.

Foreign visitors who saw him at Soviet State dinners, long before there was any but a glimmering possibility that he might succeed Stalin as ruler of the vast real estate project that is Russia and her satellite states, refer

to him as "sinister," "not a man anyone would choose to sit next to at dinner," "grim," "dull," "humorless," "inscrutable," "cruel," "implacable."

A report from *Time*, on October 6, 1952, describes, "His cheeks as flabby, his chin as double, his eyes as hard as carborundum. . . . His stiff black hair looks as if it has been pasted on. He does not attempt to make himself agreeable. Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov is not what anyone could describe as a cuddly personality."

A prominent diplomatic visitor who once met him at a Moscow dinner says:

"My most vivid memory is the sight of Malenkov. It was the most sinister thing in the Soviet Union. I was struck by his repulsive appearance, bulbous, flabby and sallow."

W. Averell Harriman, who visited Russia in September, 1941, when the first of his special missions began, and thereafter was ambassador to the Kremlin until January, 1942, says of Malenkov whom he met a number of times at Kremlin banquets and other official functions, "He usually arrived and sat with Beria, with whom he appeared to be on friendly terms. He seemed to take very little interest in the foreign officials who were present and was generally uncommunicative. . . . He impressed me as a man of rather narrow outlook, lacking the personality of a great leader."

Actually Malenkov was said to incorporate and augment the worst features of Stalin just as Stalin augmented the worst features of Lenin. Stalin became adept at machine politics first as a consequence of conviction and by the desire to propagate his own ideals. Later he became a skillful manipulator of the purge in order to stay in power.

Malenkov became a machine politician because it was the only way to progress as a second generation Bolshevik, and a skillful manipulator of the purge in order to serve his master well. Now, like a snarling wolf who has fanged his way to the top of his pack, Malenkov

must defend his flanks. His elevation to the Prime Ministership is only the beginning. He must first consolidate his power—inside Russia and throughout the Red realm.

Actually he is the first ruler of any country in any time who was a professional informer and spy throughout his career. However, after having correlated all the information and facts on his life, it is apparent that the hasty opinions drawn about the man merely skim the surface and tend, perhaps, to distort a bit some of the salient features of his personality.

It is well to establish certain basic facts now known about Malenkov before the Soviet propaganda machine gets to work in the creation of a Malenkov myth, in the same manner, perhaps, as it created a legend and myth, utterly fantastic, about the figure of Stalin. Malenkov is a man who wasted little time on making impressions where none was needed, where, indeed, favorable ones might be dangerous. He was content to operate in the shadows of filing cabinets—knowing full well that endearing qualities had little to do with the attainment of power and safety in the USSR. For success, the younger Soviet bureaucrat had to cultivate useful traits, useful friends, and useful files.

It was only the loyal and innocuous cronies of his revolutionary days that Stalin kept in service, despite ineptitude, inefficiency and bungling—a Molotov whose doglike loyalty and affection has enabled him to live to the ripe old age of 62, surviving the leader himself. Voroshilov, described as the “worst general in the Soviet Union,” was Stalin’s drinking companion. But while these stayed in the protective orbit of Stalin by ties of nostalgia, younger men without the personal associations of the older bureaucrats had to plan, make themselves useful, work ceaselessly, build machines, and battle it out to the death with one another for succession and safety. Only the ablest, most ruthless, most tireless, most shrewd, stayed afloat in the sea of intrigue that swirled about the Kremlin bureaucracy since Stalin’s ascension in 1927.

For Malenkov, there was little enough time and purpose to become a social charmer. He was not going to compete in areas he had no need to. His was the stripped-down utilitarian personality.

Actually, because Malenkov worked behind the scenes, his personality has not been properly or adequately appraised, nor have his abilities. Malenkov has played a greater and more crucial role in recent Russian history than is generally known. He has exerted more of an influence on Soviet external and internal policies since World War II than any other single man in Russia except the late Josef Stalin. The very possession of so disagreeable a personality as he is purported to have is a luxury only the strong can afford. Georgi may have occupied a position of relative power for a long time, and although not widely-traveled, may not be the provincial tyro his surly, anti-social manner would indicate.

Why was this dehumanized personality chosen to succeed Stalin?

Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov was born on Jan. 5, 1902, in the one time frontier town of Orenburg situated in the Eastern foothills of the central Urals where Europe ends and Asia begins. His father, Captain Maximilian Malenkov, was a Czarist Cossack officer known as the *Butcher of Orenburg* because of the sadistic enthusiasm with which he persecuted and slaughtered Jews.

Orenburg, now called Chkalov, is a fast-growing industrial village of 75,000 located on the banks of the Ural River which flows down from the mountains south to the Caspian Sea, a key location in a picturesque, rugged part of a vast country. To the west, the nearby Samara River flows across the broad steppes to the Volga. It must have been thrilling for young Malenkov to hike in the Urals, which was his habit, and from this majestic chain he may have been inspired to his first sense of power and thirst for achievement. The Urals is a mountain system, forming the traditional boundary between Europe and Asia. This rugged system extends 1300 miles

north and south from the Arctic Ocean to the westward bend of the Ural River a stretch so long, it is commonly divided into North Urals, Central Urals, and South Urals. The northern section, a rocky, treeless chain, rising from the tundra, has the highest peaks of the entire system. If one draws inspiration from one's environment, then it is little wonder that Georgi, at an early age, evidenced such titanic ambitions. His lonely wanderings in the bleak and strong mountains, the same which today shield most of Soviet vital industry, provided the basic background for his personality—serious, dour, inscrutable with a profound nationalistic sense of boundary and the need to be shielded from the outside world. To the east the great Ural mountain range meant to Russia what the Alleghenies meant to colonial America. In the same way that American pioneers crossed the Alleghenies, Russian explorers, trappers, farmers, and soldiers crossed the Urals—bound across the snow-packed tundras of Siberia for the golden Pacific.

The town of Orenburg, while not the gateway to Siberia, had been for most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the chief Russian outpost for the conquest of the southern Khanates of Turkestan. Beyond its streets and settlements were wild, unlettered tribes—Uzbeks, Khirgizes, Turkomans—slowly retreating year after year before the steady advance of the Russian frontiersmen, the Cossacks.

Maximilian Malenkov, Gorgi's father, was one of those Cossacks. Although the Cossack had come to represent a brutal, repressive Czarist emissary to the Russian peasants and workers in later revolt, it did not mean that a Cossack actually belonged to a social class; rather it was a way of life built up over many generations. It had its roots in the very earliest sproutings of Russian history, when the Tartar hold over Russia was broken some two centuries before Columbus discovered America. It was then the Russian Grand Dukes were determined to push the Mongol horde back to the deepest recesses of Asia,

from whence they originally swarmed. This was not only a military operation, but required colonists to settle the newly-won land—people who were ready and able to defend the soil on which they had settled. The Grand Dukes, who later became Czars, were also faced with the problem of what to do with thousands of landless peasants and former anti-Tartar soldiers. As a solution to both problems they offered arms and land to the peasants and soldiers to go and settle the Tartar lands—as far as they could reach. The settlers traveled in tightly-knit groups—for protection—and worked their settlements as part farms, part military-outposts. Land was shared and the pioneers rotated agricultural chores with military duties, somewhat like our original colonists. These Russian “Indian-fighters” became known as Cossacks; they slowly spread from the Volga River in the heart of European Russia proper, through to Astrakhan and Bokhara in Central Asia, and reached the banks of the Black and Caspian Seas. Shortly before our own war of Independence, Cossacks also settled at the Crimean shores near Yalta and, at about that time also, a bold Cossack named Yermak led a group of men across the Ural Mountains into Siberia.

Because the Czars had given them land and horses, the Cossacks were loyal supporters of the government throughout most of their existence. Only once—during the reign of Catherine the Great—had they turned against Moscow. It was a period of widespread famine. A Cossack named Pugachev started a revolution that swept like wildfire across half of Russia. His marching bands of Cossacks, bolstered along the route by landless, starving peasants, were met in force by the Empress’s favorite General, Potemkin, and defeated. Pugachev himself was captured, led through Moscow in a cage, and cruelly put to death.

Since the defeat of Pugachev, the Cossacks stayed faithful to the Czars and after the wars of Napoleon when Russia began to modernize her armed forces, the Cossack

cavalrymen became the backbone of the armies. They were not only used in wars against other nations, but within Russia itself served as a sort of militia, suppressing local revolts and keeping order throughout the land. Cossacks in traditional garb, dashing from place to place on galloping horses, singing martial songs, became familiar sights in every city and town. The symbol of Cossack became one with tyranny and repression where people rose up against the government because of hunger and famine. Their merriment and song were baleful preludes to hostile and oppressed peasants—from whom periodically the mutterings of revolt were heard. They were the roving policemen of the Czar with a long record of cruelty, often wanton, with the status of an independent, privileged oppressing class.

From such a lineage stems Malenkov, a background which in Soviet circles was not considered advantageous. Even when Orenburg became industrialized in the early 19th century, Maximilian Malenkov was a Cossack, and apparently one with a rare reputation for nastiness. It is interesting to note that both Stalin and Malenkov had cruel fathers, a fact which might well have determined their future lives and shaped the course of history. Stalin's father beat him mercilessly. The grim patriarchal middle class existence may have conditioned Malenkov to accept an authoritarian mode of existence. Only fifteen years of age at the time of the 1917 Revolution in Russia, he became perfect material for the desensitized type that flourished about Stalin in the later years.

Lazar Pistrak is one of many trained observers who have noted that almost half of the people in Orenburg, Malenkov's home town, were petty bourgeois at the turn of the century, and an additional 30 per cent were military. "Malenkov's father's name, Maximilian, is quite literary; the common Russian name is Maxim. So is his own name, Georgi; the more common form is Yuri. Malenkov himself has made several public speeches decrying 'investigations into genealogy' and the bothering

of the faithful party worker with 'searches of who was his grandfather and grandmother.' " He was blistering about people who justified their incompetence by proving that they were of true proletarian origin for three or four generations.

Malenkov's Cossack parentage may also explain his ruthlessness, his willingness to serve the government as an informer and policeman, his cruelty, nationalism, toughness. Certainly the example of his father's harsh behavior could not have served to shape the present premier of Russia along gentle molds. Whether he accepted his father as an authority or rejected him—the end result of character would be the same.

By the time the nineteenth century drew to a close, Orenburg had become principally a community of small tradesmen, with about a third of its population Cossacks. The town's strategic position on the Ural River made it inevitable that it become a trading center. Most of the peasant-soldiers abandoned their military activities to take advantage of trading opportunities. The frontier had since moved far east into Siberia, and south into Turkestan, and the development of frontiers followed a pattern similar to that of the early U.S. colonists, except that the original American settlers were not soldiers primarily, took up arms only in self-defense and abandoned military duties when the need was over.

Russian literature long reflects the conflict between eastern mysticism and western rationalism and the spiritual and physical fear of the Russian people of contact with the West. While Malenkov reflects the deeply ingrained prejudices against Western civilization, he has also shown a healthy respect, healthier probably than anyone else in the Politburo, as will be demonstrated, for technology and technological advances, stressing the need for industrial efficiency and progress perhaps even more than Stalin did himself.

This, too, had its roots in Georgi's early environment, for long before his birth, back to the time when his father Maximilian was growing up, Russian engineers were al-

ready working on their greatest achievement, the Trans-Siberian railroad, and an almost equally important spur, the Orenburg-Tashkent line into Turkestan.

The decades before Georgi Malenkov was born were full of still other important changes—throughout Russia the early strivings for democratic government started to manifest themselves. It began in 1825 with a plot by Army officers to create a constitutional government and grew to a revolutionary movement of vast proportions. In 1881, a group of idealistic revolutionaries who had thrice demanded that Czar Alexander II grant the people a constitution, assassinated him. His successor, Alexander III, sentenced the chief conspirators to death and most of the others to Siberia. But despite the other repressive measures taken by the Czar, the battle against absolute monarchy continued. Local peasant organizations developed to provide peasants with education and medical care, humane labor laws came into being, trial by jury was universal. Although there were a handful of illegal revolutionists who threatened assassination (many of these were sent to Siberia), they were not the real threats to the old order.

It was the young men of aristocratic origins who dedicated themselves to the spread of literacy and enlightenment among the peasants; business men and landowners who as a result of increasingly greater contact with Western Europe had begun pressing, through the legal press.

Perhaps the best example of the contrast between the old medieval Russia that was dying away and the new spirit that was being born was the Bejlis Trial, which took place when Georgi Malenkov was still a tot. A Jew in the city of Kiev was accused of killing a Christian boy, so the charge went, in order to obtain his blood for a religious service. In any other country, at that time, such a charge would be unthinkable. But some of the Czar's advisors felt they could get the minds of the people off their problems by stirring up hatred against the Jews, which occurred periodically in the well known "pogroms." Nevertheless, the defendant was entitled to a trial by

jury and got one. The jury was composed entirely of Russian and Ukrainian peasants, most of them illiterate, few of whom had ever known anything about the Jewish religion. The enlightened leaders of Russian opinion sprang to the defense of Bejlis, however, and despite all efforts of the Czar's advisors, Bejlis was unanimously acquitted by the jury. All over Russia, the verdict was hailed as a triumph of progress over the forces of darkness.

Georgi Malenkov was three when Russia's first big revolution broke out in the twin capitals of Petrograd and Moscow. His father, as a Cossack subaltern, would probably have supported the Czar if a test had come, but this 1905 revolution was settled in the big cities and when it was over, the Czar had granted a limited constitution. He reneged on many parts of his manifesto later, but for the first time Russia had a nationally elected Parliament, called the Duma, which, throughout its existence from 1906 to 1917, continually pressed for reforms. Three times the Czar dissolved the Duma, or arrested its deputies, or changed the election laws, and even though he managed to reduce the number of open anti-Czarists, he could not curb the rising demand for reform.

By the time young Georgi was attending grade school, the countryside around Orenburg and other Russian towns was witnessing a vast change—a change instigated by one of Nicholas's most reactionary but far-sighted advisers, Peter Stolypin. Communities which owned land in common—like the Cossack community where Maximilian Malenkov lived with his wife and son, Georgi—were encouraged to break up their land into individual farms. If there was not enough to go around, Stolypin promised government aid in resettling the farmers on land of their own in Siberia and Central Asia; dams and reclamation projects were begun in dry areas to make new land for peasants who wanted plots of their own.

For the most part, things were gradually improving for Maximilian Malenkov—and other Russians—when World War I broke out. But even though the fighting was a thousand miles away, Orenburg soon began to feel its ef-

fects. First men, then boys, were called off to war, first with weapons, then without. As the Germans moved into Western Russia, food shortages became more and more acute. With the able-bodied farmers all in the army, the crop declined under the unexperienced hands of women, boys and old men. The big city population—only meagerly supplied and hearing rumor after rumor (many of them true) about pro-German sentiment in the Czar's court—chafed bitterly. The war had begun when Georgi Malenkov was twelve. By the time he was fifteen, it must have been clear to him—as to almost everyone else in that vast land—that Russia was ripe for revolution.

CHAPTER II

The Early Party Years: 1917-1921

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION of March, 1917, was one of the fastest, least violent revolutions in human history. It started with bread riots by housewives in the streets of Petrograd, followed in a few days with riots by workers, soldiers, and leaders of the Duma. The Czar, seeing the bloody handwriting on the wall of history, abdicated. The Duma and the hastily formed council of workers and soldiers deputies formed a new government which consisted of the leaders of all of Russia's anti-Czar parties. One week after the housewives' bread riot, Czarism, which had inspired dread in Russia and throughout the world for three centuries was dead. As one of the new Russian democratic leaders put it, the revolution took place in a moment—the moment when the soldiers who were sent to break up the women's and workers' demonstrations decided to join them instead. Such a demonstration in Malenkov's Russia today would be virtually impossible because of the awesome efficiency of the Russian Secret Police, which has paralyzed the independent thinking processes of 200 million people. But, throughout the entire nineteenth century, and during the period of the Russian revolution, the average Russian appeared to be a fairly independent, rebellious individual.

Had the German army not occupied half of Europe and threatened the other half at the same time, Russia's democracy might still be alive. But the Kaiser's generals stood only a few hours from Petrograd and within artillery range of Paris at the very moment that President Wilson was joyfully recognizing Russia's new democratic government. Lenin, the German generals knew, was opposed to both sides in the battle and thought the first

thing Russia should do was stop the war—by surrender, if necessary.

When the Kaiser's army smashed the Russian offensive, in the summer of 1917, the discontent carefully nurtured by Lenin's Bolsheviks began to spread. Army officers felt that the government had been pressured by Lenin into only half-heartedly supporting the offensive. The army commander-in-chief, General Kornilov, decided to take things into his own hands. He declared that he would march on the Capital, hang all the Bolsheviks, disperse the present government, and mobilize Russia for a new all-out offensive against the Germans.

This was Lenin's big chance and he seized it. He played the role now not only of the defender of his small group of followers against a militarist plot, but of all of Russian democracy. Timid liberals, frightened by Kornilov, aligned themselves with Lenin. The Kornilov *putsch* failed and the Bolsheviks emerged with new lustre. The Bolsheviks decided that the time had come for an all out bid for power, and the upshot was that Petrograd fell to Trotsky's squads with little firing. Before nightfall on November 7, 1917, Lenin had proclaimed himself head of the government and called for immediate peace with the Kaiser. The following weeks saw the establishment of the conditioned reflex of violence, the institution of the technique of the purge which was later made a chief weapon by Stalin and by his young lieutenant, Georgi Malenkov.

By the spring of 1918, Russia was in turmoil, but Lenin had succeeded in achieving peace with Germany, thus leaving him free to fight his enemy at home. There followed a bloody three-year civil war.

It was three months after the final battle that Georgi Malenkov, at the age of seventeen, joined the conquering Red Army.

A year later he joined the Communist Party. The victory of the Bolsheviks was already highly probable and he was merely one of many who jumped on the Com-

munist bandwagon. He was assigned to work as a political and propaganda officer, and within three years moved up to the job of political commissar of a cavalry regiment on the Turkestan front. He was promoted to political commissar of a brigade and soon after to all the troops on the whole Eastern and Turkestan fronts.

In this position, Malenkov was responsible for the forced expropriation of farmers, an activity which soon grew to include the liquidation of those connected with the anti-Bolshevik movement in Central Asia. Most of those concerned were simply common peasants, farmers, tradesmen and other workers who had been jolted into the opposition by the cruelty of the Bolshevik forces.

The fight against these people lasted almost two years, during which time a large political corps was built up within the Red cavalry. Malenkov was part of this political corps, and so established, between his eighteenth and twentieth years, the foundations for his later power.

The situation in Turkestan during the years that Malenkov was a terrorist and spy there was similar to that in many parts of Russia. In February of 1921, large-scale peasant revolts had broken out in Tambov in Central Russia, and a month later, the sailors of the naval bastion of Kronstadt, just outside Petrograd, revolted against Lenin. Both these rebellions—carried out by men who had originally supported Lenin in the belief he was bringing a “higher” type of democracy—were brutally suppressed. But Lenin was wise enough to see the handwriting on the wall and proclaimed a new policy designed to end grain-requisitioning and promote free trade.

But the most educated and the best-trained specialists of pre-war Russia did not remain in the country. Hundreds of thousands left after the democratic government was overthrown, never to return. To administer one-sixth of the earth, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin had to create a new ruling class of civil servants, administrators, party and army functionaries, and cultural leaders. As soon as the fighting died down, they summoned to the

new schools being set up in Moscow all the able young Russians they had discovered in the course of the civil war, as well as able young Communists from around the world. They would train these young men as propagandists, agitators, administrators; they would instruct them in the strategy and tactics of world revolution; they would teach them languages and physics and all the studies essential to the leaders of the international civil war the Bolsheviks were planning. From all parts of Russia, as from China, Ecuador, Syria and other countries, able young men swarmed into Moscow. One of the first to arrive, after Turkestan had been pacified, was 22-year-old Georgi Malenkov.

A methodical, humorless youth, already trained in terror and ruthlessness on the Turkestan front, and well trained in "personnel work"—checking on the loyalty of soldiers and screening candidates for coveted party membership, he saw from the first that the political field was the main highway to power, and rose through the ranks of political commissars who provided the ideological stiffening for the Red Army. Malenkov was called to the capital in 1921 to complete his education as a ward of the State, and remained there close to the Kremlin walls for the next 30 years.

CHAPTER III

Behind Every Man . . . the Woman: 1922-1925

IN MOSCOW, in 1922, Georgi Malenkov studied at the Moscow Higher Technical School for engineers and administrators, from which he was graduated in 1924 or 1925. For four years he was indoctrinated with Communism, learned also a little bookkeeping and stenography.

He heard lectures by many Bolshevik leaders, and kept his eyes open, watching the others choose sides in the struggle for power. For, Lenin—whose brain had created Soviet Communism and whose iron will had led it to victory—was an invalid. Between his first stroke 20 months before and his death in January, 1924, the Soviet dictator participated only occasionally in affairs of state, and a ruthless struggle for power had been raging in the Politburo. The men about him, who had always submitted to his statements as the last word on any subject, were thinking of the future. Many of the Communist leaders hoped that there would be no quarrels among them, but each nonetheless began building up his own machine, both in the party and in Soviet society at large.

Leon Trotsky, still War Commissar, knew he had the support of the Red Army, but hesitated to assume personal leadership, hoping for some sort of government by Committee. Since Trotsky was almost as renowned as Lenin himself, and since the Communist intellectuals hated the army, most of the other men around Lenin allied themselves against him. Gregory Zinoviev, the head of the Communist International, built a personal machine in Moscow as did Leo Kamenev in Petrograd. Nicholas Bukharin, the editor of *Pravda*, Michael Tom-

sky, who headed the Soviet trade unions, and Alexis Rykov, a moderate who had opposed the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, desired committee rule, hoping that the economic liberalism of the New Economic Policy would be projected to the political field and that some civil freedoms would be restored. They, also, feared Trotsky and the Red Army and so they were led—despite their political differences with the radicals Zinoviev and Kamenev—into the anti-Trotsky alliance.

The real organizing brain of the anti-Trotsky coalition, however, was the now General Secretary of the Communist Party, Josef Stalin. In his capacity as supervisor of all the party organizations throughout the country, he began weeding out Trotsky supporters and replacing them with men loyal to himself. Since the official press was also under his control, Stalin was able to produce subtle propaganda which continually told the Trotskyites that their cause was hopeless.

Men who were in the *Pravda* office at the time have told how its editors, at Stalin's orders, falsified Communist primary election figures from the provinces. Where the Trotskyites had won, the figures were reversed to show they had lost; where Stalin's men scored bare victories, the figures were deliberately exaggerated. Although the local unit knew that *Pravda* was lying, the rest of Russia could only believe that Trotsky's cause was hopeless. With Trotsky himself either unwilling or unable to make an all-out bid for power, Stalin between 1922 and 1925 acquired complete control of the party organization, even while foreign Communists and Western diplomats were regarding Trotsky as the man of decision in Russia.

The struggle extended to almost every area of Communist life, and was especially intense among the students, and Communist schools were as much devoted to political intrigue as to their studies. This was especially true at the Moscow Higher Technical School, one of the most important in Russia, where Malenkov had assumed

the post of Secretary of the school's Communist Party cell. In this position, political activity was the main element of his life, as it was to many at the time.

But Malenkov, unlike the rising bureaucrats of the Stalin machine—Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovitch, Anastas Mikoyan, Andrey Andreyev and Sergei Kirov—was at first slow to desert Trotsky, still the head of the Red Army, in favor of Stalin.

At the time, most Moscow students still clung to Trotsky, but the Stalin machine was growing steadily, and in January, 1924, the machine gave the student rebels a new chance to switch their allegiance, and circulated a long letter in which Trotsky was more sharply criticized than ever and in which students were urged to abandon Trotskyism. The letter, which continued to be circulated until two days before Lenin's death, drew hundreds of assenting signatures from students, but the signature of Malenkov was not among them.

Whether Malenkov was still openly pro-Trotsky during the months following Lenin's death is uncertain, but he did distinguish himself in combating non-Communists among the students and faculty. In May, 1924, the Party decided to purge the schools of non-political scholars, of students and teachers with aristocratic or business backgrounds, of men and women whose personal or family loyalties had been in question. This was the first of numerous such Communist drives aimed at making all of Russian culture a weapon of the police regime.

Malenkov, who had finally begun to weaken in his affections for Trotskyism, participated in the spy work with great energy, and he managed to switch to Stalinism early enough so that Lenin's death and Stalin's ascendancy to power did not jeopardize his position.

That position was strengthened a short while later when Malenkov met a buxom, attractive blonde named Valerie Galoubtsova, whose last name, in Russia, means "little pigeon." Malenkov, at 22, was slim and attractive, but he was at heart a country boy still worrying about his near-fatal mistake of backing Trotsky so persistently.

With his superiors, he was shy and clearly a little frightened. Valerie, on the other hand, had been on the right side early. She was in a key post in Stalin's "Orgburo," the Organizational Bureau of the Party Central Committee. This was Stalin's instrument for staffing local party organizations with his own men and weeding out all local party leaders not personally loyal to his apparatus. In this Orgburo, Valerie's job was to collect and summarize the reports from the provinces—pointing out the trouble spots, noting the names and records of oppositionists, recording the day-by-day growth of Stalinist control from Archangel to Tiflis, from Smolensk to Vladivostok.

In the course of her work at the Orgburo, the "little pigeon" came into contact with Stalin himself occasionally, though more often with his adjutants—Kirov, Molotov, Andreyev, Mikoyan, and Kaganovitch.

Valerie was ambitious, bold and bright, and was quickly attracted by the young student from Orenburg, by his amazing memory, by his easy ability to master complicated facts in unfamiliar fields, by his cold pragmatic approach to the affairs of the day. Valerie knew she could make Georgi a big man, and toward the end of 1924, as Moscow drowsily settled back for the stormy winter ahead, Georgi moved into Valerie's one-room flat.

As were most Communist marriages until the late thirties, Malenkov's marriage was common-law. He simply moved in and stayed for sixteen years.

CHAPTER IV

On Stalin's Knee: 1925-1933

IT WAS NOT LONG before Valerie's contacts helped remove Georgi Malenkov from the shadow of suspicion and placed him high in the Stalin machine—in Stalin's own study, in fact.

In February, 1925, Georgi attended a conference of representatives of Party cells from Moscow, Leningrad and the provinces. Only the most important schools in the country were represented, fifty delegates in all, and the conference was led by the secretaries of the Central Committee itself, Molotov and Andreyev. Both men were key allies of Stalin in the new struggle he was promoting against Zinoviev and Kamenev. Valerie knew both men well through her work in the Orgburo.

Valerie also introduced Georgi to Boris Bazhanov, who was helping turn the personal secretariat of the Party General Secretary, in this case Stalin, into a key weapon in the intra-party struggle.

Malenkov attended the school throughout that spring, and Valerie continued to introduce him to important people in the Stalin machine. Through her influence, Malenkov was given a small job on the Central Committee, and while in that position, he met Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's old friend and future brother-in-law.

Malenkov saw his opportunity and ingratiated himself with the powerful man, and Kaganovich, in turn, took Malenkov under his wing and became his mentor.

From 1925 to 1930, Malenkov was detailed as a responsible worker with the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, a group which literally had life and death control of all Russia.

Kaganovich put Malenkov in the Orgburo. It was

there that Stalin discovered him. In 1927, Boris Bajanov abandoned his job as Stalin's personal secretary and Malenkov took his place as Stalin's personal assistant on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, doing so well that he won the full confidence of the dictator. This was a strategic spot for a young man who had already demonstrated a prodigious capacity for work and a card-index memory. It was an ideal position for a smart, inquisitive and ambitious young Communist. The party's files and secrets were open to him. He burrowed deep, learned much, and said little.

Then, having performed well under the surveillance of Kaganovich, Molotov, Andreyev, and other Stalin aides, he was moved directly into Stalin's personal secretariat. He was to work at Stalin's right hand for five years, the five years in which Stalin was to succeed in liquidating the power of all his Communist rivals and in launching Russia on the Five-Year Plans.

This was the turning point in his career. The relationship then established with Stalin made Malenkov, before he had reached the age of 30, the most important single individual in the Soviet generation that reached manhood immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution.

Stalin's secretariat was the motor-center of the vast machine which was transforming the Russian Communist party. Trotsky had been deposed as War Commissar in January, 1925, only a year after Lenin's death, and been succeeded by Malenkov's old commander in Turkestan, Michael Frunze. But Stalin had broken Trotsky's power with the aid not only of Zinoviev and Kamenev, but of the moderates, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. In beating back the Trotsky supporters and weeding them out of party posts, Stalin had relied on such party organs as Orgburo and the Central Control Commission. In critical cases however, he had to rely on men who were much more anti-Trotsky than they were pro-Stalin. The Communist Party Congresses—still officially the supreme power—had named to the Orgburo and Control Com-

mission supporters of Zinoviev, Bukharin and other leaders. From the timid and inconsistent behavior of his Politburo colleagues, Stalin saw that he could—with sufficient persistence and hard work—remake the party completely in his own image.

But since he was still playing the role of “moderate,” “conciliator,” promoter of “party unity,” he could not effect such a change openly, through the usual party organs. And so, as Secretary of the Party, he built up enormous files of documents, a network of trusted informers and a compact staff of talented young men who were to become his eyes and ears for all of Russia. This was Stalin’s personal secretariat, and in it Georgi Malenkov—alert, suspicious, retentive, thorough—soon became the leading figure.

Malenkov’s memory alone was a major asset in the Stalin machine. Industriously, he would study and re-study the files, devise new ways of obtaining information, keep up contacts with the men in the GPU who were loyal to Stalin and had their own sources of knowledge.

Malenkov’s diligence was applied not only to screening and eliminating the party’s older members, but as well to the admission of new members. Under the direction of the Secretariat, local Stalinists began enlarging their party cells to include new elements, often of the pure gangster variety. The civil war and the famine of 1921 had left thousands of homeless youths, called the *Bezprizorni*. With the NEP’s free trade swelling the pockets of many a trader, robbery and racketeering became profitable ventures again, and the *Bezprizorni*, as they ripened into adolescence and manhood, were naturally drawn to this “new industry.” Stalin was never the man to turn down allies, and in the coming struggles, he needed all the allies he could get.

In the five years Georgi Malenkov worked in the Secretariat, party units all over Russia began admitting criminal elements: former *Bezprizorni*, demobilized soldiers, former GPU men who had no work, and convicts whom the Stalin machine with its GPU connections suc-

ceeded in releasing from jail. These men were quietly fed by the Secretariat to trouble-spots where the Bukharin-Rykov forces might prove potent.

At the same time, representatives of the Central Control Commission, who were working under the Secretariat, began removing party members of "bourgeois" or "White" background whom Malenkov's office considered anti-Stalin. It was no coincidence that Party members with similar "dubious" backgrounds but who were firmly on Stalin's side retained their membership. It was no coincidence because Georgi Malenkov and his unsentimental colleagues in the Secretariat knew precisely who was who.

Once the stage had been rigged by the network operated from Georgi Malenkov's secretariat, Stalin secured the adoption of his First Five Year Plan and applied sheer power throughout the party to push out the "Right Opposition." In 1929, as Moscow banners streamed with the legend, "Stalin is Lenin today," the collectivization of agriculture got under way. All farmers who had managed to acquire even moderate holdings during the NEP were labeled "kulaks," and Communist agitators went up and down the countryside calling for "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class." Where the agitators weren't enough, first GPU squads, then Red Army regiments, sometimes armed with tanks, went into the villages. First thousands, then millions, of resisting peasants were herded into long gray freight-trains and packed off to the huge slave-labor camps that were being quickly built in Siberia and the Arctic regions.

By 1930, Malenkov was a divisional chief of the central committee and a delegate to the Sixteenth Party Congress. He then was promoted to chief of the organizing department of the Moscow party.

From this vantage point, Malenkov rose rapidly from one key job to another. From 1930 to 1934, he was the secretary and head of the Organization Department of the Moscow Province Communist Party, working under Kaganovich. His progress up the Moscow section of the

party was rapid. With Kaganovich, he helped remove Nikolai Bukharin's right-wing adherents from the Moscow party.

In Moscow, the party secretary, Uglanov, was quickly removed and replaced by Lazar Kaganovich. As his right-hand man, Stalin now sent Georgi Malenkov to work for the first time on his own. His task: a full-scale purge of the Moscow party organization. Malenkov's experience in the Secretariat, plus his early baptism of terror, made him an ideal man for the job. The purge was quick and ruthless, and the result that Moscow from 1931-1933 was almost completely ignorant of the vast new drama unfolding in the hinterlands.

With thousands of peasants shipped off to slave labor, with the new collective farms ruled by GPU machine-gunners, famine struck in the winter of 1932, and it broadened and continued and reached its height the next winter.

In 1934—just before the great purges—Malenkov came back to the staff of the Central Committee, as Chief of the Department of Leading Party Organizations, a strategic personnel post of the Central Committee. His mind filled with intimate information of all party members, he began the slow, vital work of building his own personal machine throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Bureaucracy as the party's personnel chief. He became an intimate collaborator of Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD and organizer of the great purges of 1936-1938.

CHAPTER V

The Blood Count Rises: 1934-1939

IN THE GREAT PURGE conducted by Yezhov, Malenkov and Vishinsky, and highlighted by the outlandish "confessions" of those who were Lenin's closest comrades at the Moscow Trials, untold hundreds of thousands died with GPU bullets in their brains and hundreds of thousands more perished in the Arctic slave labor camps. It was a fearsome time of intrusions in the night, quick rides to police headquarters, gruesome grilling and stealthy execution.

The opening signal for this gigantic massacre was the assassination of Sergei Kirov, Stalin's closest friend and protege, who was shot to death in his Leningrad office in the winter of 1934.

Malenkov's job during this period is said to have been to prepare the dossiers of the guilty men for use by Yezhov and Vishinsky, and to find replacements for the men who vanished.

Vishinsky's role was most dramatic; before the astonished eyes of the world, he acted as prosecutor at the public trials of Lenin's old comrades—Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Serebriakov, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky and Yagoda. He elicited and commented on the fabulous "confessions" of these men, previously elicited by GPU strongarm squads, in which they said they had plotted with foreign intelligence services to overthrow Stalin and to kill such people as Maxim Gorky, Sergei Kirov, Sergo Ordzhonikidze and other Soviet leaders. At the last of these trials, Vishinsky summed up by shouting: "I demand that dogs gone mad be shot—every one of them." But these public trials, and the lesser ones in which Vishinsky acted as prosecutor, represented only the bare

crust of the universe of death Stalin was creating in Russia. The private slaughter went into the hundreds of thousands, and Vishinsky's oratory was quite superfluous in most cases. The essential elements of the purge were an army of gunmen, and a mechanized spy network. These were the responsibilities of Yezhov and Malenkov.

The association between these two men began in 1934, when the Seventeenth Communist Party Congress created the new super-spy outfit, "ORPO." Yezhov was named as its chief, with Malenkov as his deputy; when Yezhov succeeded secret police chief Yagoda a year later, Malenkov assumed command of the ORPO, and the purge began. The ORPO provided the names and the NKVD killed them.

The ORPO was an improvement on previous Soviet spy engines in the sense that it was mechanized. Yezhov and Malenkov had both campaigned within the party hierarchy for a broader use of statistical machines and computers for police work, and this campaign bore fruit in the ORPO. Machines were used in the ORPO to single out all people ever accused or suspected of any of a myriad of political crimes or "deviations," and then to assign these people's fate to different squads of the NKVD. In addition to such machines, the ORPO was equipped with a staff of statisticians, research analysts, contact men and intelligence experts, as well as a network of its own informers and liaison through Malenkov with Stalin's secretariat.

Malenkov directed this entire enterprise—machines and men—and made the final decisions on all doubtful cases before submitting them to Yezhov. Where immediate death was not indicated, but questioning was preferred, Malenkov's office supplied NKVD interrogators and torturers with all the supposed charges against the prisoners. When new names were implicated—and a prime object of the purges was to get each suspect to name as "accomplices" other men whom the party didn't suspect—the NKVD immediately fed the names back for incorporation into the ORPO files. Malenkov, after preparing the

huge ORPO apparatus for action during most of 1934 and 1935, worked day and night during the years 1936-38 earmarking thousands upon thousands for Yezhov's slaughter.

The next attack was on the army leaders. Among the leaders of the Red Army involved in the plan were Marshal Tukachevsky, the commander-in-chief and the hero of the Polish War of 1920; Marshal Bluecher, commander-in-chief of the Far Eastern Army; General Gamarnik, chief of the Red Army Political Department; Marshal Yegorov, chief of staff, and six other high-ranking officers.

On May 31, 1937, it was announced that Gamarnik had committed suicide, and two weeks later, it was announced that the other nine had been tried, condemned and shot.

Soon afterward, Yezhov and Malenkov moved in on the army. Within a few months, nearly all the generals who had signed the death warrant for Tukachevsky and the others were themselves liquidated and, before long, almost all the 80 members of the Soviet War Council of 1934 were dead. The purge moved into the Navy and Air Force and some 30,000 officers were liquidated in all; others were sent to Siberia, including Konstantin Rokossovsky, whose skills were later commandeered by Stalin in a moment of crisis and who became one of the authentic heroes of World War II.

The most interesting thing about the Army purges is that none of the high-ranking officers confessed, nor did Stalin dare stage a public trial of these men. Their effect was to weaken severely the Red Army at a time when Hitler was on the loose. The subsequent easy German march across 1000 miles of Russian territory was in no small part due to the Stalin-Yezhov-Malenkov slaughter of Russia's best soldiers.

By the beginning of 1939, almost five million Russians were dead and ten million were in slave labor camps. The rest of the country—almost each Russian had a friend or relation involved—was in a state of severe shock. Stalin decided the purge had gone far enough. Yezhov, who by this time had become a hysterical maniac, disappeared,

and was replaced by Stalin's Georgian comrade, the former GPU chief in the Caucasus, Lavrenti Beria. It has been reported that Yezhov was first taken to a madhouse, then shot. But Vishinsky was promoted and Malenkov was named a secretary of the Party Central Committee and a member of the Orgburo. He was retained as the head of the ORPO, but its name was changed to the Administration of Cadres and its duties expanded to include various forms of patronage. When Adolf Hitler's emissaries came to conclude their pact of friendship with Stalin in August 1939, Malenkov was a big man.

CHAPTER VI

The War Years: 1940-1946

IN FEBRUARY 1941, after the Nazi invasion, Stalin further indicated his favorable disposition towards Malenkov by selecting him to deliver a party oration. It created a sensation. He denounced bureaucrats and time servers in a Soviet state, flailed "ignoramuses" who deprecated technological advancements, scored those who looked at a man's genealogy rather than ability as a prerequisite for promotion.

At this time Malenkov was unknown to the Western world, and foreign observers in Moscow were startled when, in February 1941, at a nationwide conference of the Communist Party, he was called upon to make a key speech on problems of industry and transport, which had prime importance in view of the imminence of war.

Malenkov lashed into his assembled comrades and produced, the record says modestly, "movements of animation" in the hall. He began by attacking the Council of People's Commissars: "Some of them like to sit in swivel chairs and run things by correspondence." Then he went after the high executives who "study genealogy to pick subordinates by their proletarian ancestry rather than by capacity," and jolted his hearers by saying that among non-Party people there were many sincere and capable men who had no Communist standing but who worked better and more conscientiously than many a Communist of long standing! Next Malenkov let fly against "windbags who arm themselves with catchwords like 'We're getting things organized, but there's a little jam,' or 'There's a trifling delay, but we're getting rid of the snags,' when they're asked why production is lagging below quota." He cited specific cases and came close enough

to naming names to rouse further "animation" in the audience. Then he said: "There's another type of business leader, the ignoramus, the type who knows nothing and doesn't want to know anything. But he is as conceited as they make them and is convinced that there is nothing he does not know and nothing he needs to know. You may talk to him about new methods and tell him his technological process needs improving, or that cleanliness and tidiness are essential in a factory, but he sits there, confirmed in his ignorance and refuses to listen to reason or advice." Again, the audience was "animated."

As a result of this speech, Molotov's wife, Zhemchuzhina, "retired to private life" and a number of other Commissars were demoted, including Mikhail Kaganovich, the older brother of the Politburo member, Lazar.

Another result was that the very next day Malenkov was appointed a candidate member of the Politburo.

Malenkov's impressive organizational talents were put to use during the war. When the Nazis invaded Russia, he became a member of the five-man state defense committee, worked tirelessly in stepping up military production. All the while Malenkov was building up the Kremlin's foreign spy organization.

He was rewarded with a position as head of the aircraft and tank production programs and his record in increasing output was so gratifying that honors were his for the asking. He was a Hero of Socialist Labor and in 1943 received the Order of Lenin.

In 1943 he was charged with the task of economic rehabilitation of the devastated areas. As a reward for his prodigious activities he was made a full member of the Politburo.

In the summer of 1943, the Red Army won the decisive victory of the Kursk salient. At this moment, Malenkov was appointed High Commissioner for the reconstruction of all liberated Soviet territory, from the Caucasus to the Baltic Sea, which had had a population of 88 million people.

Everywhere the Germans had wantonly destroyed his-

torical monuments, churches, and museums, as well as 40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools, and 43,000 libraries. It was a kingdom of chaos that Malenkov was called upon to rule.

In a speech at the beginning of 1946, he said: "Whoever wants to work and can work will find full use of his energies in this vast job of construction. All that is needed is to put our shoulders to the wheel and not be afraid of difficulties, but anyone who thinks he can live by his past services and rest on the laurels of accomplishment is gravely mistaken. The war is over, and now we must roll up our sleeves and set about healing the wounds which the war inflicted. Those who are complaining about the war to justify their own shortcomings must be told: 'Stop whining, get down to work, and before you know it you won't need to complain. Avoid getting into a rut, and stop living by old formulas.' "

Malenkov is one of the first high officials in Russia to have placed tremendous emphasis on the need for technological advancement. In fact, those who are acquainted with the industrial picture in Russia before the end of World War II cannot help but be astounded at the enormous progress made in the past six years—a situation almost totally due to Malenkov's efforts.

But his efforts went down strange channels. Right after the last war, Malenkov directed the kidnaping of German scientists from right under the noses of Allied troops, almost risking war with England, the United States, and France. He was held back only by the more conservative members of the Politburo who knew that in her weakened condition, Russia was in no position to defend herself. But even at that, Malenkov knew that the risk was a small one. Public opinion was largely still favorably inclined towards the Soviet Union as a result of her resistance to the Nazis.

But the kidnaping still is being felt. Having had some technological training and certainly a good deal of experience as a production efficiency expert, Malenkov knew that the theory of jet propulsion and the theoretical

formulations for atomic energy were known to the entire world. Russia lacked the technologists to build the precise and intricate equipment needed to make production models of jet planes and atom bombs. *It was largely through the efforts of these kidnaped German scientists that Russia has made such excellent military advances.*

CHAPTER VII

The Struggle for Power: 1946-1949

MALENKOV'S RISE TO POWER during the war initiated a great struggle which was to last a decade. The struggle was between the two ablest younger lieutenants of Stalin, Malenkov and Andrei Zhdanov, and during its course Stalin three times changed his own mind. Zhdanov, the brilliant leader of Leningrad, was close to disgrace in 1945, seemingly triumphant in 1947, disgraced and dead of "paralysis of the heart" in 1948; Malenkov, sidetracked during the years 1946-48 despite his wartime exploits, emerged from virtual oblivion to become Stalin's heir presumptive and to outlive both Zhdanov and Stalin and become Premier of the Soviet Union.

The great struggle between Malenkov and Zhdanov was so complex, so vast in its ramifications, it can be followed only through the eyes of an expert who has scanned all the available material in Russian and other languages and who has spoken to many of the men close to both camps. Such a person is Boris I. Nicolaevsky, the Russian Social Democratic leader now in New York, who in 1949 first reported the vast significance of the Malenkov triumph. Shortly after Stalin's death, Dr. Nicolaevsky published in the journal, *The New Leader*, an analysis of the struggle and how it determined the succession to Stalin. Here, slightly abridged, is this expert's account:

Malenkov became prominent in 1939; the 18th Party Congress had elected him to the Central Committee and that Committee in turn had made him its Secretary. His stature rose during the war, when he was a member of the State Defense Committee, along with Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov. Since the Politburo had ceased to function regularly during this period, Malenkov, backed by

Stalin, became the virtual boss of the entire party machine and acquired enormous influence over the state apparatus as well.

He used his position to remove from power some influential "older" Politburo members—including Zhdanov. Zhdanov, at the time, was in Leningrad, leading the city's defense. Malenkov and Beria prevented Zhdanov from leaving Leningrad, thus removing his influence from the central party apparatus in Moscow.

Malenkov's offensive against Zhdanov reached its peak in the winter of 1944-45. Zhdanov was kept in Finland, in a position of honorary exile, and barred from the ceremonies of January, 1945, commemorating Leningrad's heroism displayed during the siege. No mention was made of him in any of the newspaper accounts.

Zhdanov knew Malenkov was responsible for this insult, and the open struggle had begun. Zhdanov's revenge came soon after Yalta. Returning to Moscow, he waged a campaign to combat deviations from traditional Stalinism and to return to pure prewar Stalinism. A recognized party ideologist, Zhdanov concentrated on questions of culture and ideology, but also helped mobilize anti-Malenkov elements in other fields.

Most painful of all for Malenkov was Zhdanov's battle against him on questions of party structure. Zhdanov obtained restoration of the Politburo's old role as supreme power, standing above the government. Maintenance of this body's personnel was, for Zhdanov, a guarantee of the "ideological consistency" of party policy.

Zhdanov's campaign enjoyed initial success, especially among the members of the old Central Committee and Politburo. Of course, to restore completely the absolute prewar dominance of the Politburo over the government was impossible, because Stalin had since assumed the Premiership. But a way out was found by creating a presidium of the Council of Ministers, composed almost exclusively of Politburo members. To this presidium were referred all questions of government policy, except for the most basic questions of principle.

For Malenkov, this plenum was a severe defeat. He had, it is true, been named a full member of the Politburo in 1946 at the age of 45 and re-elected to the Secretariat, where his name was listed immediately after Stalin's and ahead of Zhdanov's—this made him First Secretary of the Communist Party. But that was just coating for a bitter pill. Organizationally and politically, Malenkov had been set back.

On the eve of the plenum, Malenkov had urged the party to look forward, not backward—he had appealed to the plenum not to “become intoxicated with the recollection of past services,” but to “study everyday experience” for “creative guidance of the building of a new life”; and he had criticized “pedants who have quotations from Marx and Engels ready on every occasion.”

This, a direct thrust at Zhdanov, failed to bring the desired results; the “pedants” triumphed. An anti-Malenkov bloc emerged in the Politburo. Zhdanov's proposal for a purge on the cultural front was approved, as were Andreyev's strictures on wartime collective-farm policy. Revamping of local party groups got under way, clearly directed against Malenkov. Within 6 months, Malenkov himself was deposed as Secretary of the Central Committee. (This took place in July or August 1946; the exact date is unknown because the decision was never made public.)

Precisely at this time, Marshal Zhukov was removed as Stalin's deputy in the Defense Ministry. Zhukov, too, was a victim of Zhdanov, who had extended his campaign against “deviations” to the Army. Zhukov, greatest of the Red Army's World War II heroes, was banished from Moscow and spent more than six years as a troop commander in remote outposts. (Malenkov has now returned Zhukov to the very post he held in 1946, and since he is not given to handsome gestures, one can assume that he hopes this former ally against Zhdanov can help him in the future.)

The months following Malenkov's removal as Secretary of the Central Committee were bitter. He was humil-

iated by assignment to the Agriculture Ministry, where he was ordered to revamp "incorrect" policies, which were formally blamed on him. But he was excluded from the new Council on Collective Farm Affairs, which was headed by an avowed enemy, Andreyev, and charged simply with carrying out the orders of the men whom he had loftily patronized just months before. Malenkov submitted outwardly. Promptly he began planning revenge.

Malenkov began organizing the counterattack on Zhdanov in the field of foreign policy. The latter's policy for the Cominform which he created was one of militancy. Malenkov was for transforming the foreign Communist Parties into "respectable" agencies which could better push Moscow's interests abroad. When Tito revolted, Zhdanov's star fell; soon after this historic break Malenkov stepped into his shoes.

On July 20 Malenkov again appeared as a party secretary.

CHAPTER VIII

The End and the Beginning: 1950-1953

MALENKOV, WHOSE ONLY knowledge of the world has been filtered through the distorting lenses of Marxism and its distorted practitioners, holds for the moment the sceptre of "Communist Czar." He will probably retain that "Adler Elevator" reviewing balcony in Red Square constructed for Stalin, who stood only five feet two. The flooring which Joe used when marching on and off the reviewing stand, and while actually reviewing parades, was raised nearly a foot higher than the rest of the floor. Everybody else in Stalin's party would walk or stand in trenches on either side of Stalin's dike.

But is Malenkov really stepping into Stalin's shoes? Is he the real ruler of Russia and its empire in the same sense that Stalin was? Over twenty-five years of propaganda had given the late dictator the stature of demi-god. His death leaves both an emotional and ideological vacuum.

While Lenin, Stalin's predecessor, picked a successor, some ex-Soviet officials believe that Stalin never did, that he fully expected to survive all of his lieutenants whom he kept playing off against one another. His lieutenants did not have the faith in his longevity that the dictator had, however, and Stalin well knew that the younger Politburo men were hovering about with an eye "on the carcass." Thus, "as sops to Cerebus," first Zhdanov, then Molotov, then Malenkov, alternately were permitted next to Stalin on the reviewing stands and in photographs, and on Stalin's 70th birthday, it was Malenkov's article of praise that was printed first, ahead of all others, in the Soviet press. For just as Stalin derived power as Lenin's so-called successor and pupil, so the younger

men in the Politburo wanted a sign of the "master's" favor in event of a battle for power after his death. Malenkov went further than the rest to become identified with the dictator. He virtually shaped his life in Stalin's image; dressed as Stalin dressed, his few public utterances supplemented and paraphrased Stalin's statements.

But insufficient time had passed for the identification to seep into the public mind, despite the many evidences of Stalin's favor, for more and more as Stalin grew older and increasingly careful about his health, he left the running of the machinery of government in the hands of the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov combination, particularly Malenkov who was a brilliant organizer, a man infinitely knowing in party ways, an efficiency expert who boosted Soviet production figures by tremendous percentages, and who served Stalin unquestionably in every small and useful way.

The most conspicuous sign of Stalin's favoritism for any one person came when Malenkov was selected to deliver the report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Congress which met in October of 1952. For more than two decades previously, Stalin had delivered that report—a lengthy Soviet equivalent of the President of the United States' State of the Union Message. However, the importance of Malenkov's report was substantially reduced when, on the eve of the Congress, the Soviet press released Stalin's 25,000 word document on the "Economic Problems of Socialism" which set down the Premier's ideas on the main lines to be followed in Soviet foreign policy and also in the country's future development toward the purported goal of full communism. Nevertheless, since last October, the Soviet press has frequently quoted from Malenkov's report, making it plain that he was laying down party doctrine in areas not covered by Stalin. But Malenkov, although an effective, stolid, well-grooved Communist tactician, has never, as far as is known, contributed anything new or original to Communist theory.

When Stalin died, the initial transfer of power, on the

surface at least, was made smoothly and swiftly. Georgi Malenkov took over Stalin's title of Premier. But has he taken over Stalin's power? Is power of Stalin's nature inheritable?

German diplomats believe that Georgi Malenkov, despite his new title of Premier, is not Stalin's successor and may never be, that in the dictatorship ruling Russia now and probably for many months to come, Molotov holds the balance of power between the rivals, Malenkov and Beria. They hold the further view that Stalin planned it thusly in anticipation that one ruthless rival kill off the other or both be destroyed and a dark horse nose in. It is further pointed out that titles are meaningless in the Kremlin where power must be won as in a dead-end gang by the craftiest, cruelest and strongest bullies personally eliminating the rival—a process made harder by the new setup.

Malenkov, by virtue of his file-index functions as a cadre and party-machine man seems to be in a position to wield most of the power in the Presidium. Outside of Beria, there seems no one powerful or ambitious enough to oppose Prime Minister Georgi M. Malenkov, a man who fits the pattern for Russian dictators, regarding humans as so many robots in service of the state, a man born into authoritarianism, raised in the desensitizing era of bloody revolution, and trained in the suppressing, informing, party cadre, machine politics aspects of Soviet life.

Under the omnipotence of Stalin, he could carry out his personal struggles for power. Without him, it must be consolidated from time to time but the use of the instrument of the purge might prove too sharp a weapon for him right now. Yet he must act, vigorously and dramatically to whip rivals and captive peoples into line.

What Malenkov's attitude toward the West is, we can only glean from earlier political speeches, and we only have his word for it. In a speech made in September, 1947, at a foundation meeting of the Cominform, near Warsaw, he stated: "We proceed from the fact that the

co-existence of two systems—Capitalism and Socialism—is inevitable for a long period of time and if we follow the line of maintaining loyal, good neighborly relations with all states manifesting a desire for friendly cooperation on condition that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations undertaken are fulfilled . . . But at the same time we are prepared to repel any policy hostile to the Soviet Union no matter from what quarter it comes.”

Malenkov talks out of both sides of his mouth, a trick apparently passed along from one Stalinist to the next. Though he at one time preaches the peaceable living side-by-side of Capitalism and Communism, later he rants: “What does history teach us? . . . The first World War . . . brought about the victory of the great October socialist revolution . . . The Second World War brought Popular Democratic regimes in central and southeastern Europe . . . Can there be any doubt that the third World War will become the grave for world capitalism?” This, in 1949, while Russian “peace” doves were filling the skies.

And even while this hypocrisy is studied and passed over, the more frightening and brutal inconsistency of 1953 stares at the peace-desiring multitudes. On his ascendancy to the premiership, Malenkov shot out the usual olive branch straight at President Eisenhower.

The world stirred. Here was an opportunity for honest peace negotiations. Two new administrations were in power. A fresh start, the people whispered, a fresh start.

And then with the callous indifference that smacks only of the Soviet ruling class, two jet planes in two days were shot down in flagrant violations of long-standing borders. In each instance, it was a Red MIG that did the shooting down. Malenkov had been called a liar by the chattering language of his own guns.

That is the beginning of the Malenkov regime. It is only a part of the beginning, however. Even with the dead flyers still more than a fresh memory, Malenkov was back at the old hackstand, passing out the peace lie

in an open invitation for talks with the Western world.

That the man is a careful manipulating liar is proved by a recent picture in *Pravda*. Only in amusement park side-shows where mirrors are distorted and in *Pravda* do pictures lie. During the signing of the Chinese-Soviet pact back in February 14, 1950, Malenkov was a minor figure, standing off to the side while Vishinsky penned the agreement and Stalin, Molotov, and Mao Tse-tung stood next to each other. To reveal Malenkov's new importance, *Pravda* has just edited the picture, moving Malenkov so that he stands next to Mao and Stalin. Molotov is missing from the photo entirely. So is Vishinsky.

Georgi Malenkov is Russia's new ruler. And the drum-beating Kremlin propaganda corps is working overtime to create his legend. All it has proved thus far is that Malenkov is a hypocrite and liar.

CHAPTER IX

What Makes Malenkov Run?

A Psychological Profile

THERE IS A TERRIBLE NEED to understand the psychology of Soviet leadership. Tomes have been written on this person's background and that one's by critics to the right and to the left of Soviet politics. But all is meaningless unless the individual is seen in relation to his origins, his environment, the age in which he grew, the system of which he is a part, and most important of all, in terms of *himself*, because the stamp of individuality can never be removed—regardless of how repressive an organization is.

Georgi Malenkov, Stalinoid man that he is, is still different from the other men in the Kremlin.

The Stalinoid personality permits a man to become a Stalinoid man, just as a creative personality enables a man to become an artist. First we have the material, then we create the sculpture. We cannot make statues out of pebbles.

There have been and still are liberals and rebels in all parts of the world. Wherein does the Communist of today differ from radicals and liberals? The Stalinoid outside of the U.S.S.R. is a neurotically dependent individual who seeks a strong father image. He is manipulated by the Stalinoids inside Russia who are similar, yet of another variety. These are Stalinists without conviction, created out of the political and personal needs of Stalin and shaped by the bureaucracy. Malenkov seems to have been totally unmotivated by conviction. Unlike Lenin, and even Stalin, he became a Communist because that was the winning side to be on. He was a

boy when the revolution occurred and little more than an adolescent throughout the years of revolutionary conflict. This was apparently the future state and he had to take part in it or perish. In the subsequent bureaucracy that arose after the inter-party struggle for power and in the period during which Stalin consolidated his power, only the Stalinoid men survived the succession of bloody purges that marked that period. For of the old Bolsheviks, only a few were permitted to live—Molotov, Voroshilov, the weakest and most submissive, adapting to what they knew was tyranny to save their skins while rationalizing about the eventual “withering away of the state” as industrial capacity increased. Stalin gradually eliminated all men of conviction, *because these were definite threats to his life and safety*. A man will risk death because of his beliefs but an opportunist who becomes one in the first place, for reasons of success and safety, does not have beliefs.

The rest of the members of the Politburo consisted of young men like Malenkov—too young to have been Bolsheviks, but old enough to have participated in some way during the entire revolutionary period.

It's safe to say that the entire group of younger Politburo members are Communists by expediency and were supporters of Stalin by the pressing emotional need not to die. They learned early that the only allegiances, principles, ideals or loyalties one could afford were to themselves and their loved ones. They saw how even the mothers of deposed political big-shots were punished along with their sons; how wives were sent to slave labor camps when husbands were accused of political treason—how the children of the accused suffered. Able, intelligent men knew that the only way to live in any kind of comfort and security was to get to the top. When they got to the top they found that it required constant intrigue, vigilance, planning, scheming, submissiveness, subordination of all feeling, morals and values to stay there. It was a bloody recapitulation of the history of the old Kings of England made more terrible by the

introduction of modern, machine-age efficiency methods. Everything had to be planned, approved, signaled—one wrong word, one inadvertent mistake might be fatal.

Insecurity and anxiety is the keynote to their existence. Unlike politicians in capitalist countries, the only way they can leave a job is through demotion or feet first. Many ex-presidents of the U.S. have gone back to their little hamlets and taken up life again with the neighbors, but in the Soviet Union a political functionary leaves only when he signs up with death, or conditions leading to it.

Lazar M. Pistrak, one of the leading authorities on Soviet affairs, has made a close study of the career of the new Soviet Premier. In an article in *The New Leader*, Pistrak provides a summary of Malenkov's career. "Malenkov is neither a military hero, an industrial engineer, a theoretician nor a diplomat," he states; "like Stalin, too, Malenkov works hard, works nights, speaks in a low monotone, smokes and affects a drab military tunic. Unlike Stalin, however, in the years of his rise to power Malenkov has made little pretense at either humility or moderation. In contrast to such older Soviet leaders as Andreyev, Mikoyan and Kaganovich, Malenkov and his young cohort Nikita Khrushchev are considered the hard, cold-blooded mechanics of the Bolshevik organization."

Edmund Stevens, former Moscow correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, described Malenkov as "the typical product of the party apparatus in which he has spent his entire adult life. Lacking mass appeal, he dislikes the limelight and prefers to pull the wires behind the scenes. Cautious . . . plodding . . . Malenkov has a brain closely akin to the vast party card-index which he keeps as chief of the party organization."

Unlike the old Bolsheviks who were motivated by rebelliousness and a certain passion against poverty, injustice, suffering, and idealism, Malenkov, as with the other young men now in control of the Pre-

sidium, joined the revolutionary army first and was instructed in Communism later. His was no passion for justice, but one for survival and power in an environment violent with war, bloodshed, economic and physical insecurity and change. Not much more than a child when the October Revolution broke out, he had plenty of time to witness the effects of starvation, political chaos, and violent death. But Malenkov was prepared by his background to cope with it better than others of his generation. His father, an officer, must have early acquainted him with the "kill or be killed" principle of existence. Having learned the basic law of survival from his father and having been reared by a strong patriarchal militaristic figure, Malenkov learned early to repress his own feelings, rebelliousness being one, and to accept the principle of survival of the fittest as a natural law. Whatever one had to do to secure one's existence was right. Apparently, anything that one did to further one's ambition was right also, especially in an environment where both became synonymous.

Can the principles of psychology as conceived and practiced in western nations during periods of relative freedom be applied to those reared in the patriarchal, authoritarian police state, which for many years had more people than it could comfortably supply with material goods, where death, dislocation, civil insecurity, repression of all liberties, mistrust on all levels of existence, and persecution of the innocent was a rule—where freedom of movement is an unheard of thing and living conditions so utterly at variance with that of the Western World as to stagger the imagination? A man is a paranoiac only if his feelings of persecution are based on a delusion, but where they are founded in fact, he is a realist and entitled to become suspicious, morose, anti-social, withdrawn and secretive.

In this country, a man who tries to commit suicide is charged first with manslaughter if he fails, and then committed to an insane asylum. In Russia, it is tantamount to suicide not to exercise foresight in estimating all dan-

gers and protecting oneself against them. Malenkov, by Russian standards, has apparently proven himself fittest to survive. By attaining Stalin's position, he is in a better position to survive and protect himself than he was before, except that he has not yet had the opportunity to liquidate such resourceful and dangerous men as Beria and others.

Under cover of Stalin, he could have attempted this task, but were his cohorts to be liquidated now or die of "a paralyzed heart" like his chief rival for the seat of power, Zhdanov, he would risk revolt and dissension with the vast heterogeneous mass, for he neither has Stalin's deified reputation built up over a period of 25 years nor his personal patriarchal appeal. His appearance is against him—a fat woman may be a mother symbol, but the fat man is not a father symbol. On the contrary—there is a feminine implication in obesity. He is also too young-looking a man, and his features lack the kind of ruggedness that would command the filial worshipful devotion of a people that moved without too much difficulty from reverence for the Czar, the Little Father, to Stalin, Father of all Russia. What is more, very little is known in Russia about Malenkov. His background, being bourgeois, was not much publicized, and he has only come into public recognition since 1941 and after the brief, meteoric flash of his speech, not until 1949 when he was given Stalin's benign nod as spokesman on the eve of the anniversary of the Russian revolution.

It was Zhdanov who appeared consistently with Stalin in later years, apparently being primed as the heir for Stalin's throne, not Malenkov. Malenkov was shadow-like, a rather large shadow, but silent, subservient, quiet, diligent, a behind-the-scenes plotter and intriguer. Serious, dour, diligent, not charm, nor personal magnetism, not even an appearance of strength of character seems indicated except to those who come into contact with him personally. He is described as tough, humorless and dull.

But he must have had some attractive qualities to

have endeared him to men like Kaganovich and Stalin; or was he just a most useful tool—a Stalinoid man—loyal, non-controversial, carrying out all orders well, without qualms, passions, ideals, without conscience or pity to hamper his efficiency or impair his duties—a truly merciless machine man?

In our society, the ability to kill dispassionately is the sign of the psychopathic personality type—the detached, practical criminal. A man who commits a crime of passion in Western society is more likely to be judged insane than the cold-blooded, premeditated murderer. But in Russian society would these classifications hold true? The civilized soldier kills in cold blood an enemy he has no personal animosity towards, and this is considered normal on a kill-or-be-killed basis. In Russian political society, this is apparently the case also.

Perhaps, Malenkov in the fastness of his home is a loving husband and kind father. Perhaps he gently jokes with and patiently instructs his teen-age son and daughter. Perhaps, he caresses them, loves them, plays with them—perhaps they are the only people in Russia he can trust. Very few people are fat through any genetic glandular mishap. As Malenkov would be the first to agree, having supported the theories of Lysenko, the environment contributes much toward producing obesity. What overweight means in psychological terms is not too clear. Some psychiatrists have found that people eat too much when they feel anxious, insecure, frustrated. Sweets generally indicate a need for affection, perhaps not forthcoming from his wife, who is described as being given to dashing about in a large limousine and addicted to wearing sleek, man-tailored suits.

Sometimes, overweight is an indication of a desire for power or security—the fat person feeling generally better protected and insulated from danger than the thin person. Whatever it means, fatness is the prime human quality Malenkov seems to have. Fat people are generally associated with geniality, sociability, but that is only a myth, probably disseminated by fat people. Some are;

some aren't. Some are sensitive and artistic, some are cruel. Some are insecure and some merely have a tremendous drive towards power and use their fat as a battering ram. Several psychiatrists seem to think that fat people eat too much because they feel the world isn't treating them well and thus are determined to treat themselves well.

Malenkov may have had a strong filial attachment to Stalin, having had a militaristic, stern father himself. But Malenkov is the product of this old militaristic Russia. His mistrust of the West is a cultural one. He is in many ways provincial, never having been outside the country except Sovietized Poland and Czechoslovakia, adjacent states. He is not "cosmopolitan," a word which he attacks. He speaks only Russian.

But this is Malenkov, still under Stalin's wing. Now the wing has been torn away. The fat man must fly by himself, or fall. The repressive, feared father (and protecting mother?) must no longer be catered to. Malenkov's personality may really come to the fore—either a deep yearning for peace may come from him, an end to intrigue, a desire for true security—or the emergence of rage which many submissive people hide behind their facade of submissiveness.

Malenkov is a man who may go either of two ways—the world may be forced to follow. If it is as a peaceful man that Malenkov moves, even this must be viewed askance. He is a Stalinoid still, and therefore an opportunist. Peace today may be what the Russians need, but not peace tomorrow.

But if it is as the raging fat man that Malenkov emerges, as a man who must liquidate further to consolidate, who must trigger explosions to remind his subjects of his own importance, then the world will go to war—and with it, the last of the Stalinoid men will be destroyed.

PART TWO

CHAPTER X

Inside Malenkov's Russia

IT IS DIFFICULT to understand and outguess a man like Malenkov, for the rules by which he lives—his conception of words like war, friendship, and honesty—differ so greatly from those we know. In examining the world that shaped his mind, the answers to three important questions can be seen:

(1) What is the biggest mistake that Americans make in trying to understand Malenkov?

(2) What is the big difference between Malenkov and Stalin?

(3) How did Malenkov win the Number One position against his competitors?

As one learns more about Malenkov, a paradox presents itself. Here is a man who joined the armed forces as a youth and quickly became a political commissar in it. He rose up the political ladder, performing Party tasks. He became Stalin's right-hand man in the Kremlin, far above—and far away from—the day-to-day work of the country. At no time had he worked for a living in industry. He had no contact with the life of a factory plant or the job of operating an industry. He had no connection with the economic side of affairs in general.

Yet, during World War II, while Stalin ran Russia's war, he was suddenly assigned to take over a vital section of war industry, aircraft and tank production, and reorganize it as the top industrial manager. He did such a good job that he won special commendation from his boss, and was further rewarded with the task of reconstruction. Malenkov got results. In 1946, he stood second only to Stalin at the May Day parade. How was it that Malenkov could become a competent and skilled "industrialist" with no previous experience?

The average American might assume that he is a man of such rare and versatile talent as to make this feat possible in a field of life strange to him. No Russian would be puzzled; he knows how the system works because he feels it on his own back. That way one gets an education more quickly than he would by reading books.

But what was Malenkov's real job at this time? At the summit of each industrial setup, in the Russian system, is a job that has no American counterpart at all. It does not require "know-how" specific to the given field. It is the same job that is the peculiar province of the *top* leadership in *every* field, industrial or not. That is why men like Malenkov—or Kaganovich, or Khrushchev, and many others—could be shifted around almost at will, as emergency trouble-shooters.

Malenkov's real responsibility was not that of organizing, reorganizing or streamlining an industry. It was that of organizing *men*, the men who did have the know-how, the industrial managers.

The biggest Soviet myth is that of the famous Planned Economy. It is only in the last few years that this has begun to be realized by experts in the West. (One of the first effective exposés on this point was by Kravchenko in his book *I Chose Freedom*. Kravchenko has been a Soviet factory manager himself. The latest competent analysis of the Soviet "planned chaos" appeared in the February 1953 issue of *Fortune*.)

It is true that there is a plan, the current five-year plan. How it actually works is hinted by a favorite Russian joke: A factory manager wants to hire a chief book-keeper. Each applicant is asked how much is two plus two. The first says four; he is waved away. The second, not to be trapped, says five; he is denounced as an idiot who ought to go back to school. The third applicant tries three, with the same result. Finally one gives the right answer: "*What do you want it to be?*" He gets the job.

The plan is specific enough; it details everything from working capital and expenditures to prices, labor force,

time deadlines and, of course, output per month. The only trouble with it is that it is devised at the top and imposed from the top down, with all its astronomically complex array of interlocking data.

Theoretically, it is checked and revised by suggestions from below. In practice, what this means is either that the subordinates are supposed to show their eagerness by increasing their quotas and proposing even crueller speedups, or else that they engage in a regular haggling session to "bargain" their quotas down, whether they can actually fulfill them or not. The manager knows that every quota he fills means that the next will probably be even higher, and so it is well to start as low as possible.

The Soviet factory manager in this system is constantly aware that if he fails to meet the output quota, no matter what the reason, his neck is at stake. If he's lucky or has good political connections, it may only mean demotion. At any time, however, a failure can mean that he is accused of "sabotage"—and the consequences of that for himself and his family are incurable and final.

Every manager must make decisions as a matter of course; he must also sometimes take guesses. A mistaken decision or a bad guess can mean a bullet through the base of the brain. If the manager wants to survive, he will want to take responsibility for as few decisions as possible; he will spend hours documenting the fact, in advance, that a particular decision was the work of someone else. For the same reason, it may take the manager days to get some superior official to make a decision, which he needs immediately, because the superior is faced with the same dilemma.

If he has an unusually good month, he may hide part of his output from the factory inspectors in order to hold it over to make up the quota for the next month. It will not matter to him if, at the same time, the next plant which depends on the product is shut down for lack of parts. Inexcusable bottlenecks result, continuing the vicious circle.

So one of the most amazing parts of the system comes

in. It is called *blat* by the Russians, and everybody knows everybody else does it.

The manager goes about getting what he needs by "illegal" means—through personal deals, in violation of the plan, with this or that other agency. He wheedles additional workers into getting released from their jobs by various stratagems so they can work for him. He employs a "pusher" to scour around for his needs. He invites the local Party chief to a blowout in order to beg special help from outside "channels."

Or else he produces anyway, even if the product is sure to be defective. That is likely to be true for a dozen other reasons. The manager is transmitting the ruthless pressure from above. To meet the quota, the worker has to produce 50 parts a day; he knows he has to do it. It will be less important to him that the parts won't fit, if he can get away with it.

All of these operations won't show on the books. There are two sets of figures—one for the official inspectors, who regularly paw over the accounts, and one in the manager's head.

Each worker, and all of the higher-ups, are in constant danger of being found out. Each man is in a position to sell out someone, or be sold out himself. It is the shared guilt and shared fear of the consequences, rather than loyalty or friendship, which keeps everyone from putting someone else's head in a noose.

The men at the top around Malenkov know that this goes on all the time, but nobody minds too much so long as it doesn't get in anyone's way. Part of it they even encourage, particularly the dagger-point relations among the managerial personnel. For the main thing *they* are afraid of is that the factory staff will all gang up to cover up each other's delinquencies and slow down their pace. On the Malenkov level, the objective is to play every man against the other. For this reason, rarely is a factory manager, however successful, permitted to head the same plant for as much as two years. A plant may even have a half dozen managers in the course of a year. This means

a fantastic loss in experience, know-how and efficiency, but the manager cannot be allowed to build roots and friendships and "cliques" around him in his own bailiwick.

Besides all this, the Plan itself is subject to constant change. Major objectives may be switched in the middle if the Kremlin decides, for example, that new emphasis must be given to tank production. Or perhaps a kingsize bottleneck has piled up in one sector of industry. Scores of managers and commissars are liquidated, but the bottleneck remains. Suddenly the top bosses may decide to concentrate other resources on breaking the jam, and new figures are issued right and left. New bottlenecks will form because the new figures do not mesh with what went before.

Emergencies become the normal thing. To check on the mountains of bureaucratic red tape, more bureaucratic controls are introduced. Who will control the controllers?

This is where the Malenkovs come in.

For this system actually "works" in its own way, unbelievable as that may seem to one who has been brought up in a different world.

It staggers through, producing immense quantities of goods, too, but only through one vital cementing ingredient—a dynamo of ruthless pressure—a Malenkov.

Malenkov-under-Stalin was at the head of the pyramid of *dynamo-whips* of cruel unrelenting pressure which keeps the totalitarian jungle going. The Soviet system operates, above all, through *men* driven with the lash of fear, hunger, death, slavery and exploitation. That isn't indignant language. It is a statement of cold scientific analysis.

Its bones and sinews are the organs of the state through which *men* are controlled and driven. This is "personnel work!"

But this still does not describe *exactly* the post which Malenkov held under Stalin. One reads that he was head

of the "Party" organization, or, more officially, in charge of the "Party Secretariat."

The organization called the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not only unlike the major parties of our country; it is unlike any Western socialist party; and *it is even fundamentally different from any of the Western Communist Parties*, which are merely its puppets.

It is an entirely different type of organization, to be found only in countries where the Stalinist system is in *power*. (The other Communist Parties are transformed *into* this type of organization when they, too, come to power, as they did in the East European satellites of Moscow. This is one of the reasons why their Parties, once installed on the throne, have to go through a series of racking purges in order to change over to the new role.)

In power, as in Russia itself, the "Party" is the organization through which the Malenkovs perform the job we have described of cementing the whole system together. It is not a "political party" concerned with elections, even fake elections. That is meaningless detail. The power that holds the reins of the Party organization is the same as the power which has to transmit the totalitarian drive through every layer of the system.

This was Malenkov-under-Stalin.

Now to answer the three questions raised:

(1) *What is the biggest mistake that Americans make in trying to understand Russian events, like the replacement of Stalin by Malenkov?*

It is: thinking in American and Western terms.

Example: Malenkov was the head of the political machine, and political bosses are powerful men, but in the Russian system, where there is no nook and cranny of life which is not controlled by the "Party," the boss of the political machine is the Lord of Life and Death, above him only the All-Highest himself, Stalin. He is the Dynamo of the whole system. *Don't underestimate Malenkov!*

Malenkov is cruel, but he is not the dull-witted storm-trooper type who gets a physical satisfaction out of maim-

ing, clubbing and eye-gouging. In Russia, that type fits in perfectly, but only as a guard on a slave-labor camp or an NKVD executioner and gunman. Hitler had the same types for the same purposes.

See it through the mind of Malenkov. This is how he thinks: Human beings are things. They are things to be driven like machines and cattle, except in different ways. What is important is the State, which stands above men. The surgeon who cuts into living flesh is not a brute. He is sacrificing a part for the sake of the whole. Most people would flinch from the job, and get sick to the stomach. The surgeon is to be honored for not being subject to such human weakness. We must all sacrifice. I, Malenkov, sacrifice, too, for no one else is driven as hard as I drive myself. For everything I do, and all the crimes against humanity that I commit, are necessary for the preservation of our society, our world.

And he is right. They are necessary for the preservation of *his* system and *his* world, the world created by Stalin, *which is the only world that Malenkov has known in his years as a thinking man, which is the world in which he was brought up.*

In every society, some men have the qualities that the system needs and some don't. Malenkov has the qualities for survival and mastery in *his* world. Because of the kind of system that it is, Malenkov is the kind of man that he is, *in the only kind of world he knows.*

That leads to Question No. 2:

(2) *What is the big difference between Malenkov and Stalin?*

Stalin was the creator of this system, but he was not its product; he was not himself shaped by it into what he was. Malenkov is the homegrown child of the system he now heads. He comes into this position with no links with the past, no hangovers from a different culture, no inherited points of contact with the world outside. *Keep this in mind while watching Malenkov.*

The men who *founded* the American colonies were

Englishmen, transplanted. Their children were no longer Englishmen.

The colorful figures who founded the great fortunes of the wealthy American families came up from humble beginnings. Whether you consider the qualities they needed to be those of Robber Barons or of Captains of Industry, this is certain: their children were brought up in a different social world. They thought as rich men's sons from the cradle up.

This is what is burned into Malenkov's mind: the rules by which *he* made his way. And every man tends to think that what has brought him up to a height of power is also the way to win more power.

But the rules which brought him to top-dog position in the Russian world are not necessarily those that he can use in facing the Western world in his new job as Number One, without Stalin.

(3) *Why was it Malenkov who won the Number One spot against his competitors?*

Speculation about Stalin's successor has been going on for years. Dozens of "experts" and "authorities" on Russia have tried their hand at it. Yet how many are now coming forward to remind their faithful public that they pointed the finger to Georgi M. Malenkov?

Certainly, in the last couple of years especially, he was often mentioned as also-a-possibility. But main attention was usually concentrated on Molotov or Beria or even one of the more popular generals like Marshal Zhukov. Zhdanov was "it," according to many forecasters, until he died—defeated by Malenkov, it is now clear.

There was apparently good reason for that. Malenkov had no roots in the "heroic" period of Stalin's coming to power, like Molotov and Voroshilov, old sidekicks of the Boss. Beria had control of the secret police; Malenkov merely seemed a glorified errand boy for Stalin. Zhdanov had his own base in Leningrad and the further prestige of being credited with the defense and salvation of the city during the war; Malenkov had no public glamor. Moreover, Malenkov was one of the youngest of the top

gang; he had not even made the Politburo before 1946.

He had one thing in his favor, and that was enough to outweigh the claims of all the others. *The strings of the Party machine were in his hands*, placed there by Stalin himself. The Party machine is the fundamental power in the Soviet setup. No one will oust Malenkov unless and until he can take it away from Malenkov.

Scores of dictators throughout history have hoped to push their power beyond death by trying to decree their succession; most have failed. Did Stalin turn the trick before death took him?

Stalin himself had to establish his rule during years of bloody struggle and in a sense, the struggle never ended; the latest major Soviet purge took place only a few months before he died. Masters who rule a people by fear are doomed to fear themselves.

To all appearances, Malenkov took power as smoothly as a new U. S. corporation president moving into the Old Man's office. Less than 24 hours after the announcement of Stalin's death came word of Malenkov's take-over—including a complex plan for revamping the top government and Party machine. But there was an unmistakable note of urgency and apprehension in the air. "In this difficult time for our party and country," said Radio Moscow, "the most important task of the party and the government (is) to ensure the uninterrupted and correct leadership of the whole life of the country . . . and the prevention of any kind of disarray and panic."

The thoroughness with which "disarray and panic" were guarded against showed preparation. There seemed little doubt that: (1) Stalin himself had picked Malenkov; (2) the general plan, if not the details, of succession had been worked out long ago, with Stalin's approval.

No other Western statesman saw Stalin so frequently under intimate circumstances as did W. Averell Harri-
man. His talks and conferences with the late Soviet Premier began in September, 1941, with the first of his special missions to Moscow, and extended through his years

as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, ending in January, 1946.

Observes Harriman: "During the wartime years, I saw Stalin and Molotov together on some fifty-odd occasions and I formed the opinion that Stalin did not want Molotov to succeed him. Stalin depended upon Molotov as an effective and ruthless hatchet man who could faithfully carry out his instructions. But I saw, on several occasions, that Stalin had no great confidence in Molotov's judgment.

"During my first meeting with Stalin in Moscow in September, 1941, to discuss the Soviet supply and military situation, the Nazis were on the outskirts of the capital. It appeared to me at the time that Molotov, who was then foreign minister but who recently had been replaced as Premier by Stalin himself, was under a cloud. I felt that Stalin blamed Molotov for engineering the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which had given Stalin a false sense of security against German aggression. After the Red Army organized its first counter-offensive Molotov appeared to regain lost favor. But on several occasions, in my presence, Stalin rudely brushed aside positions taken by Molotov."

But if it is true that, even before Stalin's death, the main lever of power has been in Malenkov's hands for some years in the post-war period, what evidence has there been of *new* developments in the course of the regime since that time, coincident with Malenkov's ascendancy?

The first development, the rise of Soviet anti-Semitism, is now a well-known and world-wide scandal, but *Malenkov's connection with it is far from being fully realized in the West*. The second, the beginning of an "anti-sex" drive, is a development which has been slowly poking its nose up above the surface of Soviet life, but it has not yet hit the consciousness of Western observers, even though the scattered indications are all there.

CHAPTER XI

Malenkov and Anti-Semitism

THE RUSSIAN WORD for purge is "chistka"—literally, "cleansing"—and originally Lenin employed the purge to cleanse the Communist Party of his opponents. But in Stalin's hands the purge has become a weapon to create terror, to kill off enemies or potential rivals, to provide whipping boys for the regime's mistakes.

Before the war the purge was employed to consolidate Stalin's hold over Russia itself. Since the war it has been used mainly to consolidate Russia's hold over the satellites. No one in the West knows how many victims the purge has taken. But it is obvious that all Communists—no matter how high up in the hierarchy—are vulnerable. For example, of Lenin's twenty-one "Old Bolsheviks"—the men who led and won the 1917 Revolution—Molotov survives. Others were executed, liquidated or driven to take their own lives. As for the "New Bolsheviks"—those who led the revolutions in the "Peoples' Democracies"—Hungary's Rajk, Bulgaria's Kostov, Czechoslovakia's Slansky and Clementis, Poland's Gomulka and Rumania's Pauker are among those who already have fallen.

Thoroughly alarmed by the flood of Jewish enthusiasm for Israel which sprang up in the Soviet Union in the winter of 1948-49, the Kremlin reacted sharply. Almost overnight the Israeli Legation was effectively isolated from further contact with the Jewish population. The MVD proceeded to the swift liquidation of Jewish social and cultural organizations.

Even more drastic was the systematic campaign to eliminate Jews from posts of responsibility and especially from positions involving contact with the outside world. In a matter of weeks all Jews serving with the Soviet oc-

cupation administrations in Germany and Austria were recalled. Jews were no longer included on foreign missions and delegations. Today Jews are not even admitted to the special school that trains personnel for the Soviet foreign service. The same restrictions apply to the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Elsewhere in the government and party apparatus a similar process of elimination has occurred. The one Jew on the Politburo is Lazar Kaganovich, a long-standing member with strong personal connections.

The campaign against the Jews entered its most blatant phase in January, 1949, with the onslaught against the so-called "homeless or mongrel cosmopolites." Never were the "homeless cosmopolites" openly identified as Jews, but cartoonists depicted them with Fagin-like profiles and the public got the point.

The only important Jewish writers to survive the literary purge were Ilya Ehrenberg and proverbial hatchetman, David Zaslavsky. But even they went into temporary eclipse at the height of the campaign.

It began again in 1953 with the Malenkov-directed arrests of nine important Soviet doctors (six of them Jewish) on charges that they had planned to kill Communist leaders by harmful treatment and bad diagnosis. Moscow said the doctors confessed they had killed Andrei A. Zhdanov, one of the top members of the Politburo and Malenkov's arch rival, who died in 1948 after allegedly suffering from a heart attack.

Moscow charged that the plot was organized by Jews. It called the accused men "terrorist Jewish doctors" and said they were "connected with the international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization 'Joint' set up by the American Intelligence service."

Throughout the week there were charges of "fifth column" activity in the Soviet Union. The Moscow radio said there would be more arrests.

Lavrentia Beria, Chief of the security police organization, was attacked for not displaying "vigilance" in guard-

ing against the plotters. Thus, Malenkov drove another spike into a Party rival.

Why has the Kremlin started the purge and what does Moscow hope to gain by it? Where does the pattern of anti-Semitism fit in?

In the West, the whys and wherefores of Russian purges look mysterious and fantastic—until enough information is gathered to put two and two together. Then things begin to make sense, *in terms of the Stalinist mind*.

The following happened in 1943 and no one paid any attention to it then.

In that year a certain Russian novelist was acting as field correspondent for the army newspaper *Red Star*. His name was Vassily Semenovitch Grossman. The Russian armies had just liberated the Ukraine from the Germans. Grossman toured the newly reclaimed land. Desolation met his eyes. The Nazis had burned, killed, and destroyed. The Russians, too, following their "scorched earth" policy, had burned, killed, and destroyed. The countryside lay ravaged.

The job of a Soviet newspaperman was to write glowing articles for his paper on the heroic struggles of the people against the Hitlerite invader and how Stalin inspired them through it all. His job was to tell how the people were already reconstructing the land in the name of Stalin, whether or not they were.

Vassily Semenovitch Grossman dutifully went back and started a series of articles on what had struck him most. Two such articles were printed, on November 25 and December 2, 1943, and then the series abruptly stopped.

Today, ten years later, this same Grossman has been singled out for vicious attacks by *Pravda* as the author of ideological crimes against the state. Why? Here are four facts:

- (1) First of all, V. S. Grossman is a Jew.
- (2) The articles he published in 1943 were on the subject "The Ukraine Without Jews."
- (3) His own newspaper, *Red Star*, was not the one that started to print this series. They appeared in the

official Yiddish-language organ of the regime, *Einigkeit*, which since then has been liquidated along with all other Jewish organs and institutions in Russia.

(4) In his articles, Grossman had written the following:

"I covered this country (the Ukraine) on foot and by car from the Northern Donets to the Dnieper, from Voroshlovgrad in the Donets Basin to Chernigov on the Desna River. I went down to the Dnieper and looked from afar at Kiev—and I met but one Jew in all that time. He was Lieutenant Kapershtein, who had been caught in an enemy encirclement in the Yagotin District in September 1941."

What "crime" does this add up to?

Instead of plugging the happy, devoted work of the Soviet Ukrainians, Grossman was exposing a propaganda myth of the Soviet bosses in the Ukraine—the myth that *the Kremlin had "saved the Jews from Hitler."* Actually, something quite different had happened in the Ukraine.

Grossman was too much concerned with the fate of the Ukrainian Jews. He was therefore a "Jewish bourgeois nationalist." And this last year "Jewish bourgeois nationalism" has become the Number One crime in Stalinland, as Stalin himself was living through his last months.

The new drives against "Zionists," "bourgeois nationalist" and "cosmopolitan" Jews—the fate of the Ukrainian Jews—these point to Malenkov even more than to Stalin himself.

Again, back in 1907, Stalin—then called "Koba"—was making a report before his Bolshevik group in Baku, in the Georgia where he was born. In this report, as if for a jest, he slyly remarked that the Mensheviks, who were the Bolsheviks' right-wing rivals in the Socialist movement, were to a large extent composed of Jews. And he added that "the Mensheviks are a Jewish group, the Bolsheviks a true Russian group, and it may not be a bad idea to make a pogrom inside the Party."

Baku was off the beaten path in the provinces, but much later when the Bolshevik leaders heard about it

their hair stood on end. Only Stalin could have jested in such a grim way in pogrom-ridden Russia. It was as if an American liberal were to make a speech here treating the lynching of Negroes as a matter for merriment.

This ingrained anti-Semitism popped out of Stalin at other crucial moments. In the 1920's he was working tooth and nail to consolidate his new hold over the Bolshevik party and to crucify his leading opponent, Leon Trotsky. Backing up Leon Trotsky were also top leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev. These three "Left Oppositionists" happened to be of Jewish birth, as were also some other important supporters of their group. Slyly, the Stalin clique kept reminding the country that the opposition was "full of Jews," underhandedly appealing to remaining anti-Semitic prejudices. If he had dared then, he would have more boldly carried out his 1907 prescription of "making a pogrom inside the Party," but his rule was still too shaky and the traditions of the revolution were still too strong.

In 1939 Stalin sought to save his regime by making his notorious war pact with the anti-Semitic regime of Hitler. After the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact, a shocked world heard Stalin's foreign minister Molotov declare that, after all, "Fascism is a matter of taste."

When Hitler and Stalin divided up conquered Poland, thousands of Polish Jews tried to flee the Nazi-occupied section in order to take their chances with the Russian partner. Other masses of Jews were even pushed across the border to the Russians, by the Nazis themselves. It is an established fact that the Soviet authorities refused to accept them in sanctuary and insisted on returning them to their Nazi captors!

Among the documents captured in the German archives after the fall of Berlin is this private report to his superiors by Nazi Colonel General Keitel, *complaining about the Russians*:

"The expulsion of Jews into Russian territory, in particular, did not proceed as smoothly as had apparently been expected. In practice, the procedure was, for exam-

ple, that at a quiet place in the woods, a thousand Jews were expelled across the Russian border; fifteen kilometers away, they came back, with the Russian commander trying to force the German one to re-admit the group."

(From *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, the collection of secret German government reports, published by the U. S. government in 1948.)

It is now known that anti-Semitic feelings were widespread in the Russian army. Soldiers and officers of Jewish origin, who have since fled to the West, have given abundant accounts of this. Many Jewish ex-officers have reported that they changed their names during the war not because they feared capture by the *Nazis* but because of the hostility to Jews inside the *Russian* army. (Rachel Erlich's *Summary Report on 18 Intensive Interviews with Jewish DPs from Poland and the Soviet Union, October 1948*.)

Open shows of Soviet anti-Semitism flared up first in the military circles, significant in the light of the new influx of generals and military men into the top ruling committee under Malenkov on the day after Stalin's death.

Next it is important to see that the post-war increase in anti-Semitism was biggest in—the *Ukraine*.

Immediately after the liberation, Jews returning to their homes in the Ukraine were greeted with hostility in many sections. Many who tried to regain their homes and possessions were subjected to physical attack. Others never got back more than a small part of their property.

In Kharkov Jews did not dare venture out into the streets at night. In Kiev a pogrom took place in which sixteen Jews were killed. When the Jewish community complained, the officials replied that the population had been "infected" by the Germans and that only gradual steps could be taken to change the situation. The fact is that no campaign against anti-Semitism of any sort—gradual or otherwise—was ever undertaken by the Ukrainian Soviet bosses.

A Ukrainian Jew who left the region in 1944 made

the following deposition to the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine:

"The Ukrainian authorities are greatly anti-Semitic. . . . When the Commercial Academy moved from Khar-kov to Kiev, several Jewish professors applied for permission to go there; but their applications were rejected. They addressed themselves to the chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet but received no response."

One—but only one—of the reasons why the Ukrainian authorities had no intention of vigorously moving against anti-Semitism was a special one. During the Nazi occupation of the region, anti-Moscow armed bands of Ukrainian nationalists had sprung up. Some of these bands collaborated with the invading Germans, being reactionary and anti-Semitic in their own character. They too had taken part in the extermination of Jews—the Ukrainian Jews whom Vassily Semenovitch Grossman later failed to find. After the expulsion of the Germans, some of these bands still maintained existence, even as late as the end of 1947.

One would think that the Soviet regime would have regarded these elements as worse than war criminals. But the fact is that the authorities planned to make a deal with them. In a speech before the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Politburo member Khrushchev discussed the question of an amnesty for these anti-Semitic elements. As long as they stopped fighting the regime, their anti-Semitic record and activities need not count against them. . . .

Last year, just a short time after the end of the famous trial of Slansky in Prague, in which leading Jewish Communist leaders were condemned and shot, an extraordinary event took place in the Ukraine. Three Jewish officials were arrested and dragged before a special military tribunal and after a brief trial they were put to death. The timing of such a trial, in this area which was already a tinder-box of anti-Semitism, meant that the basest passions of the Ukrainian people were being aroused.

Following the denunciation of the Kremlin physicians, the Ukrainian *Pravda* denounced twenty Jewish doctors in the cities of Kiev and Nikolaev on trumped-up accusations of deception, fraud, embezzlement and disloyalty to the government. In Kiev, two Jewish doctors, Patzuk and Magaziner, were denounced as "quacks" who had only passed themselves off as doctors. In Nikolaev, five Jewish doctors were charged with having defrauded the state of more than 600,000 rubles; their names are (or were) Drs. Heller, Wasserman, Makarovsky, Ravich and Litzman.

For every Jewish doctor or professional worker who is *publicly* denounced and driven into the pillory, there are scores of others who suffer the same fate without publicity.

The name to associate with this Ukrainian development is—Khrushchev. It was Khrushchev who was the party boss of the Ukraine all during the war and until 1945. With the re-establishment of peace, the evidence goes to show that at first Stalin sought to moderate the flames of anti-Semitism there, not for love of the Jews but because he feared it might also become a danger to his own regime. In 1945 or 1946, a new party boss was appointed for the region from Moscow—and it turned out to be the only Jewish member of the Politburo, Kaganovich! Nothing much changed, as we have seen, and the flames smoldered, but remained dampened.

Then in 1948 Kaganovich was jerked out of the post and the man who took over was—*again Khrushchev*. There can be no doubt that the reassignment of Khrushchev to the Ukraine was the work of *the man who, by 1948, had grown powerful enough to swing such "personnel" matters: Georgi M. Malenkov*.

For Khrushchev is a "Malenkov man." With the death of Stalin and the reorganization of the government under Malenkov, the same Khrushchev has risen to take the very job under Malenkov which Malenkov held under Stalin—direct charge of the whole Party machinery, boss of the Party Secretariat."

Khrushchev remained in the Ukraine only until 1950. In that year he became head of the Moscow Party organization. This promotion could be possible only for one who was completely the creature of the man who held all the Party reins.

When Khrushchev left the Ukraine, his place was taken by a bureaucrat who is even more obviously a puppet of Malenkov's. His name is Melnikov. He is a "new man," selected by Malenkov from the same Moscow Party organization; that is, he is an aspiring career-man who has been mounting the ladder under Malenkov's wing.

With Stalin, anti-Semitism was kept in the background. What accounts basically for the developments of the last couple of years is the push of the "new men" around Stalin, *their* growing power in anticipation of his death, the influence of the new-type Soviet bureaucrats who have no link with the hangovers of the past and through whom all the darkest forces of Soviet barbarism are unleashed.

Malenkov stands at the head of this clique.

With Stalin's death, the representatives of the *two focal points* of growing Soviet anti-Semitism come out into the open as members of this Malenkov clique. The generals come into his new entourage in force never before seen in Stalin's own cabinet, and Khrushchev is revealed as Malenkov's right hand.

The extreme anti-Semitic wing of Stalin's bureaucracy are now the men in power.

While Stalin was alive they had pushed forward slowly and cautiously over a period of years. The big outburst came only shortly before Stalin's end, when they must have known he was failing and when many of his day-to-day functions must surely have already been taken over by Malenkov. And now . . . we know what to expect.

A question still remains.

Granted that Malenkov heads a wing of the bureaucracy that is personally anti-Semitic, and granted that this

is in line with what we can expect from men who have arisen from the dark abyss of the Soviet jungle, where the basest passions get free rein, what has *Malenkov* to gain by flaunting this Soviet "Hitlerism" in the face of the world? Why does *his* clique adopt anti-Semitism as a weapon, and against whom is it a weapon? Does he really think that the Jews are such a danger as he makes out?

The answer to this question, it happens, will also add to the evidence that the *new* outburst of Soviet anti-Semitism is to be traced to Malenkov's hand.

It was no accident that the first anti-Semitic show-trial took place not in Russia itself but in one of the satellite countries—the aforementioned trial of Rudolf Slansky in Prague, Czechoslovakia. For there is a whole part of the story of Malenkov's fight for the post of No. 1 which has not yet been mentioned in this book—or anywhere else. Yet, anyone acquainted with the real workings of the Soviet system knows that it must have been there.

The men of the Kremlin who struggled against each other to be Stalin's heir had *two* jobs to do before their hopes could be realized completely. The first and fundamental one we have explained: to seize control of the Party machinery. What exactly does this mean in practical terms? It means that the winner is the man who gets his own men, obligated to him, into the key organs of the Party everywhere. But all of this, so far, has referred to the machinery of the *Russian* Party.

But this Russian power now has an empire to hold, a whole series of *other countries* which it controls through puppet Communist Parties in those countries. Just as the aspiring Russian dictator has to have his own creatures in every branch of the Russian Party, so he has to have his own creatures in control of the satellite Communist Parties. This was the next stage that Malenkov had to go through after consolidating his inside track in Russia.

And in all the countries of Eastern Europe, the local

sub-fuehrers were not his men—yet. They had been hand-picked and installed, as a matter of fact, by the man who had been his most dangerous rival, Andrei Zhdanov. This had taken place at the close of the war when, riding on the gun carriages of the Russian army as it took over the satellites, the Russian masters put their own creatures at the head of the new governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Albania.

But not all were of this stripe. In a few cases, individual Communist leaders had stayed in their own countries during the war and made big reputations for themselves as nationalist leaders against the Nazi armies. The most prominent examples were Tito of Yugoslavia and Wladislaw Gomulka of Poland. It was no accident that one after the other, beginning with Tito, these types were later accused by Moscow of being “anti-Soviet nationalists,” that is, they wouldn’t take orders like beaten dogs. Only Tito actually got away with it, but only at the cost of a complete break with Russia. This was followed by the famous series of purges of “Titoists” all over Eastern Europe.

The rest were Andrei Zhdanov’s trained monkeys, who remained loyal to him. They were safe—as long as Zhdanov was in the saddle in Moscow. But when the internal struggle between Zhdanov and Malenkov was decided—and sealed in the only way an inner-Kremlin struggle can be sealed, with Zhdanov’s sudden death in a suburban Moscow hospital especially built for this purpose by Beria with Malenkov’s aid—another purge became due.

This was the purge of the Zhdanov men in the satellites in favor of the Malenkov men. This is what has been behind the last wave of purges in East Europe. Malenkov had to find a way to make a clean sweep there.

This is why *anti-Semitism* was introduced as a weapon for this purpose. The key fact is this: among the satellite sub-fuehrers who had been put in power by Zhdanov

and who were still in power, *an extraordinarily large number were Jews.*

It was not any immediate danger from the Jewish population of *Russia* which was the direct warrant for the latest outburst; the only sector of Stalinland where Jews played a big role was *in the Eastern European Communist Party leaderships.*

The leadership of the Hungarian regime is largely Jewish, headed up by Matyas Rakosi, who spent fifteen years in prison before being released to the Kremlin in exchange for Hungarian war prisoners.

The number of Jews at the top of the Polish branch-office of Moscow is considerable, led by veteran Communist President Boleslaw Bierut and Minc. In Czechoslovakia we all saw the number of Jewish Stalinist leaders who figured, from Rudolf Slansky on down. In Romania there is (or was) Ana Pauker and her clique. Only in Bulgaria and Albania is there an absence of Jews in the top echelons.

The large number of Stalinist henchmen of Jewish origin who were installed by Zhdanov was not due to Zhdanov's own inclinations. The fact is that Zhdanov had his own personal reputation for anti-Semitism. But first, he had few alternatives in 1945: he wanted men who would not be subject to "nationalism" and there were not many to choose from. Secondly, it was widely suspected even at the time, by informed observers, that he was not at all loath to pick Jews to do a job which was sure to get them hated by their own country's people, for later they could be discarded and the population's resentments sidetracked. Later, Georgi Malenkov was able to use this device to advantage.

By using the weapon of anti-Semitism, Malenkov turns the sharp edge of this weapon against the Zhdanov men, who will be cleaned out one and all. Slansky was the warning. Ana Pauker is in growing disfavor. Lajos Stoeckler, president of the Hungarian Jewish community has been arrested. Rakosi will be next. Not even Malen-

kov knows where it will stop, because once race prejudice is given impetus, there is no telling how it will end. Whatever else results from the purge, the 3,000,000 Jews living in Russia and the satellites are in grave danger.

CHAPTER XII

Malenkov and Sex

"MALENKOV LOOKS LIKE A EUNUCH," a Western diplomat who met him told a colleague. He did not mean it literally, of course, and yet he said more than he knew.

This chapter is the first attempt made anywhere to put together part of an unknown picture. As the new men of power come up from the steaming Soviet bureaucratic jungle, what part does sex play in their lives? What are their attitudes on women and love?

The question must be asked. Of all the dark aspects about the men who rule a sixth of the planet, this is the darkest.

Don't expect to read about secret orgies in the Kremlin. The truth is far more amazing.

There has been a new trend in Stalinland in the last few years. Where it has been noticed at all, it has been treated only as a curiosity—one of the strange things the Stalinists do and say that sane men can only shrug off.

It is a new line on sex. It does not stem from Stalin. There was absolutely nothing whatsoever in Stalin's personal history, habits, life, turn of mind or sentiments or ideas which ties in with it; on the contrary! And by now a great deal is known about the personality of Stalin.

Besides, this trend has become visible to the naked eye only *in the last few years*. Like the new Soviet anti-Semitism, it must be tied up with the victory of the new type of Soviet bureaucrat who has developed on the home soil of the Russian system, the type of Malenkov.

Whatever is believed, here are *facts*. First, start a little distance back.

The Soviet leaders have gone through three stages in their attitude toward promiscuous sexual conduct.

In the period directly after the Russian Revolution of 1917, the idea arose in some sections of the Communist Party that all of the oldfashioned bourgeois moral attitudes on the behavior of the sexes were now as outmoded as the capitalist system. The real Communist must know no taboos. Sexual intercourse was a natural function like any other and there must be no mumbo-jumbo about it. It was just like drinking a glass of water. You are thirsty and you drink. You feel desire and you satisfy it.

This came to be discussed under the name of the "glass of water theory." One of its main proponents was the active Bolshevik woman leader, Alexandra Kollontai. But Lenin set his face and authority sternly and vigorously against it, and it never made any headway as a tolerated point of view.

Arguing from his Marxist point of view, he sought to explain to those who would go wild with new elaborations on the emancipation of women, that socialism sought the development of the highest aspects of the human personality, and that close tender relationships between man and woman was one of these. Had not the great teacher of the movement, Frederick Engels, written a book in which he had argued that the institution of monogamous marriage, while it had arisen with class societies, would find its very highest honor under socialism?

But things changed when Stalin consolidated his own dictatorship, built a new bureaucratic machine around him, and liquidated virtually every one of the Old Bolsheviks in framed-up trials and secret assassinations. With the new despots came a new mode of living for the privileged few on top. They began to fall into the pattern of every set of uncontrolled tyrants. Stories began to circulate of riotous parties and practices. It was well known that scores of the most powerful masters, on every step of the ladder from Moscow down to the provincial leaderships, kept mistresses. Others discarded their wives to marry glamorous actresses and ballet dancers. These were among the age-old rewards of power—why not take advantage of them?

And then, in the last decade, there has been an unexpected change. Instead of sinking deeper and deeper into the habits of profligates and rakes, there was an about-face. But only in part. The result is a curious combination of both of the preceding periods.

Lower bureaucrats still notoriously keep mistresses, for example, and attractive young women who have cases to plead or favors to ask can expect the time-honored routine. The same goes for the military bureaucracy. The same for the artistic intelligentsia. The same for dignitaries ranging from concentration-camp commandants to party secretaries.

But not the top men of the regime! For years now, it has come to be understood that if you want to get near the summits, you must not be the type that "gets entangled with women." And finally: "Malenkov looks like a eunuch."

The model for the top leadership has been set at almost a Puritan standard. Mistresses are out. Even wives who are too glamorous are frowned on. A steady and stable home life is the goal.

This has nothing to do with moral scruples or ideals. The reason is purely practical. In the first place, "entanglements" with women are dangerous. Who knows this better than these same bureaucrats who systematically use women to entrap and spy on enemies and foreigners?

Furthermore, susceptibility to women—"overemphasis on sex"—is a sign of weakness. It can lead to divided loyalties. This regime wants no personal loyalties to exist between man and man, man and woman, parent and child, which are stronger than the individual's loyalty to the state.

In America, too, we speak of men who are "married to their job." Here it is regarded as a personal characteristic. The Russian bureaucracy has raised this to the level of a principle for the leadership of the state. Take a busy American executive who is "married to his job" and

multiply the characteristic by a hundred, add a new dimension, pour steel-reinforced concrete into the mold, and you will get an idea of the model New Soviet Bureaucrat.

This is an extension of something we are familiar with. It predates the rise of Premier Georgi Malenkov. It is in this atmosphere that Malenkov learned the rules for making his way.

The new trend of the last few years has given all this a further logical twist and put it before the mass of people as an image of the New Soviet Man.

Every man and woman must be married to the State. The new line is that romantic love is a "bourgeois deviation."

A Soviet textbook for school children is entitled *I Want To Be Like Stalin*. The new party line on love demands that all good Communists must Want To Be Like the Masters. The aim is to produce a race of eunuchs of a type that the world has never seen.

Hard to believe? No one but a first-rate satirist could have invented the following proofs if the Communists had not actually written them themselves in dead-sober seriousness.

You are listening to Radio Moscow, last December, to be specific. It is broadcasting the Soviet equivalent of a soap opera in which boy meets girl. She is a young girl tractor driver; he is a worker on a collective farm. The scene is a field, on a night of the full moon. What are they doing? Why, working, like good enthusiastic Communists who know that the eight-hour day is a capitalistic invention. But soon the girl stops the motor:

SHE: "How wonderful it is to work on such a night, and to do everything to economize on gasoline."

HE: "This night has given me the idea of working harder and harder to surpass the Plan."

With some more of such tender interchange, they fall into each other's arms. He murmurs caressingly:

"From the very first moment I saw you, I was enrap-

tured by your capacity for work." (Reported in the Berne, Switzerland, *Freies Volk*, a liberal periodical, on December 19, 1952.)

There is no evidence that Soviet housewives drop their dishes to listen to this drivel. But they don't have much choice, and it doesn't matter to the Masters. They are setting out their model on how to make love on the five-year plan. An American soap opera might use the old one in which the boy pretends that the auto has run out of gas. This is bourgeois decadence, implying wastefulness. When a good Soviet girl invites opportunity, it is in terms of fulfilling the Plan by saving gas. Love at first sight is also still here, but . . . the female flesh is to be valued in terms of labor power.

The satellites play the game of follow-the-leader. On the Budapest radio a commentator announces the evils of "capitalistic love," which he calls "romance on the conveyor belt." He goes on to describe love in Soviet society as "sincere, beautiful and pure." By "pure" he apparently means dehydrated. For he, too, presents a model to his listeners, a chapter from a Soviet novel by Maltsov, *With One's Heart*.

"This," he preaches, "describes the skiing visit of a young man and a young girl to a collective farm. Enthralled by the examination of agricultural machinery, they forget the time, and in the dark they miss the way and wind up on a fox-breeding farm, among the sheds.

"But beyond trying to warm her frozen hands, breathing hotly down her neck and trying to kiss her, at which she bursts into tears, the hero makes no further advances. To ensure further meetings, however, he lends the girl his gloves, and they part filled with glowing happiness." (The magazine *East Europe* for April 1951.)

Soviet re-educators are not going back to the 18th century; nor are they becoming Puritanical.

Here is a contemporary Communist exposition of the New Soviet Love, heavy with fake theory:

"Love has passed through three historical stages. In feudalism the relation between the sexes is the master-

slave relation, with the woman always listening to the man and sticking to him like a piece of property. In capitalist love, affection is bought and sold. The woman sells her beauty, youth and flesh for luxury and comfort offered by the man. Finally comes the new Democratic Love. Man and woman have no mercenary relations, and therefore, the highest form of love is reached. . .

"This love is sombre, intellectual and definitely revolutionary. . . Under the trees on moonlit nights, small groups of schoolmates argue serious problems. You will never see a boy and a girl pair off to look at the moon or whisper to each other in typical bourgeois manner. If enemy agents try to engage us in amatory affairs, they are quickly rebuffed. . . When we look up at the sky, we can only think how happy the moon must be to shine on Stalin. . ." (Ceylon *Daily News*, May 7, 1951.)

The last two sentences, with the reference to "enemy agents," is an attempt to redirect the sex impulse into love for the state.

One of the few Western observers who has noticed this trend at all writes as follows: The Stalinists' literary bloodhounds "blame their own writers' *romantic approach to the love question* on Western influence. A Budapest Red organ declares *the love question* must hereafter be treated in a *sober and super-revolutionary way*. . . . In fact, romantic tendencies *smell of bourgeois idealism* and must be scotched. The publication of pocket-sized love stories is prohibited by the Prague regime. *Rude Pravo*, the top Communist Party organ in Czechoslovakia, urges as substitute reading such romance-whetting volumes as *How to Fight a Kulak*, *The Lot of U. S. Negroes*, *The Coal Brigades* and *The Fraud of Catholic Miracles*." (Leland Stowe, *Conquest by Terror*.)

The Soviet regimes carefully pick their candidates for popular heroes in order to educate the people on How to Be Like the Masters. Another Czech organ, *Pravo Lidu*, in 1952 reported that Vera Hamoelkova, a 21-year-old student at a mining college, "spent her wedding night in true People's Democracy fashion." Don't jump to con-

clusions. The girl, says the paper, "took her bridegroom down into the Stalin Mine, where the couple put in a voluntary night shift to increase coal production."

What is behind this systematic attempt to teach a strange combination of prudery and sexlessness, under the guise of fighting "bourgeois romantic love"? It is true that the Soviet doctrine refuses to recognize modern psychoanalysis, but the shade of Freud can afford to look down on the Kremlin and chuckle.

The New Soviet Bureaucrats are projecting their own psychology onto the masses.

The strange thing about this trend is that it was predicted in fictional form by a writer who is still being criticized in some literary circles for letting his "imagination" go wild on this point. The book is the famous novel *1984* by the late George Orwell.

But Orwell was not letting his imagination go wild. He understood the Soviet system. He asked himself what it would look like when all of its characteristics were developed to the limit, and wrote a fantasy tale embodying his vision of a "Stalinism-plus," set decades ahead in the future. To many critics who praised his political insight, his picture of the anti-sex campaign in *1984*'s Soviet system appeared overdrawn. Yet when the novel was published in 1949, the symptoms were already starting to appear behind the Iron Curtain. Orwell explained it in advance.

He depicted the Model Totalitarian Woman who has absorbed the Party's teachings, carried to the limit. The hero Winston recalled his relations with his wife, Katharine, and compared embracing her to grabbing a jointed wooden image. She did not resist, nor did she cooperate; she submitted. And Winston, like a normal male (but apparently not like a Soviet male) found the situation extremely embarrassing and, finally, horrible.

But Orwell carries his lance further. Hero Winston, indoctrinated as he was, could have stood this nonsense had his wife not decided to have babies. Their love-making became a once-a-week drudgery, for two purposes:

1. To make a baby, and, 2. To do their duty to the Party.

Naturally enough (or, unnaturally, if sitting in Malenkov's corner), Winston grew to dread that one day each week.

Though in exaggerated form, Orwell has explained the direction of the Soviet bureaucratic mind in the realm of love and sex.

He explains that the aim of the Party in this is, among other things, to keep men and women from forming loyalties which the Party might not be able to control. He has put his finger on the main point.

But not all of Orwell's women were as narrowly directed as Katharine. 1984's hero eventually meets Julia, the girl in the Anti-Sex League, and she, of course, turns out to be quite Pro-Sex.

Julia had grasped the Party's meaning of sexual puritanism. She knew it not as merely a sex instinct in its own little world, but as a means to creating emotional hysteria, desirable because it could then be transformed into war fever and leader idolatry.

But how about the family? Malenkov knows today that the family, as such, cannot be abolished. So, instead, children are set against parents, as spies, ready to report to the Party authorities the tiniest defection from the Line. In this way, the family is preserved—a small howling group of frightened people surrounding each other as informers in their desperate attempt to do good by the State.

And this is not prediction or fiction. It is straight political reporting of reality, well known to Malenkov and to all students of the Soviet. The Kremlin despots systematically use children to inform on their parents. One of the boy heroes of the Soviet Union, whose picture hangs in school rooms all over the country, was a little monster who (according to the official story) denounced his own father to the secret police. He is a "martyr" because, when he proceeded to widen his stoolpigeon activities to the rest of his village, he was killed by his own grandfather.

It is not only "romantic love" that the Soviets wish to totalitarianize. It is every aspect of personal life.

In Romania, a young worker named Modi Sandalovici is compelled to beat his breast in public confession in the columns of the Young Communist organ (*Scanteia Tineretului* for March 27, 1952). He recognizes his "errors" and "grave sins." Among these are "spending too much time running after the girls in the shop" and "doing his work poorly." And among them also he admits: "*I began to like the waltz, that decadent dance, to lace my shoes like the young bourgeois, and to wear a hunting cap.*"

In Hungary, the official organ of the Budapest Communist Party had to warn its readers, on the contrary, that simply wearing a necktie was *not* "bourgeois." There seemed to have been some doubts about that among the zealous.

The state arranges for vacations, how to spend leisure time, how to get married in short order in a factory ceremony so as to lose the least amount of time from work, what kind of music to like, and what clothes are "counter-revolutionary."

A good installment of 1984 is here, today, under Premier Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov.

CHAPTER XIII

Ruler of $\frac{1}{6}$ the Earth . . . $\frac{1}{3}$ Its People

WE HAVE SEEN WHAT KIND OF MAN Malenkov is. We have examined his personal qualities and the capacities which he brings to his new assignment in the Prime Minister's post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics as well as the Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party. These were among the top posts held by Stalin.

The sixty-four dollar question is, can Malenkov measure up to the demands of leadership in the most powerful state in world history? The manner in which he manipulates the reins of power that are now his, and the goals he pursues with that power, affect the destiny of every human being on this planet.

Unlike great conquerors who had preceded him, Malenkov's own predecessor, Stalin, did not rely only upon the military and political power of the state he ruled. Through the international Communist movement, he commanded powerful or significant fifth columns in every major country of the world, using them to stir dissension, foment civil wars, and gather espionage data as the needs of the Soviet Union dictated. Thus even in times of peace, Stalin could and did wage political—or sometimes even military—warfare against other sovereign nations.

Such is Malenkov's inheritance.

The Stalin era transformed Russia from a backward agrarian country into the world's second most powerful industrial state. The following table shows the phenomenal growth of Soviet strength in five key sinews of industrial might, and compares the Russian output with that of the U. S. (Figures are in millions of metric tons and

billions of kilowatt hours; totals for 1952 and 1955 are calculated from percentage increases in goals of the Five-Year Plans.)

	U. S. S. R.			U. S.
	1927-28	1952	1955 (Goal)	1951
Pig Iron	3.3	25	34.3	64.0
Steel	4.3	25	44.7	95.5
Oil	11.5	47	69.4	307.5
Coal	35.5	300	377.5	523.0
Electricity	5.0	117	162.5	482.3

The industrial potential of the Soviet Union, even when added to that of its satellites, is far less than that of the U. S. and its Western European allies. But the combined strength of the Communist world in actual military force in being at the present time exceeds that of the U. S. and its allies. The Communist forces have 9,000,000 to 11,000,000 men under arms, the West 8,000,000 to 9,300,000.

And behind the Communist armed strength there is the relentless pressure of its ideological appeal.

The Golden Horde was aptly named. The fierce Mongols, peerless warriors, cared only for the plunder their conquests brought them. They had no genius for organizing the conquered lands and winning the allegiance of their peoples. Their empire reached its greatest extent—from China and Siberia to Poland—under Kublai Khan, who ruled from 1259 to 1294. But hardly had he died when it began to fall apart.

On the rubble of the Mongol kingdoms rose the Russian Empire. In the last days of the khanate the Dukes of Moscow founded a Russian state. Ivan the Terrible proclaimed himself the first Czar “of all the Russias” in the sixteenth century. Fur traders and Cossack freebooters fought their way into Siberia; in less than 100 years “Great Russia” stretched to the Pacific Ocean.

The Czars took the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Moslem Central Asia by force. They added the Baltic countries

and much of Poland. Many of these lands regained their freedom in the chaotic days of the revolution—only, in large part, to be recaptured by the new Soviet Union. In little more than 30 years since, under Josef Stalin, the conquest of the satellite system has still further swollen the Russian “Empire.”

Can Malenkov hold these conquests where the Mongols failed?

The very name the Russian Empire now bears—namely, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—is a lie; for the U. S. S. R. is not a union of republics as it is proclaimed to be; instead it is the compulsory serfdom of nearly 200 subjugated nationalities, speaking different languages and stemming from different cultures, each held in leash by terror.

Only half of Malenkov’s 215,000,000 subjects inside the U. S. S. R. are Great Russians. The 50,000,000 Ukrainians and White Russians in the south and west, the smaller numbers of Baltic peoples in the northwest, the Turks and Mongols in the east—all have cultures of their own and ancient traditions of freedom. They chafe under the ever-broadening Russification program of the regime. Uncounted millions more, prisoners in Siberian slave-labor camps, are potential recruits for rebellion.

In the satellites Moscow has exploited rather than developed. Trade is manipulated in Russia’s favor, leaving subject peoples no margin for better living. Resentment of this “one-way street” can only deepen the bitterness of the captive Poles, with their centuries-old hatred of the Russians; the Czechs, with their memories of hard-won independence; and the Balkan peoples, traditionally jealous of their national freedom.

The Russian grip is weakest in China. The 450,000,000 Chinese want no more foreign domination. Historically, the Russians have victimized them—notably in Mongolia and in Manchuria. And the Chinese did not long endure a similar fate at the hands of the Mongols.

Ninety-seven percent of the 215 million inhabitants

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are Malenkov's State serfs. The remaining six million are members and candidates of the Russian Communist Party—a high privileged group of state bureaucrats. These are the men and women with the heaviest stake in Russia. They are the plant managers, technologists, government office holders, intelligentsia, collective-farm managers.

Greatest rewards of Soviet life, including the best living quarters, motor cars, food, higher pay and social position go to them.

What is the internal mechanism for the operation and interrelations of this new ruling class of Russia, the totalitarian bureaucracy? The real power resides at the apex of the bureaucratic structure with no control over it from the ranks below. The convocation of the Congress does not provide an opportunity for the ranks to assess policies but to rally the apparatus, to confirm the adherence of the party machinery.

The Communist Party congress is meaningless and functionless as an institution of control over the bureaucracy. Its remaining role—and one that accounts for the decreasing frequency that role has had to be played since there was an interval of 13 years between Congresses—is something else.

For a monolithic state also has its group and clique struggles.

These take place not in the party as a whole—that is a capital offense—and still less in the society as a whole, but are confined to and centered in the top circles. The tug-of-war of the bureaucratic groups and cliques has its own forms, its own weapons, but it is there.

How does this class as such limit and condition the will of the top dictators?

The bureaucracy wields its political power through the fusion of the Communist Party with every organ, organization, nook, cranny and thread of the State and all State institutions.

The executive committee of the ruling bureaucratic class is the Party. The central lever of power is not in the

army, not in the MVD, not in the managerial staffs of the industries. It lies at the apex of the Party apparatus.

It is this lever that Malenkov possessed as a general secretary and Orgburo head, for several years under Stalin.

At the summit of Soviet life is the Presidium. Until recently, unlike the American and British Cabinets, its personnel had been virtually unchanged in a decade.

The Presidium was formed in October, 1952, by abolishing the Politburo and merging the Political Bureau and Organization Bureau. These two bureaus had been the subcommittees of the central committee. They were the day-to-day centers of real power.

The job of the Central Committee (which is now required to meet only every six months) is to check on the very top leadership (now combined in the Presidium).

As the new Premier, Malenkov will boss the Council of Ministers, which rules Government agencies; the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which hands down decrees binding all citizens of the U.S.S.R., and the Supreme Soviet, which ratifies decisions of the Presidium.

Is Malenkov really stepping into Stalin's shoes? Is he the real ruler of Russia and its empire in the same sense that Stalin was? The answer: Not quite. All the indications of the present situation with regard to Malenkov's power is that he is the Number One man in a directory. The directory is more or less the ten men who constitute the new Presidium and there is no reason to believe right now that Malenkov has inherited Stalin's complete power over all of his co-workers. He still has to get to that position. His word alone is not absolute. Many of the decisions that the world is wondering about are going to be heavily influenced by this directory of ten. Therefore, to know what Russia is going to do now, it is necessary to look not only at Malenkov, but also at the men who are at the top who will be participating in making the decisions in the near future.

Ten men, headed by Malenkov control the whole, vast

machine of the Soviet and direct the activities of world communism.

They are for practical, immediate purposes, the U.S. S.R., and it is with them that others must deal. If there is to be hope for peace, these men must be understood as individuals whose lives, personalities, thoughts, and actions have become vital to others' existence.

These ten men—collectively—will rule Soviet Russia: Georgi M. Malenkov, 51, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who became Stalin's successor as Premier.

Lavrenti P. Beria, 54, Deputy Premier and Minister of Internal Affairs, a post combining the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of State Security (secret police). Beria has long had charge of state security. He is head of the Russian Secret Police and the Atomic Energy project.

Vyacheslav M. Molotov, 62, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, a post he held from 1939 to 1949. He displaces Andrei Y. Vishinsky who becomes permanent Soviet representative to the U. N.

Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, 57, Deputy Premier and War Minister.

Lazar M. Kaganovich, 59, Deputy Premier. Kaganovich is an old friend of Stalin and was at one time mentor to Malenkov. He is the only Jew still holding a high position in the Soviet Union.

Marshal Klementi Voroshilov, 72, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament), an empty honorarium making him titular President of the Soviet Union.

Anastas I. Mikoyan, 58, Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade, two ministries which have been combined.

Maxim Z. Saburov, Minister of Machine Building.

Mikhail G. Pervukhin, Minister of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry.

Nikita S. Khrushchev, 58, head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party, in which post he replaces Malenkov as direct boss of party machinery. He will act as Malenkov's deputy, as Malenkov was Stalin's.

Malenkov and the four deputy premiers—Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich—will be the Presidium, or core, of the Council of Ministers, amounting to an inner cabinet.

Power in the Soviet Union is exercised through two parallel structures—the Communist Party and the Soviet State. Although they are closely interlocked, the Party is supreme.

The Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. is an elite of about 6,300,000 members (3 per cent of the population). It is tightly organized and disciplined from the top hierarchy to the lowest cells. Nominally, the supreme authority is the Party Congress consisting of delegates from all over the country. In intervals between Congresses—thirteen years elapsed between the Eighteenth in 1939 and the Nineteenth last October—a 125-man Central Committee chosen by the Congress is supposed to govern.

Actually, the Central Committee meets rarely. The real power is vested in two of its organs. One is the Presidium. It was set up at the Congress last fall to combine the functions of the old Politburo which dealt with policy and the Orgburo which dealt with party organization. The other organ is the Secretariat or chief party executive. It supervises the party apparatus, checking on subordinate officials and making sure that orders are obeyed.

Stalin was General Secretary of the Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium and first member of the Secretariat. His power was absolute.

The one post which Stalin held and which Malenkov has not taken over is that of first secretary in the powerful Secretariat of the Party, which supervises the Party machinery. This job has gone to Nikita Khrushchev. This is one of the indications that the Directory of Ten has not handed all personal power over to Malenkov. Within this directory, the most powerful personalities are undoubtedly Beria, Molotov and Bulganin; possibly also Khrushchev, but there is reason to believe that Molotov is slipping.

Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party is the chief executive body of the Communist party and is concerned with problems of party organization and implementation of party policy decisions. The secretaries in apparent order of rank: Malenkov, Khrushchev, Suslov, Nicola A. Mikhailov, A. B. Aristov, S. D. Ignatiev, Peter N. Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin.

Council of Ministers is the Soviet Cabinet and also the chief executive organ of the Soviet Government empowered to issue decrees that have the force of law. Presidium: Chairman or Premier, Malenkov; First Deputy Chairman or Deputy Premiers, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich. Newly appointed key members: Minister of Internal Affairs, Beria; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov; Minister of War, Bulganin; Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade, Mikoyan; Minister of Machine Building, Saburov; Minister of Transport and Heavy Machine Building, Vyacheslav A. Malyshev; Minister of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry, Pervukhin; Chairman of the State Planning Committee, G. P. Kosyachenko; Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Shvernik.

Supreme Soviet is the Soviet Legislature, and, under the Constitution, nominally the highest authority in the land; in practice it meets rarely and unanimously endorses all proposals put before it by the Government. During the fifty or fifty-one weeks of each year in which it is not normally in session, its legislative and appointive powers are exercised by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Chief Officers of the Supreme Soviet: Chairman, Voroshilov; Secretary, Nikolai M. Pegov.

Reduction in the size of the Party's Presidium (formerly Politburo, which comprised 36 men) not only strips that all-powerful organ down for action, but gives the older members of the Presidium a tight hold over the new leader.

Molotov, Beria, Bulganin and Kaganovich, veteran members of the Politburo, though they have lost out in the race for the main prize, are in a position to keep the 51-year-old Malenkov on a short leash.

Lavrenti P. Beria in the reorganization becomes head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in which is combined the former ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security.

Marshal Bulganin stays at his post as Minister of War, but will have as his first deputies Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky, who has been acting as War Minister, and Marshal Georgi A. Zhukov, the famed Soviet commander, who disappeared from public view after World War II.

Another old Politburo veteran who emerged with strengthened power is Anastas Mikoyan, whose ministry will now combine foreign and internal trade.

Let us now take a closer look at the top men who stand at Malenkov's right hand.

CHAPTER XIV

Malenkov's Hatchet-Man: Beria

MURDER, INC., had nothing on Beria. Formed in Brooklyn, New York, in 1931 by Albert Anastasia and Abe Reles, they were able to "bump off" only 63 men over a period of nine years.

Bald, pince-nezed Beria and his butchers actually murdered two million men and women, imprisoned at least ten million more in Soviet slave labor camps. All this in a period of only fifteen years . . . fifteen long years since his fellow Georgian, Stalin, had hustled him in 1938 from the mountains of Georgia to Moscow. His name spells terror to countless millions. Withal, he has a façade of tenderness.

The last chance to prevent a second world war faded on August 23, 1939, for Ministers Molotov and Ribbentrop had just finished signing the Nazi-Soviet pact. "Now the western democracies cannot attempt to poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict between Germany and Russia," Stalin exclaimed exultantly.

Then he proposed a toast. "I know how much the German nation loves its Fuehrer: I should therefore like to drink to his health. And now," Stalin said, turning his head from Ribbentrop to Beria, "allow me to introduce the head of my Gestapo."

Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria is now a member of the top-ranking Presidium. He heads the vast secret police (MVD), and the far-flung system of slave labor camps in which between ten and fifteen million people grind out their hopeless lives. In all official listings his name follows directly after that of Malenkov, and he is first among the "First Deputy Premiers," the group which really rules Russia.

Who is L. P. Beria, and how did he get where he is today? What are the origins of this shortish, thick-necked man, whose eyes stare balefully from behind his glinting professorial pince-nez under the dome-like forehead?

Beria is alleged to have been born in 1899 near Sukhum on the Black Sea. Official Soviet records say that he is the son of poor peasant parents. It is known, however, that he graduated from the Polytechnic High School in Baku as an "Architectural and Construction Technician" at the age of twenty. This would seem to cast doubt on the poverty of his origins. It should be borne in mind that the biographies of most Soviet leaders are tailor-made after the fact, and in the case of men whose role in the pre-Stalinist era was unknown outside of Russia, they are likely to be more fancy than fact.

From the time of his youth, Beria was drawn to police work. Although a native of the province of Georgia, Beria later became one of the ruthless oppressors of the Georgian people. In 1920 he was assigned to do "intelligence" work for the Communist Party and the Red Army which had captured Baku after a series of battles against the White Guard troops who were at that time supported by British and French funds. (These countries had heavy investments in the oil fields centered around Baku.) Such assignments were common for party members in those days. But the following year, Beria joined the Cheka (Secret Police and Intelligence) as a permanent job. During the next ten years he rose to be assistant chief of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Cheka, then assistant chief of the Georgian Cheka, chief of the Georgian GPU (pronounced "Gaypayoo," the Stalinist successor of the Cheka), and finally chief of the GPU for the whole Caucasus area.

In 1924 there was a serious revolt in Georgia. The nationalist sentiments of this country of peasants and shopkeepers had remained strong throughout the regime of the Czars, and the difficulties of life in the first years of the Bolshevik regime added fuel to the local desire for autonomy. Stalin, himself a Georgian, was at that

time in charge of the bureau of nationalities of the Soviet government, and Lenin and his colleagues tended to accept the judgment of this "expert" on the national question of how to handle the national minorities in Russia.

But his methods, and those of the lieutenants whom he placed in charge in the various countries, were so harsh that they aroused the opposition not only of the people, but of the local Bolsheviks themselves. The uprising of 1924 was put down in blood, and harshest measures were taken even against Bolsheviks who opposed the brutality of the suppression. Lenin, who was sick at the time, concluded that the truth about Georgia was being kept from him by Stalin, and had a special investigation made by his own secretaries. He was dumbfounded and outraged by their findings. Just before he died, he proposed to Trotsky that they form a bloc against Stalin for the purpose of removing him from the position of power which he had usurped behind the back of the Party.

Lenin died, and the bloc died with him. Trotsky tried to wage the fight against Stalin's brutality alone. But throughout this period, L. P. Beria was directly in charge of the suppression of the Georgian people and of the Bolshevik opposition in his own country. His loyalty to Stalin, and to Stalin's methods, never seems to have wavered for a moment. They found that they were very well suited to each other.

When the first Five-Year Plan was announced in 1927, Beria was transferred to "Party work." This means that he rose from a purely police job to the job of bossing all aspects of government and economic work in the Caucasian area. He held the post of Party Secretary for seven years, from which he directed the industrialization projects in the area, and kept a watchful eye on the seething discontent of the peasants, workers and national minorities who were being pressed into the mold of Stalinist society. These were the years during which all traces of freedom and democracy were stamped out both

inside the Party and the country. Beria was an able agent of the policy. He received the highest civil decorations the government could bestow, and in 1934 he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

Although Beria had been rising steadily in the new Russian hierarchy, up to this point he had remained merely a provincial figure. But he was preparing his road to bigger things. While still a Party boss in the Caucasus, he wrote a book entitled *Bolshevik Organizations in the Trans-Caucasus*. A typical piece of Stalinist "history" writing, this one was distinguished only by the brass with which he re-fabricated the roles of all the men and women who had participated in the events of the previous twenty years.

The main point, however, was that in this "history" Stalin appeared as the chief organizer, the inspirer, the shining light of the Bolshevik organization on Georgia from its earliest days. Every success was due to Stalin, and every setback to Stalin's enemies. Stalin's "genius" was made to blossom forth on every page, and his deeds to sparkle with superhuman brilliance from the days when he was an infant.

Beria knew his boss well, and he played to his weakness for praise. This book laid the groundwork for his later rise. But it was not until the great purges which started shortly before the first Moscow Trial of the old Bolsheviks that he really came into his own.

These purges were one of the most amazing episodes in Russian history, in fact, in the history of any tyranny. They started with Stalin's decision to exterminate the whole generation of Bolsheviks who had led the Russian Revolution. They knew too much about Stalin's actual role in that great event, and about the way in which he had helped the bureaucracy to rise to the position of a ruling class over the workers and peasants. Although many of them had given up and become his supporters, he knew that deep in their hearts they could never forget that the revolution had been made for freedom and

equality. He and his closest associates felt that until they were removed from the scene there was always a chance that the oppressed peoples would rally around them to throw off the dictatorship.

The problem was not only to kill them off, but to discredit them in the eyes of the people. Thus the great trials were organized in which the old Bolsheviks, after careful "psychological" preparation in the cellars of the GPU, rose in court to "confess" to all kinds of crimes against the leadership and the nation. Since that time this kind of "trials" has become standard equipment of Stalinist rule in all countries. They have been repeated in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. But at that time they were still a novelty, and millions of people all over the world came to accept them as good coin.

The problem which has bothered men of good-will in the non-Stalinist world about these trials is: how can people be made to confess crimes which they cannot possibly have committed? It is commonly known that third-degree methods can compel victims to sign false confessions while they are still in the hands of their tormentors. But once they have been brought into court, what is to prevent them from denying their guilt, and exposing the torturers?

It was the job of Beria and the other chief GPU agents to come up with the answers. One of the answers was the "conveyor," a word which came to strike a chill into the heart of every Soviet citizen.

"Conveyor" was the name given to one of the methods of breaking down the resistance of prisoners and getting them to "confess" to any crime desired. It was engineered and perfected in the days when Henry Yagoda ruled the GPU, and the GPU terrorized the country. It is a simple, but clever device.

The victim is simply questioned by a relay of inquisitors. Put that way, it does not sound like the average person's idea of torture. But it must be added that the process lasts not a few hours, but days, and in stubborn

cases, for weeks. The victim is not permitted to sit down for hours on end, and in the first few days he gets no sleep at all. Once he has collapsed from fatigue, he is permitted to lie down for a few hours, but no sooner does he get back enough strength so that he can stand up again, than he goes back on the "conveyor."

He is badgered by demands that he confess to all manner of crimes, and told that his inquisitors have proof of his criminal activities. While he is completely exhausted, his inquisitors remain fresh and full of energy. Little by little his inner resistance is drained out of him. He knows that he will get rest only after he confesses. The craving for rest, for quiet, grows in him like the thirst of a man lost in the desert.

The "conveyor" is designed to break down the resistance of the strongest wills. Beatings and other forms of physical torture can be borne by men of character and convictions. They quickly reduce the vitality of the victim and bring unconsciousness or death. A strong man can bear them, knowing that they cannot last forever. But the "conveyor" goes on and on. As the victim is given just enough food and rest to keep him from final collapse, he knows that there is no end to it. Its very "mildness" is its strength, and it succeeds except in rare cases where the victim has almost superhuman qualities of resistance. In those cases the bullet at the back of the neck is the only "cure."

The "conveyor" was only one of the several methods developed by the GPU in the course of trial-and-error experiments with many victims. Solitary confinement, threats against relatives and dear ones, all had their uses. And then there have been rumors that the Russian doctors have developed drugs which affect the vital brain-centers in such a way that the "patient" becomes a pliant tool in the hands of his "re-educators" . . .

The first great Moscow show trial was organized by Henry Yagoda, head of the GPU. While a handful of old Bolsheviks and minor officials appeared in court, thousands upon thousands of men and women from all walks

of life disappeared into the dungeons of the secret police, never to be heard from again. Terror gripped the whole country. Everyone who had a grudge against his boss or a fellow-worker denounced him for "Trotskyism" or some related "crime." Industrial managers, army officers, government and party officials at all levels were dragged off to be shot. The prison camps in Siberia were filled to the bursting point, and new ones were organized by the dozens. Denouncing people to the police became a frenzy, and at times almost a grim sport. If a person denounced no one, he might himself be suspected of "protecting enemies of the state."

But Yagoda, who had been one of Stalin's accomplices since before 1924, knew too much. He too disappeared into the cellars of his own organization, and after undergoing the "processing" which he had developed, emerged at the second Moscow trial to "confess" his own crimes.

Among other things, he "confessed" that he had arranged the untimely death of the great Russian writer, Maxim Gorki. This had been done by getting Gorki's doctors to prescribe the wrong medicines for him. Others had been done away with by spreading mysterious poisonous "dusts" in their offices from which they contracted strange maladies. This was the concocted story.

Henry Yagoda was succeeded by Nicholas Yezhov, at the time described as "the shining sword of the republic." (The GPU had been renamed in 1934 NKVD, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but its function remained the same.) The purge continued with mounting fury. In the cellars of the NKVD the "conveyors" worked overtime. The whole of Soviet society was rocked from top to bottom. Every possible supporter of every possible opponent of Stalin was eliminated.

During the period between the first Moscow Trial in August 1936, and the summer of 1938 the purge raged. Of the 22 men who had formed Lenin's Central Committee when the Bolsheviks took power in 1917, sixteen were executed then. In 1940, the seventeenth, Leon Trotsky, was killed in Mexico in a plot reported to have

been engineered by Beria. This eliminated one of the men Stalin feared most—a rival ideological irritant about whom opposition could cluster. The second generation Stalinoid men were in governmental positions.

Five out of the seven chairmen of the Soviet executive committee were killed, plus almost all the members and candidates of the Soviet executive. The heads of practically every one of the "republics" of Stalin's empire were purged: those of Ukraine, Georgia, White Russia, Uzbekistan, Transcaucasia, and most of the others. The majority of the commission which wrote the Stalin Constitution (proclaimed as "the most democratic in the world") were shot down like dogs. Two out of five marshals of the Red Army; three army group commanders out of six; ten army commanders out of fifteen; fifty-seven army corps commanders out of eighty-five; 110 divisional commanders out of 193; 202 brigade commanders out of 400, all were executed on charges of being agents of Japan, or England or France, or Germany, and sometimes of several of these countries combined.

The victims among the industrial managers and party leaders were on the same scale. Of the nameless rank and file, thousands upon tens of thousands were either "liquidated" in the cellars of the NKVD, or were transported in cattle-cars to the wastes of Siberia or to the Pechora under the Arctic circle. The purge, which had started with a limited goal of murdering the remnants of the old Bolsheviks had got out of hand. The whole of Soviet society was demoralized. Industrial managers looked at the long list of the men who had sat behind their desks before them, and refused to take any responsibility for fear that an error would be called "sabotage." Party leaders refused to defend even their most loyal and competent assistants, lest they be accused of protecting "enemies." The whole Soviet bureaucracy was falling apart at the seams. Even Stalin realized that the thing had gone too far.

Beria, Molotov and the other men who are now at the top of the Russian pyramid rode out the storm. They

either stood by coldbloodedly while their associates were going before the guns of the NKVD, or they helped them on their way. In the summer of 1938 Stalin asked Beria to prepare a report on the situation. It was submitted to him in person at his vacation villa at Metsesta. Beria was immediately appointed Vice-Commissar of the NKVD, and although Yezhov remained the nominal chief till December of that year, the reins were taken from his hands. After that he, too, disappeared, never to be heard from again.

Beria's first action on assuming actual control over the NKVD was to organize a "purge of the purgers." Immediately five important NKVD officials in the Ukraine were tried and executed on charges of criminal abuse of their powers. The purge was called to a swift halt. The country sighed an almost audible sigh of relief. A wholesale review of all cases of expulsion from the Party was undertaken. According to official figures published for the provinces of Moscow and Leningrad, more than 50 per cent of persons expelled were reinstated on the ground that the action against them had been unjustified, based on slander or other false premises. Thousands of exiles were brought back to their homes and former positions. But the dead could not be brought back, and other thousands remained in the living death of the slave camps.

It was typical of Stalin's methods, that when it was decided that a policy had gone too far, he would take the credit for reversing it. Thus, in the case of the great purges, the legend could be maintained that he didn't really know what was going on. The moment he found out, the kindly old man called a halt and punished the people who had been responsible for the massacre. The official story put out by the Kremlin was that Yezhov had turned out to be a madman. This story is repeated to this day in almost every biographical sketch on Beria which appears in this country. The government appoints a homicidal maniac to run its political police, and only discovers its "mistake" after he has exterminated the cream of the army and of Soviet society in general!

Beria was brought in to reverse the policy of the purge. In March 1939 he made a speech at the Party Congress in which he went so far as to attack the tendency of people to blame failure in various branches of the government and economy on "hostile and disruptive forces," instead of on poor management and execution. Right after the Congress, he was elected a candidate to the Politburo, top Party governing body, though he did not receive full membership till 1946.

But had Beria really resisted the "excesses" of the purge all along? Far from it. Although it is in the nature of such events, and of the secret police in all countries that their actions, and those of their chief agents, remain veiled in secrecy, something is known of Beria's own personal participation.

One of his last actions before coming to Moscow to take over the secret police was to stage a big trial in Transcaucasia. In secret proceedings, 30 persons, mostly old Bolsheviks, some of them former personal friends of Stalin, were judged and executed. Among the crimes of which they were accused was "the preparation for committing a terroristic act against the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, L. P. Beria." In this way Beria, the Party chief, got rid of the last witnesses who could have refuted the falsifications in the "history" of the *Bolshevik Organizations in the Trans-Caucasus* written by Beria.

When Lavrenti Beria took over the NKVD, it was like no secret police which had ever existed in history before. Even then, in addition to thousands of secret agents and administrative clerks, it had armed and uniformed detachments. It administered tens of prison camps in which thousands of prisoners were kept to work in forests, mines and on construction projects.

It is, of course, difficult to establish the exact number of persons condemned to forced labor in Russia, or to trace the development of forced labor in statistical terms down through the years. It is estimated that in the period 1933-35 there were about five million men and women

living in the NKVD's slave camps. For the period 1935-37 Nikonov-Smorodin, a Russian fugitive from a labor camp, estimated the slave laborers at between five and six million, and drew up a map which showed some 35 slave sites. (It should be noted that these are not individual camps, but whole regions which fall under a single administration.) Postwar estimates place the total at over ten million slaves.

By 1936, the NKVD's "economic projects" were a significant part of the whole economy of the country. They had a big share of the Russian budget. As the slaves were poorly fed, clothed and housed, and as they were overworked, disease and death took an enormous toll among them. The gaps had to be filled by new "enemies of the people." Recruiting slaves became an economic necessity. The regional directors of the NKVD were given quotas to fill. Any man who failed to fill his quota could be considered too "soft" and a possible protector of "criminals."

Beria inherited this system. He built it up further. After 1939 the public trials, publication of sentences and other evidence of the terror ceased to appear in the Russian press. But individuals and whole groups continued to disappear into the maw of the NKVD and to fill its labor camps. The average bureaucrat and worker no longer lay awake in bed, fearfully expecting the knock on his door in the hours before dawn. But a chance critical remark, a failure to show up on the job on time if repeated too often, the failure of a factory to deliver its quota—all these or any number of other "offenses" could lead to the dreaded phone-call to "come over for a conversation" from the NKVD.

Yet how can even such measures fill these camps with their millions of victims? The mass scale on which deportations are carried out can perhaps be gathered from one example.

In August, 1940, the Baltic States were officially incorporated into the Soviet Union. On November 28 of the same year, the Lithuanian NKVD issued orders to its local staffs to draw up lists of people to be deported. The

orders included members of all political parties except the Communists, from pro-Czarist to socialist and Trotskyite. All officers and émigrés from Russia are included, as well as "shopkeepers, hotel and restaurant owners," who were apparently considered socially dangerous. Even "persons maintaining correspondence abroad" were to be included in the lists.

The whole operation proceeded in a well-planned and organized fashion. The schedule called for reports from the local agencies on the compilation of the lists by May 5, 1941. The whole job was to be finished by June 1. From April 23 on, a constant stream of orders, instructions and revised orders issued from the office of Gladkov, head of the NKVD in Kaunas. (Incidentally, Gladkov, like most of his chief subordinates is a Russian.) It appears that the local offices were often dragging their feet, as reprimands and threats against them from above flowed thick and fast.

By the end of May, everything was ready for the "operation." On May 31, 1941, the People's Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. for State Security dispatched a brief communication which reads as follows:

"The People's Commissar for State Security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade Merkulov, has ordered: Persons of anti-Soviet leanings engaged in active counter-revolutionary agitation are to be prepared for deportation into remote areas of the U.S.S.R.

Communicated for appropriate action."

On the eve of the operation, June 5, the forces assigned to carry it out assembled throughout the country. "One operational official, one member of the NKVD, one soldier of the armed forces of the NKVD, and one representative of the local group of the Communist party" were assigned to "carry out the operation of two families." Explicit instructions were handed to them on how to do the job in such a way to create the least possible disturbance in the community, which was known to be "hostile to the Soviet power."

"Care must be taken that the operations are carried out . . . so as not to permit any demonstrations and other trouble," read the official instructions.

". . . Operations shall be begun at daybreak. Upon entering the house of the person to be deported, the senior member of the operative group shall assemble the entire family in one room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any possible trouble.

"After completion of the search the deportees shall be notified that by a government decision they will be deported to other regions of the Union. The deportees shall be permitted to take with them household necessities not exceeding 100 kilograms in weight (about 200 pounds) . . ."

As the heads of families were separated from the rest, care had to be taken to prevent the families from knowing that this would happen. The agents were instructed not to separate the heads from the rest of the family till they had all reached the assembly-point at the railroad, so as to prevent scenes and resistance from developing. "During the assembling of the family in the home of the deportee, the head of the family shall be warned that personal male effects must be packed in a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection of the deported men will be made separately from the women and children." (In the Nazi extermination camps, the victims were told that they were being taken to a bath, and were given a piece of soap and a towel at the entrance to the gas chambers to keep up the illusion.) Sanitation, it would seem, plays a special role in the tyrants' dictionary.

On the morning of June 6, the operation was carried out almost without a hitch. An operational report dated June 19 states that there was hardly any shooting, and only one man was wounded. It is estimated that a total of 200,000 people were rounded up in the Baltic States, of whom 50,000 to 60,000 went to the slave camps, while the rest were resettled in exile.

This vast domain of slave labor, this world of trials and shootings and deportations was presided over by Lavrenti

Beria from 1939 to the present. Although the name of the NKVD was changed to MVD, the institution remained just as gigantic and just as ruthless as ever.

In 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, Beria became a member of the State Defense Committee, the highest body set up to conduct the war. He was made a full member of the Politburo in 1946, as a reward for the loyal services performed in wartime, and as an expression of Stalin's personal confidence in him.

The war and the years which followed it gave Beria's police plenty of work and plenty of victims. Not only did the vast hordes of German prisoners of war captured after Stalingrad fit right into the slave-labor system, whole Soviet nationalities were deported to the slave camps and the "remote regions" of the country.

The first national group to be picked up bodily at Beria's orders and scattered over the face of the land were the Volga-Germans. By a decree of August 28, 1941, the Autonomous Volga-German Soviet Socialist Republic was declared abolished, and its population was dispersed.

(The 1939 census had shown it to have a population of 605,000.) This whole national group was charged with having shown sympathy for the enemy, or having winked at the activities of those in its midst who showed such sympathy. After the war additional nationalities were rounded up by the NKVD, men, women and children and scattered through the country, mostly to its "remote regions."

In addition hundreds of thousands of Poles, Romanians, German prisoners of war, Czechs, Bulgarians and Hungarians were deported. Many Russians who had permitted themselves to be captured by the Germans during the war were given the same treatment. Slave labor, under the direction of the MVD, was one of the chief groups in the rebuilding of Russia after the war.

In addition, Beria was put in charge of "organizing" the satellite "peoples' republics" after the war. His agents were everywhere, watching and directing the Communist Parties of the new territories. The moment any group

or leader in one of these parties showed any signs of independence, he was given the "treatment" developed in the cells of the old GPU.

Laszlo Rajk was destroyed in Hungary, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, Wladyslaw Gromulka in Poland, and Rudolf Clementis in Czechoslovakia. Ana Pauker of Rumania, who probably has more blood on her hands than any other woman in history, has been expelled from the Romanian Politburo, dismissed from her post as Foreign Minister, and is probably awaiting her final fate, if it has not already caught up with her. All this is the direct handiwork of Beria, backed up, of course, by Malenkov, Molotov and until recently, Stalin.

In Dedijer's book on Tito, the Yugoslavs quote an illuminating remark by Stalin about his police chief. Stalin was drinking "bruderschafts" with various members of the Tito party. He turned suddenly to Rankovic (head of Yugoslav security), advising him to be careful of Beria, and then to Beria, asking him, "And you two? Which of you will trap the other?"

After the war, Beria was also made head of the Russian atomic energy project. The reason for this is not necessarily that Stalin placed more trust in him than in some other of his henchmen, but that the slave labor controlled by the MVD was a "natural" for work in the uranium mines and on the construction of the big atomic projects. The life span of uranium miners is even shorter than that of the slaves who work in the forests of the frozen north or in the peat-bogs of Siberia. Their rations are poor, and no pains are taken to protect them from exposure to radiation. To Beria, as to his colleagues, human life comes cheap.

When Stalin died there was wide-spread speculation that Beria would succeed him. It was thought that his control of the secret police, with their well armed, picked contingents of troops would give him the inside track. But it must be remembered that Beria has never been an "MVD man" first, and a Stalinist second. His loyalty has always been to the regime, to the new ruling class which

it has created, to the bloody clique which runs it. Whenever it has become a matter of defending this clique, he has been as ready to liquidate his buddies in the MVD as anyone else.

Little is known about the personality, the character of this cold man, with his mild, professorial manner. If he is consumed by the ambition to be top dog, he may yet liquidate Malenkov. But if he should attempt it, he would not be acting as a representative of the interests and ambitions of the MVD, but as the leader of some special clique in the Communist Party which controls *all* Soviet institutions.

In his oration at the bier of the man who had brought him up to the heights, Beria made it quite clear whom he serves: "Stalin, like Lenin," he said, "left to our party and our country a great legacy, which must be treasured as the pupil of one's eye, and constantly multiplied.

"Great Stalin trained and rallied around himself leaders well tried in battles, who have mastered the Lenin-Stalin ability of leadership and on whose shoulders has fallen the historic responsibility to carry the great cause begun by Lenin and successfully continued by Stalin to a victorious end."

Lenin, of course, has been revolving these many years in his grave over all the things that have been done in his name. But Stalin can rest easy. Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria will see to it that the work of oppression and butchery which was begun by the master is carried forward by his loyal and prized pupil.

This is Beria, the butcher. He is Malenkov's right fist.

CHAPTER XV

Malenkov's Elder Statesman: Molotov

VIACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH MOLOTOV was born in the village of Kukarka, now known as Sovietsk, on March 9, 1890. One thing distinguishes him from all the others who have achieved top positions since Stalin's death: he is the only one who can really be called an "old Bolshevik." He alone has a political history which precedes the October '17 revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power, and played a prominent, though modest role in the Party and the government from the beginning.

Now, at the age of 63, Molotov is Russia's Foreign Minister, First Deputy Premier (although listed second behind Beria among First Deputies), and member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Russia. But these are no promotions for the old warhorse of Stalinism. Thirteen years ago he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, a post which in other countries is the equivalent of prime minister, and in any event was second only to the position of Stalin. In fact, his present position, high as it is, looks very much like a slight demotion.

The estimates of Molotov's ability have varied through the years. Twenty-five years ago the story circulated in Moscow that when Stalin had suggested to Lenin that Molotov, an old and trusted member of the Party, one of the original editors of *Pravda*, should be nominated to the Party Central Committee. Lenin looked at him questioningly and said, "Why that one?" Stalin repeated Molotov's merits, and Lenin replied: "Well, if you like. But you know what I think of him; he's the best filing clerk in Russia."

Trotsky's opinion of Molotov was not much higher. In his book *Stalin* (which he was writing when one of

Beria's agents sank a pickaxe into his brain in Mexico in 1941, he describes the bureau of the Party's Central Committee in Petrograd at the time of the February revolution of 1917: ". . . two workingmen, Shlyapnikov and Zalutsky, and one college boy, Molotov." Elsewhere Trotsky reports that Molotov's nickname among the top leaders in the early years was "lead bottom."

These passing references do not give a true picture of the man. But they do indicate the idea of his abilities which was widespread among the old Bolshevik leaders. It was not that Molotov was considered worthless or stupid. It was simply that he was surrounded by so many men of superior talents that he made little impression on anyone. No one thought of him as a first-rank leader then. But it turned out his particular qualities were superior for the place and circumstances in which he lived, than those of many a more brilliant man.

Molotov is a plodder, a man of slow thought and halting speech. He is square-faced, thick-set, stolid and colorless. A thick drooping mustache hangs over a stubborn, determined mouth. He wears out opponents by hammering away at a point in endless filibustering. He is conscientious and steadfast: the kind of a man who is not easily moved from a course of action once he has set his mind on it. But the qualities which took him through the turbulent years of the underground movement against the Czar, the revolution and civil war, the five year plans and the great purges are of a different character. This was an instinct for power, for the way things were going, and utter ruthlessness in following that instinct to the end.

Molotov was born Scriabin, the son of a shop assistant and a close relative of the noted composer, Alexander Nicholaevich Scriabin. He changed his name to Molotov (the Hammer) while in prison and exile before the revolution of 1917. Although the son of fairly prosperous parents, he threw himself into the revolutionary movement of 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War. He joined the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic

party while still in high school, and received a two-year sentence of exile from the Czarist police in 1909. After two months' imprisonment, he was exiled to Vologda in northern European Russia, where he started organizing railroad workers. His youth was similar to that of many young men of all the democratic and socialist parties during their years of struggle against the Czarist autocracy. He was arrested five times, and escaped. Much of his time was spent in underground hiding from the police. For a good deal of it he lived in the Viborg district of St. Petersburg, a working-class quarter with strong revolutionary traditions.

As was the case with most of the "professional revolutionaries" who led the Bolshevik party in those days, Molotov was closely involved in the constant discussions and disagreements over strategy and tactics. Unlike the Stalinist parties of the world today, that was an organization with a lively atmosphere of debate and disagreement. Lenin was a recognized leader of great stature, but he had to win his arguments; they were not enforced by the machine from above.

The first time Molotov tangled with Lenin was when the former was secretary of the editorial board of *Pravda* in Petersburg in 1913. Lenin was in exile in Cracow. The paper had adopted a "soft" or conciliatory line toward the so-called "liquidators," the socialists who thought that due to the Czarist terror and the general atmosphere in the country it would be better not to try to rebuild the party.

Lenin was for a complete break with these people, whom he considered cowardly and a hindrance to the development of labor struggles. But the editorial board of *Pravda* edited his articles and struck out the attacks on the "liquidators." Lenin was furious, but sitting in exile in Cracow, he could do little.

To a friend in Petersburg, Lenin wrote that the whole editorial board was "stupid." "They are not men, but pitiful dishrags and they are ruining the cause," he

wrote. "We must plant our own editorial staff on *Pravda* and kick the present one out."

When the Czar was overthrown in February 1917, Molotov happened to be one of the few Bolsheviki of any standing in the capital. Lenin was in Switzerland, and most of the other prominent leaders in exile either inside or outside the country. Kamenev and Stalin were the first members of the Central Committee to get into Petersburg. As was often the case in those days, Stalin tended to hew a neutral line between the factions and policies of the socialist movement. Molotov was for a firmer policy. At the March 1917 conference of the Bolshevik party he vigorously opposed the idea of unification with the Mensheviks, a notion favored by Stalin.

But as the real leaders of the party got back into action, Molotov faded into the background. He was not one of the leaders of the party, but one of its wheel-horses. Although today it is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction where the lives of the present leaders of the Russian government are concerned, it appears that in 1918 he was put in charge of the nationalization program in northwestern Russia, including Petrograd. In 1919, after the White commander Kolchak and his Czech allies had been expelled from the Volga region, he was sent in to take charge of the reconstruction. A year later he had a more important job of the same kind in the industrial Donets Basin in the Ukraine.

Although for a leader his assignments had been routine, his worth was recognized, and at the Ninth Party Congress in 1920 he was elected an alternate to the Central Committee. Next year, at the 10th Congress, he became a full fledged member. During the same year he was elected a candidate to the Politburo, and in 1922 he was one of two assistants to the newly created post of General Secretary, occupied by Stalin.

This was indeed a rapid rise for a slow-moving, cautious man. He was now in the Secretariat, which behind the back of the Party was rapidly becoming a real center of power. It was supposed to be concerned with the as-

signment of Party personnel to the many tasks needed by the struggling young government. But actually Stalin was using his post to build up *his own* machine inside the Party. Molotov had been in close touch with the various Bolshevik groups in western Russia during the previous years, while up to 1917 most of the other leaders had been abroad, or like Stalin, in distant exile. The job of the Secretariat, as Stalin used it, was to see to it that men loyal to him were placed in positions of power; preferably men who owed their position to him, and not to their own ability or popularity in the country or Party.

From that time till Stalin died, the thing which distinguished Molotov was his practically unswerving loyalty to the boss. He saw his star, and he hitched his wagon to it. In the Secretariat he was in excellent position to observe the real power which Stalin was gaining in the Party organization, and the relative weakness of his opponents.

Lenin fell gravely ill two months after Stalin became General Secretary of the Party. Although he recovered partially and was able to resume work in 1923, it was evident that he would never be really well again. The Secretariat stepped up its activity. With great care, so as not to arouse the suspicions and hostility of Lenin and the other leaders too much, the process of weeding out independent revolutionists and replacing them with bureaucrats beholden to Stalin went ahead.

Molotov stayed in the background, but he had made his choice. It was not primarily a question of choosing between Stalin the man, and Trotsky or some other Bolshevik leader. The real issue was much larger. The revolutionary enthusiasm, the democratic aspirations of the early days of workers' power in Russia had been dulled and exhausted in the blood and starvation of the civil war. Tens of thousands of the socialist idealists who had been the sparkplugs of the revolution had fallen on the far-flung battlefields of the civil war, or had been worn down by moral and physical exhaustion. Their place had been taken by a new type of man: more administrators

than revolutionists, men more accustomed to wielding power than to fighting tyranny, men who regarded the new society as a chance to "make good" than as a step forward in the progress of humanity.

Every leader and vast numbers of the rank and file knew that sooner or later they would have to face the question: with the stream or against it? Should they adapt themselves to the slowly growing conservatism, and take the easy way of ruling *over* the masses through the organs of state power which had been developed during the civil war, or should they combat the creeping bureaucracy, and fight for an expansion of democracy in the country?

The choice did not present itself sharply, in a clear-cut manner which a man could face and decide in a day or a week. The bureaucratization of Russia was a slow, laborious process. It consisted of granting the leaders a small privilege here, and a little concession there. It showed its face in the growing rudeness with which officials treated the common man, in the cropping up of scandalous abuses of power by Party or State officers.

In the twenties when the chief battles in this silent war were being fought, the economic privileges of the bureaucracy were still very minor, even though they were already significant. They did not ride around in shiny limousines, and inhabit fancy villas outside town. They did not work in plush offices, surrounded like our great corporation executives, by a small army of vice-presidents and lesser officials. But they had a little more to eat, and were already housed a little better than the ordinary workers.

Just how far the Party was from its present aristocratic attitude and way of life (the workers in Russia now refer to the high officials as "Bolshevik magnates," or "the party bosses") is illustrated by an episode from Alexander Barmine's *One Who Survived*. Barmine had been expelled from the War College during a purge which took place during the early twenties. He felt he had been

treated unjustly, and decided to appeal to the Central Committee of the Party. Here is what happened:

"Vyacheslav Molotov, then secretary of the Central Committee, was available for interviews any day. I went to a two-storied, yellow-painted house in Vosdvizhenka Street, not far from the Kremlin. My Party card gave me admittance. 'First room on the right,' I was told. The room was huge, badly kept, and poorly furnished. There was a table in the middle surrounded by chairs. Several people were waiting, seated near the door. At the far end, in front of the window, was a smaller table, covered with papers and with several telephones. Molotov sat there talking with a workman. He had a very large and placid face, the face of an ordinary, uninspired, but rather soft and kindly bureaucrat, attentive and unassuming. He listened to me carefully, made one or two notes, asked a few questions, and said, stuttering slightly: 'All right. I'll do what I can for you.'

"Four days later my sentence of expulsion was reversed. The authorities made a good many mistakes in those days, but some of them were thus quickly repaired. The democratic spirit of the Party then still revealed itself in direct contact between members and officials, and also in a simplicity of manners which at times came near to crudeness."

The struggle between the new bureaucracy and the representatives of the democratic traditions of the revolution began before Lenin died. But with the removal of his great personal prestige and authority from the scene, it broke out in full fury in 1925. Molotov took his stand squarely with the bureaucracy, that is, with Stalin. In December, 1925 he was made a full member of the Politburo, and was immediately sent to Leningrad with Kirov and Voroshilov to handle the revolt of Zinoviev and the Leningrad Party against Stalin. They took prompt and severe measures in purging the Party of Zinoviev's supporters. Although Zinoviev, who had been one of Lenin's closest collaborators, had been undisputed leader of the Party in Leningrad for years, he once more

showed his fatal inclination to run away from a fight. He weakened and capitulated. This was the first of a series of capitulations which finally brought him to the prisoners' dock in the Moscow trials, where he "confessed" to having been a secret counter-revolutionary for decades.

The struggle for the complete consolidation of the bureaucracy as a new ruling class raged for a decade. Desperation was on its side and it won. The poverty of Russia recreated the struggle of man against man for a bigger slice of the pie which was not large enough to provide plenty for all. The rules for dividing the pie were now different. A man did not get the lion's share due to his ownership of property, but rather to his position on the bureaucratic ladder. That depended on his loyalty and unswerving devotion to the men who were on the ladder above him, and particularly to the man with the mustache at the very top.

Molotov stuck to Stalin like a leech as one group after another of their former associates was hurled down into the abyss. In 1927, Trotsky and his friends were expelled from the Party.

Molotov was appointed to the key post of Moscow Party Secretary in 1928.

By the end of 1930 every single leader of stature who had been prominent in the early days of the revolution had been kicked off the Politburo.

In December 1930, at the age of forty, Molotov took Rykov's place as Premier (President of the Council of Commissars) and as a member of the Council on Labor and Defense, the only governmental body to which Stalin belonged at that time.

In seven years from Lenin's death, Stalin had defeated the most famous and popular leaders of the Bolshevik revolution.

Trotsky, the organizer of the Red Army, was in exile; Zinoviev, head of the Communist International; Rykov, head of the government; Bukharin, party theoretician and long-time editor of *Pravda*; Kamenev, mem-

ber of Lenin's first Politburo and Trotsky's brother-in-law; Tomsy, head of the trade unions—all were gone.

During the days of the First Five-Year Plan Molotov devoted himself to the problems of industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. The misery imposed on the peoples of Russia in these years was enormous. During the collectivization drive tens of thousands of peasants were driven from their land and sent to the slave camps, and the famine which resulted in the early '30s doomed millions to death from starvation. It took strong nerves and utter ruthlessness for the men who directed these operations. Molotov never wavered.

During this whole period there is only one bit of evidence of friction between Molotov and Stalin. Although the relations of the men in the Kremlin have been shrouded in thick clouds of mystery, this evidence is unmistakable.

At the first Moscow trial in August, 1936, the defendants were accused of a plot against the lives of the government leaders. The plot, it was charged, had been organized directly by Zinoviev, Kamenev, and I. N. Smirnov. They were acting under orders from Trotsky who, in turn, had made a deal with the Nazi high command. Other defendants in the trial, minor figures of no previous standing, confessed that they had tried to carry out the assassinations under the orders of their alleged leaders.

The whole trial was a frame-up, as was demonstrated two years later by the famous Commission of Inquiry Into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, headed by the eminent American philosopher, John Dewey. But the point is this: The defendants "confessed" to having tried to kill Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordjonikidze, Zhdanov. They claimed the credit for the actual assassination of Kirov (who had been shot by a desperate member of the Young Communist League in 1934). But the name of Molotov is not mentioned once as a proposed victim.

Yet at that time, Molotov was Chairman of Council

of Peoples' Commissars, second man to Stalin in Russia. The omission is striking, to say the least. The whole purpose of the trial was to paint the "oppositionists" as mad-dog assassins, agents of Hitler, and to demonstrate to the hard pressed Russian people that their top leaders were risking their lives in the all-out struggle against enemies of the nation, both foreign and domestic. Why should Molotov not be included in the list of figures whom the Nazis want destroyed?

Further evidence of the fact that Molotov was in disfavor in 1936 is the absence of any prominent mention of him in the press during the early part of the year. The usual prominent display of his speeches are lacking, there are no eulogies of the accomplishments of "the Hammer." He is simply ignored.

It is impossible to say, at the moment, exactly what had gone wrong in the relations between the boss and his chief lieutenant. Is it possible that this man of strong nerves and ruthless drive for power was still taken aback at the prospect of dragging the whole revolutionary leadership in the mud before the eyes of the masses? Can it be that he could not generate the desired enthusiasm for the spectacle of the trials, in which his old comrades-in-arms were to "confess" that they had been the agents of foreign powers all through the decisive years?

There is little in Molotov's history, either before that time or since which would lead to such conclusions. Of all the men around Stalin he has been one of the most brazen in making speeches which were in open contradiction to the known facts. Perhaps there was some other source of friction. In any event, by the time of the last Moscow trial in March, 1938 (in which the chief defendants were Bukharin, Rykov and Krestinsky), Molotov appears prominently on the list of men they had "sought" to kill.

The first indication we have that Molotov was being groomed for a post in the foreign-policy department was a speech he delivered to the All-Union Soviet Congress in January, 1935, in which he explained Russia's entry

into the League of Nations. It is characteristic that Molotov explained and justified this act in terms of uniting the "democratic" powers against the Nazis. Yet he was the man who less than five years later was to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact which started World War II, and to whom is attributed the famous remark "Fascism is a matter of taste."

Between 1935 and 1939, although his pronouncements on foreign policy became more frequent, no one thought of him as a major figure in international affairs. In 1936 his wife visited the United States and lunched with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. She was supposed to be inspecting the American cosmetics industry, as the new standard of living of the bureaucracy had naturally led their wives to giving more thought to a personal appearance which befitted their new location in society. Actually, however, she was trying also to get American agreement to build a battleship for Russia, a deal which fell through.

By 1939 the Kremlin was coming to the conclusion that it had more to gain by a deal with Hitler than by continuing its alliance with France and Britain. For four years the whole Communist International had been mobilized to urge "collective security" of the "democracies" (including Russia) against Hitler Germany. But Britain and France looked feeble compared to the might of the "New Order" in Germany. After Czechoslovakia was sold down the river at Munich, Stalin made up his mind that most was to be gained by coming to terms with the "Hitlerite beasts."

Litvinov had been Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and his name was most prominently linked with the "collective security" policy. On May 3, 1939, he was called to a conference by Stalin. When he arrived, he found Molotov in the room with the boss. After he sat down at the table, Molotov opened up by informing him that the government had decided to improve its relations with Hitler, and to sign a pact with the Nazis if possible. As a Jew, and a famous enemy of such a policy, Litvinov stood in the way.

The Commissar of Foreign Affairs argued against the new policy. He got angry, pounded the table, marshaled all the arguments against it. Stalin sat with a bored look on his face, and sucked his pipe.

After listening for over an hour without saying a word, he suddenly put down his pipe and said: "Enough." He shoved a paper across the table to Litvinov and said, "Sign here." It was Litvinov's letter of resignation. He signed. Molotov was the Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

On August 23, 1939, the Stalin-Hitler Pact was signed in Moscow. Nine days later Hitler invaded Poland from the West, and Stalin followed with his invasion from the East. World War II had started. During the following year Russia occupied the Baltic States, tore Bessarabia from Romania, and fought her abortive war with Finland. The Nazi-Soviet pact seemed to be paying off. But on June 22, 1941, Hitler launched his invasion of Russia by way of the countries recently occupied by Stalin, and within a few weeks they had again been lost by the Kremlin.

Molotov was the front man for the Stalin-Hitler Pact. He was given the job of explaining and justifying it to the world, and the stunned peoples of Russia. He delivered the speech on the pact to the Supreme Soviet which dutifully ratified it on August 29. He attacked the British and French for not being sincere in their negotiations with Russia, and the Poles for refusing to accept "military assistance from the Soviet Union." (The type of "assistance" they could expect was demonstrated in the Russian invasion a few days later, and in the mutilation of their country which followed World War II.) "We could not but explore," he went on, "other possibilities of insuring peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the USSR."

This is one of the reasons why Molotov has such a reputation for toughness. He simply has no principles, or rather, he has only one principle: do what the boss says, and do it well.

After Russia had been forced into the war, Molotov

continued to play a prominent diplomatic role. He accompanied Stalin to Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam, where he found it just as easy to get along with the Western representatives as he had with the Nazis when policy required it. At Yalta in February 1945 Stalin pulled one of his typical stunts the purpose of which is to humiliate his subordinates. The Nazi-Soviet pact was somehow mentioned, and Churchill said that he had always condemned it. Stalin beckoned to Molotov. "Come here," he said, maliciously, "and explain your pact with Hitler."

On May 6, 1941, a little more than a month before Hitler struck, Stalin took over the chairmanship of the Council of Peoples Commissars. This was not really a demotion for Molotov. Everyone recognized that Stalin had always been the boss, and that his decision to take over the formal leadership of the government must be based on some crisis which was approaching. Molotov continued to have as much prestige as ever. He represented Russia in the chief wartime and post-war conferences. When people think of the cold war, they are as likely as not to think of Molotov insisting on the veto at the San Francisco conference; Molotov "conferring" for weeks with the other foreign ministers, but not even agreeing on an agenda, etc.

None of these actions necessarily reflects his own personality. They are the decisions of the Russian government, which up till recently meant the decisions of Stalin. But there can be no question that in carrying them out, specially in the period of the cold war, Molotov has shown a certain flair of his own. No one can be as stony-faced as he. No one can look his colleagues from the other governments right in the eye and tell them that black is white one day, green the next and purple on the third as well as he.

In his book, *War or Peace*, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has a remarkable section on Molotov's diplomatic skill as observed at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in 1945. Dulles was much impressed with the clever way in which Molo-

tov played on the personalities and national weaknesses of the men he was dealing with. He treated each one differently, and the difference was directly related to the power of the country which each represented. Although his behavior was often extremely rude, it was very effective.

"Mr. Molotov put on a remarkable performance," Dulles writes. "His techniques, different in each case, were carried out with extraordinary skill. I have seen in action all the great international statesmen of this century, beginning with those who met at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. I have never seen personal diplomatic skill at so high a degree of perfection as Mr. Molotov's at that session."

In 1949, just ten years after he had become foreign minister of Russia, Molotov was succeeded by Vishinsky in that post. At the time there was speculation that "the Hammer" was finally on the skids. But he retained his post as vice premier and on the Politburo of the Communist Party. Reports have it that in recent years he has been paying more attention to affairs in the Far East, and that he has been in personal charge of the war in Korea. Be that as it may, when Stalin died he once more became Foreign Minister and is second in the list of First Deputy Premiers.

Yet Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov is not where he may have expected to be. For years, outsiders have thought that Stalin's succession would fall either to Beria or to him. And "the Hammer" may well wonder whether even his present high estate will remain with him for long.

CHAPTER XVI

Malenkov's Generals

OF THE THREE MEN who form the top of the military side of Malenkov's pyramid, only one is a professional soldier, a military commander: Marshal Georgi Zhukov. Significantly, he is not at the top. After Stalin's death he was recalled from obscurity to become Deputy War Minister, behind Bulganin who is his chief.

Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of War, First Deputy Premier, member of the Central Committee and Presidium of the Communist Party, is a true product of the Stalinist bureaucracy. He has a thatch of gray hair topping a high forehead, gray mustache and goatee, fairly pleasant expression and good looks. During the major part of his political career he has held one government or Party post after the other. He does not, and never has represented "the army," that is the officer section of the Russian ruling class. He has always represented the Party leadership, and his military assignments were Party assignments to military work.

Bulganin was born in 1895, the son of a white-collar employee. Little is known of his early life, as even Stalinist "history" writing finds it difficult to create a political past out of absolutely nothing. It is said that he joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, and took part in the civil war against the Czech and White Russian forces in Siberia. In the early years of the revolution he was active in the Cheka (secret police) at Nizhnii Novgorod, in Moscow and in Central Asia. In 1922 he was assigned to the construction department of Elektrozavod, the largest electrical-equipment plant in Russia, and later became

its manager. He received the Order of Lenin for distinguished work in the field.

Bulganin was one of "Stalin's men," one of those whom the General Secretary of the Party, via his local henchmen was picking and choosing for advancement in the Party. In 1931 Kaganovich, then the boss of the Moscow organization, elevated Bulganin to Chairman of the City Soviet. From 1933 to 1937 he was in direct charge of constructing the famous Moscow subway, first under Kaganovich and later under Khrushchev.

In 1938 he was suddenly switched to the chairmanship of the State Bank of the USSR, and with it achieved the rank of Commissar, a position in the Cabinet, and vice-premiership of the Union. It should be noted that sudden promotions and switches in that year were likely to be connected with the disappearance of predecessors into the NKVD cellars.

This was an extremely important post in the over-all direction of the Five-Year Plans. The State Bank performed a function which combines that of our own Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the major investment banks of the country combined, if we can imagine all these institutions pulling together in the development of a planned and centralized economy.

In 1939 Bulganin was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and also was a delegate to the Council of Nationalities. His first connection with the army came two years later, as the Germans approached Moscow. He was appointed Political Commissar of the armies fighting on that front under the military command of Marshals Zhukov and Timoshenko.

After the successful campaign before Moscow, he was given the military rank of Lieutenant-General, and in November 1944 was promoted to a full General of the Army. He took Voroshilov's place in the "inner war cabinet" during the same year, when the latter went out to Siberia to organize the armies which were to enter the war against Japan. Bulganin became a candidate mem-

ber of the Politburo in 1946, and succeeded Stalin as Minister of War, when the Generalissimo gave up that post two years after the war was over. It was at that time that Bulganin was made a Marshal.

Although Bulganin will be 58 years old next June, he is one of the real "self made" men of the Party. Actually, of course, this should read "made by Stalin." As a competent and ruthless Party stalwart from beginning to end, there is no question of his "representing the army" in any possible struggle for power. He represents the domination of the Party over the army. But for that very reason none of the real prestige which the army won during the war attaches to him. To add some of that prestige to the government after Stalin died another, different type of man was needed. That man is Georgi Zhukov.

Zhukov with his irregular, coarse, worried looking countenance, is and has always been an army man, a professional soldier. He was a junior commander of the Red Army during the civil war, and his whole career has been a military one since then, with no Party connections of consequence. (All top military men in Russia are members of the Party, as a matter of form.) He was one of those who survived the purge which literally decimated the officer corps during the 30's. As the most brilliant military men of the country, headed by Tukhachevsky, were executed in 1937 the Russian Army found itself decapitated when the Germans struck in '41. Stalin's military pets, Voroshilov and Budenny proved utter failures, the first in the North, the second in the South. They were both removed from active command of troops in the field. The new officer corps had to be forged in the crucible of war, at the expense of disastrous defeats, lives of millions of soldiers, and the occupation and devastation of some of the most developed parts of their country. But eventually, through the most brutal process of selection which can be imagined, a new group of competent leaders came to the top. One of them was Marshal Zhukov. He had been appointed Chief of Staff just before Hitler struck. He led the defense of Moscow, which was the first

and really mortal blow suffered by the Nazi armies. He played a major role at Stalingrad and in raising the siege of Leningrad. He took Warsaw, and commanded the armies which captured Berlin.

Together with Eisenhower and Montgomery, Zhukov sat on the Allied Control Council in Berlin during the first "honeymoon" period of the postwar era. He was a military hero of the Russian people, and the whole world had the name of Marshal Zhukov on its lips. He received invitations from America to take part in ticker-tape victory parades in our cities. He was not permitted to do so. Stalin had won the war, and he did not want anyone to get a different idea.

Shortly after the fall of Berlin, General Dwight D. Eisenhower honored Marshal Zhukov at a banquet in Frankfort. He later reported the following conversation with him:

Zhukov: "We've got some of those German synthetic oil plants that we captured over in our territory. We have repaired them but we haven't been able to get them running yet. I understand you've got some running on your side. Could some of my experts come over and see how you got yours working?"

Eisenhower: "Sure, send 'em over. We'll show 'em how to do it."

Zhukov (in a surprised tone): "You mean you don't have to ask your government?"

Eisenhower: "Of course not. Send 'em on over."

This is a good example of the degree of "independence" permitted even the outstanding leaders by the tight little clique in the Kremlin.

Instead of returning to greater honors in his own country, Georgi Zhukov was assigned to a minor military post as commander of the Odessa Military District in the South of Russia.

There he had a lot of time in which to let his head shrink back to normal size. Vasilevsky (now also Deputy Minister of War) was made Chief of Staff.

Zhukov had become too popular, and hence Stalin cut

him down. But now Malenkov's government can stand a bit of popularity. The problem is to give the generals and others high in the officer caste the feeling that their position is secure and will be honored by the new regime, without giving them too much power at the same time. *They* know that Bulganin is not their man, but the man who has been set to watch over and control them. With Zhukov up there, they may feel more at ease. And his figure is supposed to be popular among the people. But on the other hand, Malenkov and his associates have read history, and they know the role which the military forces can easily play in a dictatorship. The problem is to achieve a proper balance.

Klimenti ("Klim") Voroshilov is included in a list of generals more out of long tradition than for any other reason. The position assigned to him after Stalin's death is the most decorative, and the most powerless of all jobs in the top hierarchy.

He has replaced Nikolai Shvernik as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. Thus he becomes the ceremonial head of the country, a job which has always been held by harmless nobodies.

Except for Molotov, Voroshilov is the only genuine old Bolshevik at the top. But unlike "the Hammer," he was a complete unknown before the revolution, a provincial stalwart of the Party. Born in 1881 in the Ukraine, he went to work in a mine at the age of seven. The Party historians say that he joined the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democrats in 1903, and became the chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Lugansk during the revolution of 1905.

Like other socialist militants of all factions, he was arrested and deported several times by the Czarist police. Although he is said to have attended a couple of socialist conferences abroad before the revolution, there is nothing to indicate that Lenin or other leaders of the Party were aware of his existence until the days of the civil war.

Early in 1918 Voroshilov was sent to his home town of

Lugansk by the Party. In order to get there he had to pass through territory occupied by the German army after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Once on home ground, he organized a force of partisans who fought from armored trains. With characteristic bravado, he sent a telegram to the Central Committee: "With a force of 600 men, consisting mainly of local workers, we have set out from Lugansk to meet the German invaders. . . . We are proceeding via Rodakovo and Kharkov to Konotop. We shall give the executioners of the proletarian revolution blow for blow."

Characteristically also, he got no farther than Rodakovo, his first objective.

Voroshilov next turns up at Tsaritsyn, and it was there that he formed his unshakable alliance with Stalin, who had been sent to Tsaritsyn to organize the delivery of supplies for the cities.

Although from the point of view of the military picture as a whole Tsaritsyn was relatively unimportant, Stalin and Voroshilov decided to make a stand there against the converging White armies. They pointedly ignored orders from Trotsky, the Commander in Chief. Thus began the famous feud over "the military question." The real issue was whether the Red Army should be organized as a disciplined force under a unified command, or whether it should consist of partisan forces, more or less autonomous in character, who would decide on their own objectives and ways of carrying them out. Another element in the disagreement was over the use of officers of the Czarist army as "military technicians" in the Red Army, in view of the lack of men with experience in commanding large bodies of troops. Neither Stalin nor Voroshilov could ever forget the sharp attacks launched against them by Trotsky.

Voroshilov had a number of commands in the Civil War. He proved himself a competent divisional commander—most of the "armies" fighting in those days bore little semblance to modern large-scale operations. But until Lenin's death and the outbreak of the fight between the representatives of the bureaucracy and those of the

revolutionary tradition he did not rise very high. He was made commander of the Moscow Military District in 1924. During the following year Trotsky was replaced as War Commissar by Mikhail Frunze, an old revolutionist who had spent many years at hard labor in Siberia. Only seven months later Frunze died under somewhat suspicious circumstances. He was ordered to undergo a surgical operation by a special committee of doctors selected by the Secretariat of the Party to handle his case. His own doctors had advised him that his weak heart could not stand anasthesia.

He was succeeded by Voroshilov as Commissar of War, and at the same time "Klim" was made a full member of the Politburo without a preliminary stage as candidate.

Voroshilov was Stalin's man, and everyone knew it. He helped Molotov to crush the Zinoviev opposition in Leningrad, and was an active Stalin partisan throughout. He stood by while the flower of his army command was mowed down before his eyes in 1937. As Commissar of War he was Stalin's direct representative in the highest military echelons.

Apparently Stalin took his old friend seriously as a military commander. He had done a good administrative job in preparing and arming the Russian forces by 1941, considering the backwardness of the economy of the country. Until the army was demoralized by the purge of 1937, it had undoubtedly been built up into one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world. Under Tukhachevsky's brilliant command it was the first to develop large-scale paratroop formations, and in World War II its "Katashka" rocket-launchers pioneered in the application of these missiles in the military field.

But when the German Panzer divisions bore down on the northern front where he was placed in over-all command he proved lacking. Other generals were demoted or shot for similar failures. Stalin simply withdrew Voroshilov from command of troops, and put him to work organizing in the rear where he had real administrative and political value.

Klim Voroshilov had been replaced as Defense Commissar by Timoshenko in June, 1940, after the disasters of the first phase of the war against Finland. Now, in the new setup after his friend and protector Stalin has left the world, he no longer is connected with military affairs at all. The handsomest man among the leading group with his entirely gray hair and mustache, broad Slavic features, and straight thin line of mouth, he has been kicked upstairs to decorate what is called in the West the post of President of the Soviet Union. No one thinks of Klim as a possible factor in any future struggle for power. But his loyalty to the ruling group in Russia assures that he will do his utmost to keep things quiet, to prevent any such struggle from taking place.

PART THREE

CHAPTER XVII

What's Ahead Now?

WILL IT BE A CAT-AND-DOG FIGHT inside the Kremlin? Will the serfs and slaves of the Soviets revolt? *Does the rise of Malenkov mean war or peace for the West?*

All this is *one* question, not three.

The following has more to do with the answer than all the guesses that are being made about Malenkov's own intentions.

Tito is visiting Stalin in Moscow on the very last friendly visit he paid to the Boss before the two broke. Stalin urges the Yugoslav dictator to pull a maneuver to get around the people's growing discontent: it is nothing less than to restore ex-King Peter, whom the Communists overthrew, to the throne—

"Just for a short time," advises Stalin. "When you have used him, it is not difficult to stick a knife under his shoulder blades."

Such are the rules of power among the Soviet bureaucrats. These are the rules of power also inside the Kremlin.

If the new gang around Malenkov starts sticking knives into each other, the West will have a breathing-space in the cold war.

The rules of power among the Soviet masters do not always call for sticking knives. They sometimes call for "salami tactics."

Matthias Rakosi has explained what "salami tactics" are. He is the Stalinist fuehrer in Hungary, and he knows the rules as well as anyone. In one of the frankest articles ever written by a top Stalinist leader, he explains how his Hungarian Communist Party took power in the country

with only a tiny minority of supporters, ousting the majority Smallholders Party. Here's the heart of it:

"In March 1946 we formed the Leftist Bloc within the independent front which included the Communists, Social-Democrats, the Peasant Party and the Trade Union Congress. We demanded the elimination of the reactionary elements from the Smallholders Party, and to begin with, 21 deputies were expelled.

"After this success we adopted 'salami tactics', i.e., we kept on cutting down the power of the Smallholders Party, slice by slice, so to speak, as you do the salami . . ." (Rakosi in the February-March 1952 issue of the Budapest periodical *Tarsadalmi Szenile*.)

This is another rule of power inside the Kremlin too. The successful knife-wielder does not always stick the dagger-point *under* the shoulder blades. First he lops off limb after limb of the other fellow's power, slice after slice of his influence.

This takes time. While the salami slicer operates in the Kremlin and down through the ranks of the bureaucracy, the West will have its breathing-spell.

The scared men of the Kremlin are now jittery over two things. They are not only jittery about the danger from the people under their boots; they are jittery about each other. "Uneasy sits the crown . . ." Caesar is dead and "a Caesar has no heirs." Stalin's word may be enough to give Malenkov the inside track, but it is not enough to keep the rivals from each other's throats. The underlings who cringed at Stalin's nod are now on their own, playing for their own stakes.

An optimistic picture can be built up of imminent scrambles for power among the top Ten. It would be only half true. The West cannot count on an immediate split to disorganize the bureaucratic machine. That is for tomorrow, not today, because Malenkov and his uneasy colleagues understand all this a hundred times better than we, and they know that their main danger to themselves comes from *themselves*.

That is why their every effort right now is bent to

present a united front to the Soviet people and to the world. Their eyes must be turned inward.

This is why their very bulletins on the illness and death of Stalin were filled with warnings about "unity." Even before the Boss's death, the medical bulletins themselves, detailing Stalin's temperature and heartbeats, carried appeals for unity and a solid front.

This is why Moscow's formal announcement of Stalin's death had as much to say about "unity" as it had praise for the dead leader:

"In these sorrowful days, all the peoples of our country are rallying even closer . . .

"The steel-like unity and monolithic unity of the ranks of the party constitutes the main condition for its strength and might. Our task is to guard like the pupil of our eye the unity of the Party . . ."

Malenkov, Beria and Molotov were even forced to come out with a damning confession: they decried "dissension and panic" because of one man's death. Whose dissension, whose panic?

Another giveaway was the minute detail in which the course of Stalin's medical care was given, and in which the steps in his treatment are described. Why? Because it is widely believed that the deaths of other Soviet leaders—Zhdanov, Gorki, Ordjonikidze, Frunze and many others—were in reality inner-Kremlin assassinations. The scared men at Stalin's corpse were anxious to show that Stalin was dying a natural death.

The Yugoslav Titoists have even told the world that they—who know the rules of power in Moscow—are convinced that Stalin's body was already cold when his "illness" was announced. This is frankly a stab in the dark, not based on any direct evidence. But they may be right. The scared men might have needed at least a few days to prepare for the impact.

"We know those people," said one of Tito's righthand men. "We know them all personally and we know just what can be expected of them."

In a rigid totalitarian machine, the passing of Number

One always means a power vacuum. Conflicting cliques try to crowd into the vacuum. No one has to tell Malenkov or Beria that they can trample each other to death.

Stalin once observed that "the struggle between the old and the new, between what is dying and being born, is the basis of our development." It can also be the basis of the new gang's downfall. An immediate open struggle inside the family may release popular discontents which can end by sweeping them all away.

The order of the day becomes "Tighten our ranks!" As a result even one of Stalin's last decisions is ignored in the interest of a tighter front. Only last year, at the 19th Party Congress of the ruling party, the Politburo was abolished and party control put in the hands of a "Presidium" of 25 members and 11 alternates. One of the first acts of Malenkov was to cut this unwieldy number down to 10 members and 4 alternates.

"Panic" and disorganization is the main enemy. It is useless to go into scholarly comparisons with such events as the breakup of Genghis Khan's empire on his death: The fundamental institution of Stalinland, which cements it together under the whip, was never known to Genghis Khan. That is the Party machine, and if the Party machine remains united, Malenkov will weather it through. After that the scores can be settled among the top Ten, by the knife in the shoulder-blades or by the salami slicer.

But meanwhile the West has a breathing-space, while Malenkov repairs the fences at home and in his empire.

It is erroneous to expect Malenkov to resort to foreign adventures and aggressive actions in order to consolidate all opposition against the external foe.

There is not a single competent authority on the Russian world who believes this. The reason for this is the second factor which will determine war-or-peace for Malenkov.

In war the Soviet empire will undergo its greatest strain. This was true even before Stalin's death.

If the mere fact of Stalin's death raises the specter of "dissension and panic" before the regime, involvement in a war at this time would be fatal.

The Soviet empire is a newly won, ramshackle structure held together by terror through the use of vast resources of organized controls from above. In wartime the resources must be shifted over to a mighty effort against the military enemy. The Irish revolutionists used to say, "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity." For the people of Russia, every difficulty of the Kremlin is a chance for them to draw an easier breath.

Even within Soviet Russia, *the majority of the people are not Russians*. Fifty-four per cent belong to other nationalities, mainly living in the minority "republics" which compose the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Strictly speaking, as a matter of fact, the word "Russia" denotes only one of these republics, the biggest and dominant one among them, also known as "Great-Russia."

But 12 out of the 14 republics of the Soviet consist overwhelmingly of other peoples who traditionally hate the Great-Russians. These include Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Georgians, Moldavians, Kazakhs, etc. During the war whole republics were wiped out by Stalin because their people were deemed "unreliable." Their populations were herded into dispersion over the whole land, almost overnight. In the Ukraine we now know that when the Nazis invaded during the war, substantial sections of the population welcomed them at first, with open arms. These people learned better when the Hitlerites behaved like Hitlerites, but it was only the true face of Nazi barbarism which threw these Ukrainians back into the arms of Moscow, while still hating the Muscovite rulers.

The Ukraine is among the largest of these non-Russian republics of "Russia," and it is also the scene of the widest-scale opposition to the regime among the people. It was only some of the reactionary Ukrainian nationalists who were even willing to make common cause with

the Nazis. During the war the largest band of Ukrainian fighters for freedom took arms in hand to war against both Hitler and Stalin. This was the movement named the UPA, which stands for Ukrainian People's Army.

After the end of the war the UPA rebels continued their military action, as anti-Stalin guerrillas in the Ukrainian marshes and forests. It was not a mass army, under conditions of constant harassment by the troops of Beria, but it enjoyed virtually complete sympathy from the peasants of the countryside. In March 1950 its commander-in-chief, General Taras Chuprinka, was killed in a clash with Beria's troops.

The existence of this anti-Stalin underground resistance has been acknowledged by the authorities, who berate it as a league of "bandits." In a decree of December 30, 1949, the government called on them to quit fighting, but incidentally it also admitted that only recently "hundreds of youth" had gone underground to join their ranks.

Since about 1950, these forces have been transformed into more of a political underground than a military resistance, waiting their chance.

Malenkov—and even more his man Khrushchev, who was overlord in the Ukraine for years—knows what to expect if Moscow is embroiled directly in war with the West.

The Ukraine is not the only focus of discontent. Since the beginning of the war, nine regions of the Soviet have had to be totally liquidated by Stalin: These were:

- (1) The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.
- (2) The Crimean Autonomous Republic (Tatar population only).
- (3) The Kalmuck Autonomous Republic.
- (4) The Volga-German Autonomous Republic.
- (5) The Balkarian Autonomous Republic.
- (6) The Karachayev Autonomous District.
- (7) The Kyzlar National Region.
- (8) The Adygey Autonomous District (in this case the

district still exists, but the entire original population has been removed and replaced by Russians).

(9) The national minorities of the Taman Region.

Here is one of the questions that stares Malenkov in the face: if war breaks out, how many more republics and regions will have to be wiped out?

Look to the west of the Ukraine: between the borders of the USSR and Western Europe lie the new Russian satellites from the Balkans up to Poland. Each one is a tinder box.

During the year 1951 alone, seventy-one government and Communist leaders were purged and liquidated in these states. This "Malenkov purge" is still going on. This turmoil is going on among the loyal-Communist tops. But this Malenkov purge is only super-added to the fundamental hatred of the people.

The Eastern European people have not been "Stalinized," let alone "Malenkovized." Russian-style concentration camps dot their countries, but they are not "in hand."

Taking the year 1951 alone, here is the sort of resistance which bedevils the conquerors:

Romania: Two Soviet ammunition trains blown up south of Jassy in early June . . . A Soviet military train derailed near Feteshi in July . . . Near Copsa Mica 18 Russians were killed when another Soviet ammunition train was blown up . . . Rebellious farmers killed a militia captain and two of his men in the village of Piscul. . . .

Poland: In May President Bierut told his Communist Central Committee that "sabotage and wrecking are increasing." . . . Twice during the year the Soviet express from Moscow to Warsaw was wrecked. . . .

Czechoslovakia: Twenty-five tons of grain destroyed at Nove Zamky by saboteurs' fires . . . A resistance band seizes 100 rifles and thousands of cartridges from an arms depot near Brno. . . .

CHAPTER XVIII

War or Peace?

MALENKOV THINKS of war or peace more in terms of such rebellious ferment than in terms of the diplomatic speeches at the United Nations.

War or peace? First things first, for Malenkov. Right on the flanks of his nervous satellites is the dread example of Tito of Yugoslavia.

But we cannot kid ourselves, here in the West, that Moscow's captive empire is going to fall apart in a series of Titoist rebellions by the satellite leaders. The defection of one Tito was a terrible lesson to the Kremlin. But the push is still there behind all of the branch-office sub-fuehrers, and Malenkov will have his hands full.

Above all, he has his hands full with Mao Tse-tung's China. Is Mao an obedient puppet of the Kremlin, or is he becoming another Tito? *Neither*.

Every evidence shows that Mao, self-made dictator of Soviet China, is following a *third* course which is not either one of the two which Americans discuss so darkly. And this accounts for Mao's behavior on the death of Stalin.

The Chinese dictator has given no indication that he wants to break with Moscow. At the same time, he has *not* behaved like the other satellite leaders. He did not say "Excuse me" every time Stalin sneezed.

Mao is reaching for the status of an independent *partner* with Moscow *within* the Soviet empire.

This is exactly what Tito himself was after up to 1948. Stalin refused to concede. Yugoslavia must either bend to him or break; it broke—but not in pieces, merely away from Moscow. There is absolutely no doubt that if Stalin had been willing to go along with a partnership arrange-

ment, rather than a puppet setup, Yugoslavia would today still be a loyal member of the Soviet empire.

Mao's aim is the same. In this sense he is already "another Tito," but the Tito of pre-1948, not the Tito of today. Mao has declared his independence *within* the empire in numerous ways. Only the last was the fact that he alone, among the heads of the Soviet countries outside Russia, failed to come to Moscow on the death of Stalin and sent instead Chou En-lai, his premier. In China alone, and not in any of the Eastern European satellites, is Mao's picture carried along in parades and displayed in public places in positions as prominent as Stalin's portraits and in sizes as big as Stalin's. In China alone do the newspapers couple the names of Mao and Stalin as equals, coordinately.

Mao has already recognized Malenkov as the successor of Stalin—in *Russia*. But only in Russia. The death of Stalin will not be used by the Chinese to pull out of their alliance with Moscow. It will be used only to increase the independence of the Chinese partner of Moscow within the firm.

It will take a long time before all the portraits of Stalin in China are replaced by pictures of Malenkov!

And so Malenkov will have his hands full, but not exactly for the reason that uninformed Westerners expect. It is not a "Titoist" break by Mao that he has to fear—unless he tries to push his luck, and his demands, too hard. There will be a tug of war between Peiping and Moscow within the family.

Outside of Russia, no national Soviet leader is as powerful at home as Mao, but the same tug will be felt elsewhere in the empire. The satellite dictators also Want to Be Like Stalin—they want to be as powerful in their own countries as Stalin was in his, or as Malenkov aims to be now. They want to be dictators like Stalin *in their own right*, not puppets of a foreign dictator. They want to be "national-Stalinists."

So—does Malenkov want war or peace? There is one thing Malenkov wants first. It is power to decide himself

on such questions, with a docile Presidium behind him and a docile empire at his side. *And until he has solved this his eyes will be turned inward on the empire itself.*

At the bier of Stalin, Malenkov pledged himself to peace: "The Soviet Union protects peace, is against war and is for friendly relations with peoples. The peoples want peace. We must avert bloodshed and secure peace. We must avert war and live in peace with all countries. We consider the policy of peace among all nations is correct and proper."

The language sounds like that of a kindergarten lesson, or like a man repeating a formula by heart. The pledge, as a pledge, is as good as any by Stalin: it will be kept as long as the regime finds it in its interest to do so. More important than cheap pledges is, perhaps, that Malenkov did not use the occasion to rail against the West in the usual Soviet fashion. Still more important is that Malenkov has not got much choice about choosing between foreign adventures or internal consolidation.

Even if Malenkov were such a benighted barbarian as to think of plunging the world into war, it is doubtful if he yet has enough prestige among his fellows to carry them along. "Stalin could have decided on a war of aggression against the West," declared Boris Bajanov, Josef Stalin's private secretary at one time. "He would have been followed unhesitatingly. On the other hand, the Russians wouldn't follow Malenkov in spite of his new powers. He would have to smash serious opposition before he could start an adventure of his own."

And Malenkov has enough opposition to smash as it is, right now, without a war.

Also before Malenkov is the same big fact that faced Stalin: in today's wars, temporary military superiority in men and arms is not as decisive as industrial strength.

The Soviet bloc, including Russia, China and East Europe, probably has between nine and eleven million men in uniform. They are organized, Western experts believe, in about 400 to 600 divisions of different strength.

Of this total Russia supplies about 4,100,000 men and about 175 to 200 divisions.

The United States and its allies, including Yugoslavia, according to military expert Hanson Baldwin, may have between 8,000,000 and 9,300,000 men in uniform, organized in 170 to 200 divisions or their equivalent. But there is a big difference in the way in which the Western and Eastern armed forces are divided between land forces, sea forces and air forces. The Communist advantage in land power is partly offset by the Allied advantage in sea power. The United States alone has in commission and in reserve a fleet as big as the rest of the world combined; and the world's second sea power is Great Britain.

That leaves the air forces. And this has been Malenkov's personal special field of concentration for some years.

Asher Lee, a British authority, wrote in *The Soviet Air Force* that Malenkov was Stalin's "principal aide on air matters in the Politburo." *Fortune* magazine (February 1953) credits him with being the "overlord of Soviet aviation."

Stalin once described artillery as "the god of war," and in the Second World War, the Russian army was unusual in its lavish use of massed artillery on every possible occasion. But there is reason to believe that under Malenkov's direction the Soviet "god of war" has shifted—to aviation.

Malenkov will want more time to continue the job he started under Stalin. In looking ahead, whether toward war or (for a while) peace, the West has to keep its eye on what happens to the airplane in Soviet industry.

In quantity, but not necessarily in quality, the Soviet air forces today represent the world's biggest single pool of national air power. This is where its greatest effort has lain since Malenkov took over the job. The MIG-15 was developed under Malenkov's direction. It went into production only in 1948, and by 1950 its production was

soaring. The current output of the MIG-15 is estimated to be about 5000 a year.

It was Malenkov who was also responsible for building up the Soviet long-range air-force arm, the *Aviatsiya Dalnevo Deystviya* or ADD. Its buildup started under Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov a decade ago, but Golovanov's name has not been mentioned in the Soviet press for years. ADD has now been built up to a strength of about 1000 planes of the Tu-4 type.

If artillery was Stalin's favorite, aviation is Malenkov's god. But above both idols is the power that stands behind every arm of the military—the industry to produce the weapons. Malenkov knows that the Russian bloc is far behind the West in this respect. The paradox is: Few people doubt that the Russians could begin by overwhelming Europe up to the Pyrenees. On the other hand, probably few Russians doubt that in the long pull of a hard exhausting war, the Soviet empire could not keep industrial pace with the West.

This brings us back full-circle: the problem of war and peace for Malenkov goes right back to the strengths and weaknesses of his economic and social system, where it is most vulnerable.

The Soviets lash their people: "Produce! Produce! Catch up with and surpass the decadent democracies of the West!" And the harder they lash, the more the hatred of the people mounts under them.

This inactive but live volcano under the Kremlin is the biggest force for peace in the world.

Multitudes filed past the bier of the departed dictator, but anyone who ever witnessed a great parade in Red Square knows how little such shows mean. They are not spontaneous expressions but staged spectacles in which the marchers are compelled to take part. Of course, there were some tear-stained faces. But those who were overjoyed by Stalin's death could scarcely show it in public. President Eisenhower, almost alone among statesmen, used the occasion to address a message to the Russian people over the heads of their masters. It was a wise

and understanding move. He made it clear that Americans look to them, despite the Kremlin, to safeguard "peace and comradeship" in the world. The internal enemies of the regime who seem to alarm Malenkov and his brethren are potentially our allies. If psychological warfare means anything, it means that we must let the Russian peoples know that our quarrel is not with them but with their overlords. The end of Stalin has unquestionably created an emergency for his successors. The awe he inspired, the prestige he commanded, were brakes on internal opposition. Now those brakes have been released. The consequences of this fact, though not immediately apparent, may prove far-reaching, especially if we capitalize on it. Our opportunity is to exploit this favorable interval to convince the intimidated Soviet population that their Red regime is not invincible, that its self-anointed demigods have feet of clay. We must convey to the Soviet masses our friendship for them as distinct from their tormentors. There can be no effective resistance to tyranny without hope and a sense of powerful allies. That tremendous forces of opposition are at work in the satellite areas is clear enough from the way Bulgaria and Albania rushed to take special security measures as soon as Stalin died. Our job is to foster and fortify those forces, from Titoist deviations to all-out anti-communism.

Never since Moscow launched its cold war have we had a more favorable climate for seizing the initiative.



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